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SUMMARY
In this thesis, we analyze the impact of the decentralization of price and leadtime
decisions made by the marketing and production departments, respectively, in a make-to-
order firm. We first study a monopoly environment, and find that in the decentralized
setting, the total demand generated is larger, leadtimes are longer, quoted prices are lower,
and the firm profits are lower as compared to the centralized setting. We show that coor-
dination can be achieved using a transfer price contract with bonus payments, where both
departments receive a fraction of the total revenues generated as a bonus payment. In the
second study, we extend this work to a duopoly environment, where two firms compete on
the basis of their price and leadtime quotes in a common market. We find that under in-
tense price competition, firms may suffer from a decentralized structure, particularly under
high flexibility induced by high capacity, where revenue based sales incentives motivate
sales/marketing for more aggressive price cuts resulting in eroding margins.
We take the parameters of the demand models in the first two studies as constant, while
estimating those parameters based on historical data is a very important problem in prac-
tice. In the last study of this thesis, we address the challenges encountered in estimating the
price sensitivity of customers shifting focus to the passenger travel industry. We explore
how to obtain better price elasticity estimates through an empirical study with an emphasis
on the endogeneity problem, which arises as a result of the simultaneous determination of
supply and demand. We show that if one does not account for endogeneity, price elas-
ticities may induce an upward-sloping demand curve suggesting that high price produces
high demand, or may be biased downward to the extent that elastic demand curves are in-





Recent business trends and advances in consumer behavior modeling have shown that de-
mand for goods and services, and in turn, the profits of the companies, are shaped by not
only inventory policies and capacity allocation but also by price and leadtime decisions.
Quoting the right price and the reliable leadtime to match supply and demand is especially
important as many companies move from a make-to-stock to a make-to-order model to
satisfy their customers’ unique needs. There are numerous examples of companies, which
lost significant amount of money due to pricing and leadtime decisions. Mercedes-Benz
underestimated customers’ willingness to pay when it first introduced SLC roadster in the
early 1990s. As a result, it received more orders than it could fulfill within a reasonable
leadtime. Over time, Mercedes-Benz gained more information about how much customers
value its cars and substantially increased the price to align demand and capacity [38]. A
well-known example for quoting reliable leadtimes is the case of seven online e-tailers,
including Macys.com, Toysrus.com and CDNOW, that paid fines totaling $1.5 million to
settle a Federal Trade Commission lawsuit over late deliveries made during the 1999 hol-
iday season. The e-tailers promised delivery dates when fulfillment was not possible and
failed to notify customers when shipments would be late.
Ideally, a firm should take a global perspective and coordinate its decisions on price
and leadtime quotation for increased profitability. In reality, however, different divisions
of large companies all too often fail to communicate on important business decisions [65].
Moreover, each function behaves to maximize its own interests, and assumes that this will
also lead to maximization of the overall profit. Narayanan and Raman ([91]) point out that
this assumption is in fact wrong and emphasize the importance of aligning the incentives of
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different functions: “Supply chains extend across several functions and many companies,
each of which has its own priorities and goals. Yet all those functions and firms must pull in
the same direction to ensure that supply chains deliver goods and services quickly and cost-
effectively... If a company aligns the incentives of the firms in its supply chain, everyone
will make higher profits.”
Quoting the right prices to maximize revenue and leadtimes to ensure reliable deliv-
ery involves the decisions and actions of both marketing and manufacturing functions of a
company. These functions may be different companies within a supply chain or different
profit centers within the same company. In many companies, manufacturing is evaluated
based on costs and operational efficiency while marketing is evaluated based on revenue and
volume [6]. Misalignment of incentives usually imply decentralization of price, leadtime
and capacity decisions. While several studies have noted improvements in business per-
formance when marketing and manufacturing divisions work together [93, 78, 55], studies
that measure the impact of the decentralization of price and leadtime decisions and sug-
gest coordination mechanisms are lacking. This is important since depending on market
conditions and its current workload, the firm may find it more profitable to offer customers
shorter leadtimes at the expense of higher prices or vice versa. In this thesis, we analyze
the impact of the decentralization of price and leadtime decisions for a make-to-order firm
under a monopoly in Chapter 2 and a duopoly in Chapter 3. We model firm operations as
an M/M/1 queue, and develop uniform delivery time guarantees. The marketing depart-
ment makes pricing decisions to maximize its revenue, while production makes leadtime
decisions with cost and delivery reliability concerns. Customer demand is modeled by a
linear function that is decreasing in the quoted price and leadtime.
In Chapter 2, we find that in the decentralized setting, the total demand generated is
larger, leadtimes are longer, quoted prices are lower, and the firm profits are lower as com-
pared to the centralized setting. We explore coordination mechanisms and examine their
robustness to estimation errors in the problem parameters. We also provide insights on the
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sensitivity of the optimal decisions with respect to market characteristics, sequence of deci-
sions, and the firm’s capacity level. We show that a decentralized setting with marketing as
the leader would dominate one with production as the leader. In Chapter 3, we extend this
work to a competitive environment, where two firms compete on the basis of their uniform
delivery time guarantees and prices in a common market. Under this environment, a firm’s
generated demand is not only sensitive to its own quoted price and leadtime, but also to its
competitor’s price and leadtime. We explore if and when decentralization dominates cen-
tralization under competition. We model this problem as a two-stage game, where in the
first stage, firms simultaneously choose their organizational structures so as to operate in a
centralized or decentralized structure, and in the second stage, they simultaneously choose
their price and lead-time decisions. We find that under intense price competition, where the
intensity is characterized by the underlying parameters of market demand, firms may suffer
from a decentralized structure, particularly under high flexibility induced by high capacity,
where revenue based sales incentives motivate sales/marketing for more aggressive price
cuts resulting in eroding margins. Particularly, when price competition is more intense than
lead-time competition in the market, a centralized organizational structure is dominant for
both firms in the duopoly.
We take the parameters of the demand models in Chapters 2 and 3 as constants, while
estimating those parameters based on historical data is a very important problem in prac-
tice. Therefore, in Chapter 4, we address the problems encountered in estimating the price
sensitivity of the customers in a revenue management context. We move our focus from
a manufacturing/retail setting to the passenger travel industry, as market response models
have been widely studied in retail industries, while studies in passenger travel contexts
are lacking especially at a product level under availability controls dictated by revenue
management systems. Over the past few years, the passenger travel industry has been
transformed by the increasing availability of low-cost carriers/high-speed train services
and customers becoming more conscious of low prices through the visibility offered by the
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internet [60, 22]. Thus, carriers tend to decrease the range of restrictions and offer a lim-
ited number of differentiated products. In this new environment, besides setting protection
levels or bid-price controls for booking classes, revenue management systems need to be
able to generate "what-if" scenarios, i.e., price-sensitive forecasts by departure date that
indicate the expected level of demand across a range of possible price points. In order to
better serve this purpose, accurate estimation of the price sensitivity of customers plays an
important role.
In Chapter 4, we explore how to obtain better price sensitivity estimates through an em-
pirical study based on the data of an international high speed rail operator. We particularly
focus on the endogeneity problem, which arises as a result of the simultaneous determina-
tion of supply and demand. When carriers observe or anticipate high demand, they often
react by raising their prices, which results in high price-high demand and low price-low
demand pairs in the data. We show that if one does not account for endogeneity, price elas-
ticities may induce an upward-sloping demand curve suggesting that high price produces
high demand, or may be biased downward to the extent that elastic demand curves are in-




COORDINATION OF MARKETING AND PRODUCTION FOR
PRICE AND LEAD-TIME DECISIONS
2.1 Introduction
In many firms, manufacturing is evaluated as a cost center that seeks lower costs and oper-
ational efficiency, while marketing is evaluated as a revenue center with control over price
and other marketing elements [6, 63]. However, this is not necessarily an effective strategy.
Dividing a firm into independent units for measuring performance on accounting terms
may lead to misaligned incentives and suboptimal system performance [93]. Malhotra and
Sharma ([78]) emphasize the need to align the manufacturing and marketing incentives
with the firm’s goals and objectives. Hausman et al. ([55]) empirically demonstrate that
business performance is enhanced when manufacturing and marketing work together for
goal attainment.
The two prominent aspects of customer service, namely, price and lead-time, involve
the decisions and actions of both departments. Shapiro ([110]) identifies lead-times and
cost control as two marketing/manufacturing areas of “necessary cooperation but potential
conflict" among others. Dr. Karl Kempf, Intel Fellow and Director of Decision Tech-
nologies in Intel’s Technology and Manufacturing Group, reports that different divisions of
large companies all too often fail to communicate on important business decisions: “I have
lost count of the number of times the sales and marketing guys have made a price move on
a particular product only to find that manufacturing capacity fungibility is not what they
expected and to capture the increased demand for the target product required cannibaliza-
tion of a number of other products - it is not uncommon for this kind of problem to have a
$100M negative impact overall (prior discussion could have minimized the impact)" [65].
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Former Kozmo.com manager John C. Wu addresses the strategic importance of coordi-
nated marketing and operations [137]. Kozmo.com was a web retailer that promised to
deliver every order within an hour. Low prices were offered to attract customers despite the
high fulfillment costs incurred as a result of their service commitment. Not surprisingly,
Kozmo.com went out of business. According to AMR Research, companies on the leading
edge of price management achieve their success by a centralized pricing function and the
adjustment of sales incentives to include margin, not just volume [104].
In this chapter, we study the impact of the decentralization of the marketing and pro-
duction departments of a make-to-order (MTO) firm, where pricing decisions are made by
the marketing department and lead-time decisions by the production department. Although
a shorter lead-time may attract more customers and generate more demand, it puts pressure
on the firm’s production resources. On the other hand, customers might be willing to wait
longer if they are offered lower prices. Therefore, depending on market conditions and its
current workload, the firm may find it more profitable to offer customers shorter lead-times
at the expense of higher prices or vice versa. To capture the trade-off between price and
lead-time, we model the demand as a function of both the price and lead-time sensitivity of
the customer. Under the decentralized setting, given their incentives (objective functions)
production chooses a lead-time subject to a service level constraint for reliable delivery,
while marketing chooses a price. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game with
two alternative decision making sequences, where production is the leader and marketing
is the follower in the first setting, and marketing is the leader and production is the follower
in the second setting. We address the following research questions:
1. What are the inefficiencies that result from the decentralization of price and lead-time
decisions as quoted by marketing and production, respectively?
2. How can we design a coordination scheme that will align the incentives of marketing
and production with the firm’s overall objectives?
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3. What is the impact of different market characteristics, decision-making sequences
and capacity on the optimal decisions and overall profitability?
Our model where production and marketing/sales make the lead-time and price deci-
sions, respectively, applies to several industries, especially to established production sys-
tems where the capacity is fixed.1 In practice, even if the lead-time quote is communicated
to the customers via sales/marketing (along with the price quote), the main input (or deci-
sion) about the lead-time quote usually comes from production. On the other hand, as the
leader, marketing can influence production’s lead-time decision via its price decision based
on the potential demand to be generated, before communicating the quote to the customer.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. We begin by presenting a summary of
the relevant literature. In Section 2.3, we discuss our model assumptions and introduce
notation. We start our analysis with a centralized setting, where price and lead-time de-
cisions are made by a single decision maker. We next present the decentralized settings,
where marketing chooses the price and production chooses the lead-time according to their
individual objectives. We compare the centralized and decentralized settings and analyze
the sensitivity of the optimal decisions to problem parameters. In Section 2.4, we present
a transfer price contract with bonus payments that provide the right incentives to both de-
partments in order to achieve the centralized solution. In Section 2.5, we provide insights
on including capacity as a decision variable. Section 2.6 concludes with a summary of
insights.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two streams of research related to our work: (i) due-date management, and (ii) the
marketing/production interface. For an extensive review on due-date management policies,
1There have been some examples in practice where marketing made lead-time decisions without con-
sultations from production, but such practices have resulted in unsatisfied customers and significant losses
for the firm. For example, Kirk Drummond, chief information officer of a leading food services and prod-
ucts provider Sysco, reports of situations where salespeople brought in huge last minute orders for next-day
fulfillment without any advance warning to operations [61].
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see [66]. Several researchers study the due date quotation problem taking into account
shop-floor congestion at the time an order is placed and consider scheduling/sequencing
decisions [44, 43]. Elhafsi and Rolland ([44]) consider a MTO manufacturing system,
which consists of several processing centers that are subject to failures and repairs. Their
model takes into account the congestion level of the shop floor at the time the order is placed
in order to quote a delivery date within a prespecified time window with the minimum
operating cost. They consider two types of customers as time-sensitive and cost-sensitive.
Elhafsi ([43]) extends this work by introducing two options for each customer class: partial
deliveries allowed and not allowed. In order to quote short and reliable lead-times to an
upcoming order, service level constraints are applied such as the percentage of orders filled
on-time or job tardiness [116, 59]. Spearman and Zhang ([116]) examine the problem of
minimizing the average lead-time in a multi-stage production system. They consider two
types of service level constraints as the fraction of tardy jobs, and the average job tardiness.
Hopp and Sturgis ([59]) study the same problem subject to a target service level as the
percent of orders filled on-time using a control chart method. Some of the studies consider
order selection decisions, where the probability that an arriving customer places an order
decreases as the quoted lead-time increases [41, 40]. Duenyas and Hopp ([41]) study this
problem under first-come-first-serve (FCFS) and other scheduling policies where the lead-
time is dictated by the market and where firms are able to compete on the basis of lead-time.
Duenyas ([40]) extends this work to multiple customer classes with different net revenues
and lead-time preferences. The firm incurs a penalty for an order not filled on time. Finally,
a small number of papers consider price and lead-time decisions simultaneously [42, 87,
86, 101, 132, 26, 134, 27].
More relevant to our work are the papers that consider price and lead-time decisions
simultaneously in steady-state. Palaka et al. ([95]) study a firm, where customer demand
is treated as linear in the quoted price and lead-time. Firm operations are modelled as an
M/M/1 queue with FCFS sequencing. The objective is to maximize revenues less total
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variable production costs, congestion related costs and lateness penalty costs subject to a
service level constraint, which specifies the minimum probability of meeting the quoted
lead-time. The authors show the impact of changing parameter values on the optimal deci-
sions of a firm and discuss the robustness of firm profits to misestimation of the parameters.
So and Song ([114]) use the log-linear Cobb-Douglas demand function to model the de-
mand in a similar setting, but do not include congestion or lateness penalty costs in the
objective function. Boyaci and Ray ([21]) extend the previous two models to the case of
two substitutable products for which dedicated capacities are allocated. Finally, Ray and
Jewkes ([105]) study a variant of the linear customer demand model in [95] by treating
price as a function of lead-time. These papers develop uniform delivery time guarantees as
opposed to quoting a lead-time to each upcoming order with regard to the current state of
the system, which constitutes a major distinction from the first set of papers mentioned.
In this chapter, we model customer demand as a linear function of price and lead-
time as in [95], but we only consider variable production costs as in [114]. The desirable
properties of the linear demand function are discussed in [95]. One desirable property is
that the price elasticity of demand is increasing in both price and lead-time. The lead-time
elasticity is higher at higher prices and quoted lead-times. Another desirable property is the
separability of price and lead-time, which reflects customers’ perception of time and money
as substitutes. While previous papers assume a centralized decision maker controlling price
and lead-time, our main contribution is in demonstrating the inefficiencies that result when
price and lead-time are quoted by two independent functions within a firm. We show
that a transfer price contract with bonus payments motivates marketing and production
to generate higher profits with an efficient output that matches the centralized solution. Our
results for the centralized setting, which we use as a benchmark, are consistent with those
found in [95]. However, we provide a more detailed analysis on pricing decisions.
The second stream of research concentrates on the joint decision making of the mar-
keting and operations functions of a firm. For an early review of marketing and production
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coordination, the reader is referred to [46]. Several of the papers in this stream focus on
pricing and/or replenishment decisions [45, 35, 84, 102, 67, 69, 73, 53]; however, they do
not consider lead-time decisions. Eliashberg and Steinberg ([45]) and Kumar et al. ([69])
study a distribution channel in a multi-period deterministic demand setting, where the man-
ufacturer has to decide on the production and inventory quantities and the price to be quoted
to the distributor. There is decentralization in the marketing and production functions of the
distributor in [69] as different from [45], where the marketing department makes pricing de-
cisions to maximize its profits while the production function makes procurement decisions
from the manufacturer to minimize inventory and processing costs. Customer demand is
modeled as a linear function of the distributor’s selling price. Gupta and Weerawat ([53])
study variants of revenue sharing contracts for a manufacturer, whose revenues depend on
order delays, to influence the replenishment decisions of its supplier. The selling price and
the demand rate are assumed to be exogenous, and the operational decision variable is the
inventory level. Li and Atkins ([73]) compare different scenarios for the decision mak-
ing structure in a firm in a newsvendor setting, where marketing is the dominant function,
production is the dominant function, or both have equal power. Dewan and Mendelson
([35]) and Mendelson and Whang ([84]) develop optimal pricing schemes in a queueing
setting for aligning the objectives of user departments that compete for capacity taking into
account user delay costs and capacity costs. Porteus and Whang ([102]) and Kouvelis and
Lariviere ([67]) use internal market mechanisms in a newsvendor setting for manufacturing
capacity where optimal incentive plans are derived to induce system-optimal actions from
marketing and manufacturing via principal-agent theory. The selling price is exogenous in
the first paper, and modeled with an inverse demand function in the latter.
Some of the work in this area consider coordination issues for other types of decisions.
De Groote ([33]) studies a firm, where the marketing department selects the optimal design
of product variety, while the manufacturing department decides on the process flexibility.
Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj ([6]) model a duopoly in which firms with decentralized
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marketing and manufacturing functions with conflicting objectives compete on the basis of
price and quality. [47], [28], [56] and [112] study the lead-time quotation problem within
the marketing/operations interface. However, they do not consider pricing decisions. A
recent paper by Liu et al. ([74]) considers price and lead-time decisions in a two-firm
setting; a supplier and a retailer within a supply chain, where the supplier also needs to
choose the transfer price. In contrast to our focus on evaluating marketing as a revenue
center and production as a cost center, they focus on the inefficiencies that result from the
double marginalization in the supply chain. Although they find that decentralization leads
to lower profits as we do, since the decentralized structures in the two papers are different,
they show that under the decentralized setting prices are higher, lead-times are shorter and
demand is lower, which is exactly the opposite of what we find in our study. Moreover,
they do not consider coordinating mechanisms, whereas we show that coordination in our
setting can be achieved through a transfer price contract with bonus payments. In this
respect, our work is the first to study marketing and production coordination for price and
lead-time decisions.
2.3 The Model
We consider a firm that serves customers in an MTO fashion. Capacity is assumed to be
constant, while price and lead-time are decision variables. We include capacity as a deci-
sion variable in Section 2.5. It has been shown in the literature that for high service levels
the tail of the waiting time distribution is approximated well by the exponential distribution
even for a G/G/s queue [114]. Thus, the firm’s operations are modeled as an M/M/1 queue
with mean production rate, µ, and mean arrival rate, λ. We refer to the mean production
rate, µ, as the capacity of the system. Subscript C denotes the centralized setting, while
subscripts P and M denote the decentralized setting with production as the leader and mar-
keting as the leader, respectively. We use the following notation throughout the text:
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Parameters:
a : maximum attainable demand (market potential) corresponding to zero price and zero
lead-time
b : price sensitivity of demand
c : lead-time sensitivity of demand
m : unit production cost
µ : capacity of the production system (service rate)
s : service level defined as the probability of meeting the quoted lead-time
k : used for computational simplicity, k = ln(1/(1 − s))
Decision Variables
p j : price quoted by the marketing department ( j = C, P,M)
L j : lead-time quoted by the production department ( j = C, P,M)
D(p, L) : expected demand generated by the quoted price p and quoted lead-time L
λ j : mean arrival (demand) rate ( j = C, P,M)





: profit achieved by the marketing and production departments, respectively
r : incentive per unit offered to the production department for positive demand
w : transfer price charged per unit by production to marketing
α1, α2 : the fraction of revenue offered to marketing and production as a bonus payment,
respectively
K : unit capacity cost (to be used in Section 2.5).
Our model assumptions are as follows:
A1. There are no holding or lateness penalty costs; there is a variable production cost.
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A2. Expected demand rate, D(p, L), is linear in price, p, and lead-time, L:
D(p, L) = a − bp − cL
where b > 0 and c > 0.
A3. (Positive Demand Assumption) There is positive demand for the firm to provide
its services when the smallest reasonable price, m, and the shortest lead-time that
satisfies the service level constraint, (k/µ), are chosen: D (m, (k/µ)) = a−bm−ck/µ >
0. Note that if this assumption is not satisfied, the firm can never generate positive
profits, and hence, the problem becomes trivial.
A4. All the parameters of the system are common knowledge to marketing and production.
2.3.1 The Centralized Setting (Model C)
In the centralized setting, the marketing and production decisions are considered simulta-
neously with the objective of maximizing profit.
max
(λC ,pC ,LC )≥0
λC (pC − m)
s.t. 1 − e−(µ−λC )LC ≥ s (1)
λC ≤ a − bpC − cLC (2)
λC ≤ µ (3)
Constraint (1) states that the probability of meeting the quoted lead-time should be at
least as large as the required service level. Constraint (2) ensures that the mean demand rate
served by the firm does not exceed the demand generated by the quoted price and lead-time.
Constraint (3) is the stability condition.
The optimal solution is identified by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal demand generated under the centralized setting is given by the
unique root of fC (λC ), i.e., fC (λ
∗
C




) = (a − 2λ∗
C
− mb)(µ − λ∗
C
)2 − ckµ (4)
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These results are a special case of those found in [95] for the fixed capacity case, when
there are no holding or lateness costs.
2.3.2 The Decentralized Setting, Production Leader (Model P)
In this section, we consider the case where the production and marketing departments op-
erate in a decentralized setting making their decisions based on individual incentives. We
model the sequence of decisions as a Stackelberg game, where production moves first and
chooses a lead-time that maximizes its profit subject to the service level constraint. Market-
ing observes this lead-time decision before quoting price with the objective of maximizing
its own profit. We assume initially that no production-related costs are incurred by the mar-
keting department. Hence, the objective function of marketing is given by the revenue of
the firm.







= pP(a − bpP − cLP)











(LP) = a − bp
∗
P
(LP) − cLP (5)
The optimal demand, λ∗
P




tion’s lead-time decision is then used in production’s problem. The cost term of produc-
tion’s objective function reflects the cost incurred by the firm. However, one should note
that if this was solely a cost minimization problem, production would quote the longest pos-
sible lead-time, which satisfies the service level constraint driving demand to zero. There-



















LP ≥ k (7)
In order to generate strictly positive demand, r would range from m ≤ r ≤ p∗
P
, given
the linearly decreasing structure of π
PR
P
in LP . A reasonable incentive that we choose is
r = p∗
P
(LP), which turns production’s problem into the firm’s overall problem in the decen-
tralized setting. Note that this objective function is consistent with the concept of creating
pseudo-profit centers within the firm, i.e., associating revenues artificially with cost centers,
as discussed in [93].
Proposition 2 The optimal solution to the decentralized setting, P, is given by:






















2c , and the firm will be selling at cost.
Proposition 2 states that there is a minimum capacity requirement, µ > µ0, for the pro-
duction department to generate positive profits under this decentralized setting. Long lead-
times under restricted capacity motivate marketing to quote low prices in order to maximize
its profit, which may not be sufficient to cover production costs. Therefore, in order for pro-
duction not to drive demand to zero, the price quoted by marketing needs to be at least as
large as the unit production cost. Note that, in practice, this would correspond to misaligned
incentives leading to suboptimal performance.
2.3.3 The Decentralized Setting, Marketing Leader (Model M)
Under this setting, marketing moves first and chooses a price that maximizes its revenue.
Observing this price, production quotes a lead-time with the objective of maximizing its
profit subject to the service level constraint. We start with production’s problem and offer
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= πM = (pM − m)(a − bpM − cLM ) (8)
s.t.
(
µ − (a − bpM − cLM )
)
LM ≥ k (9)
As the objective function is linearly decreasing in LM , Constraint (9) is tight at optimality,




(a − bpM − µ) +
√
(a − bpM − µ)2 + 4ck
2c
(10)










As long as the unique maximizer of π
MR
M
over the interval [0, (aµ−ck)/bµ] is at least m, then
we can characterize the optimal solution by the following proposition. Otherwise, the firm
will be selling at cost.
Proposition 3 The optimal demand under decentralized setting M is given by the unique








)2 − ckµ (11)













2.3.4 Comparison of the Decentralized and Centralized Settings
In this section, we discuss the inefficiencies due to decentralization of pricing and lead-time
decisions and compare the centralized and decentralized settings.
Proposition 4 The optimal decisions of the centralized setting (C) and the decentralized



























As long as it is given a positive margin, production quotes the tightest reliable lead-time
given its available capacity and the required service level. As marketing’s incentive is based
on revenue irrespective of the production costs, it is motivated to create more demand than
the centralized firm, which requires longer lead-times and lower prices.
When marketing is the follower in the decentralized firm (P), it responds to longer
lead-times by decreasing prices, as it can be seen from its best response function (Equa-
tion (5)), which creates a large volume of demand but also high production costs. On the
other hand, in M, marketing can anticipate production’s best response as the leader, where
production quotes lower lead-times to higher prices (Equation (10)). Thus, marketing can
choose a higher price to motivate production to satisfy as much demand as possible without
increasing lead-times significantly.
Proposition 5 In a decentralized setting, highest revenues are generated when marketing
is the leader, while highest volume is generated when production is the leader. The firm
would prefer having marketing rather than production as the leader for generating more
profits and quoting higher prices and lower lead-times in a decentralized setting.
The aggressive response of marketing in P results in the highest volume among all three
settings. However, low prices are not sufficient to make up for the high production costs,
and this setting generates the lowest profits. When marketing is the leader (M), its influence
on production helps to achieve highest revenues. However, costs also increase and overall,
lower profits are generated as compared to the centralized setting. Thus, our analysis shows
that employing a revenue or volume-based incentive mechanism for marketing does not
lead to optimal profits. Note that the dominance of the decentralized setting with marketing
as leader over the one with production as the leader is consistent with the findings in [73],
where marketing and production make pricing and replenishment decisions, respectively,
and misalignment of incentives within the firm can be mitigated through having marketing
as the dominant function. However, in our case we see that the two functions can still not
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achieve the centralized solution without a coordinating mechanism. Even when there are
no capacity restrictions and no service level constraints, the profit difference between the
centralized and decentralized solutions is m
2b
4 , i.e., constant.




 , and the optimal profit π
∗
 to problem
parameters for the centralized and decentralized settings is given in Table 1 assuming that
the problem parameters are such that p∗
M
> m and p∗
P
> m. For most cases, it can be seen
from Table 1 that the direction of change in the optimal decisions and profit is independent
of the decision-making paradigm (i.e., centralized or decentralized). The cases where the
behavior of the optimal price (and profit for M) changes conditionally are indicated by a
“?". We demonstrate these conditions analytically or numerically further in the text.
Table 1: Sensitivity analysis on optimal decisions and profit

























a↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
b↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ - - ↘ ↘ - - ↘ ↘
c↗ ↘ ↘ ? ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘ ? ?
m↗ ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ - - - ↘ - - - ↘
s↗ ↘ ↗ ? ↘ ↘ ↗ ↘ ↘ ↘ ↗ ? ?
µ↗ ↗ ↘ ? ↗ ↗ ↘ ↗ ↗ ↗ ↘ ? ?
Observation 1 In the decentralized settings, the quoted lead-time is not affected by a
change in b or m as long as production receives a positive margin, given marketing’s best
response in price. As marketing does not consider production costs, the optimal price is
independent of a change in m. Moreover, an increase in b is met by a decrease in the quoted
price. Thus, the generated demand is not affected by a change in b or m.
We next discuss the cases where the behavior of the optimal price (and profit for M)
changes conditionally. In all numerical demonstrations, we use a = 50, b = 4 c = 4 m =
5 µ = 25 and s = 0.95 unless otherwise stated.
Figures 1 (i) and 2 (i) show a comparison of the profits and prices, respectively, under
C, P and M at different capacity levels. We observe that for low-medium capacity levels, M
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(i) (b = 4) (ii) (b = 2) (iii) (b = 6)
Figure 1: Comparison of Profits at Different Capacities
performs very close to C, while as the capacity increases, M deviates from C and converges
to P. Under P, at low capacities production quotes long lead-times to which marketing
responds with low prices, and up to a certain capacity level, the firm sells at cost and makes
no profit. As more capacity becomes available, marketing responds to shorter lead-times by
increasing prices and the profits also increase. Under M, marketing chooses a higher price
as compared to P, anticipating production’s response under tight capacity as the leader. As
capacity increases, production can quote lower lead-times and more demand can be met.
Thus, marketing’s response as the leader gets closer to its response as the follower, which
results in lower prices and profits as compared to the centralized setting. From Figure 2 (i),
we can see that higher capacity does not necessarily result in charging higher under C or
M. Price increases in µ up to a certain point in order to quote shorter lead-times within a
tight capacity interval. As capacity increases, lower prices are quoted to increase demand.
However, decentralization results in a sharper decrease in the quoted price. Note that price
stabilizes as it approaches the unconstrained solution, i.e., a+mb2b for C and
a
2b for M under
ample capacity, which is reached at (a − mb) for C and a for M.
Observation 2 Higher capacity results in higher flexibility and higher profits for a cen-
tralized firm. However, higher capacity does not necessarily result in higher profits for a
decentralized firm.
In Figures 1 (ii) and (iii), we explore the effect of b on the deviation of the decentralized




is very similar to the optimality equation for λ∗
C
(Equation (4)), but is independent of m and
b. The optimal demand under P is also not affected by a change in m or b. Thus, we expect
the deviation in profits to decrease as m and/or b decreases. A decrease in m alleviates
the adverse effect of low prices on margin, while a decrease in b motivates marketing for
less aggressive price cuts. In Figure 1(ii), we observe that at a lower b, M tracks C more
closely, and the gap between the centralized and both decentralized settings decreases as
the capacity increases. On the other hand, when b increases in Figure 1(iii), the firm needs
to sell at cost for all capacity levels when production is the leader, while positive profit
can be obtained within a tight capacity interval when marketing becomes the leader. We
observe similar results when m changes rather than b. In summary, when marketing is
the leader, the profit difference from the centralized solution may not be significant under
tight capacity and when b and/or m is low. The following proposition summarizes the


























































(i) (c = 4, s = 0.95) (ii)(µ = 8, s = 0.95) (iii)(µ = 8, c = 4)
Figure 2: Price vs. Capacity, Lead-time Sensitivity and Service Level (Low Capacity)
behavior of the optimal price, p∗i , with respect to lead-time sensitivity, c, and service level,






3 , a − xi
)
as medium and µ ≥ (a − xi) as high for i = C, M.
Proposition 6 When µ ∈
(
a−xi
3 , a − xi
)
, i.e., capacity is medium,
(i) p∗i increases in c up to a threshold, c
0













(ii) p∗i increases in s up to a threshold, s
0
i , and then decreases, where s
0





















3 , a − xi
)
, i.e., capacity is low or high, p∗i decreases in c and in s.
Note that low, medium, and high capacities are defined with respect to the market potential
for both C and M, but also depend only on the unit production cost and price sensitivity
for C. Under high capacity, lead-times are already low and price is decreased to capture
more demand as c or s increases, although the change is relatively minor. At low capacity
levels, it is not possible to shorten the lead-time further as c increases, while longer lead-
times are required as s increases. Thus, the firm needs to decrease its quoted price in order
to attract customers. From Figures 2 (ii) and (iii), we can see that under “low" capacity
the price decrease under M is more aggressive than under C and the gap between the two
settings increases as c or s increases. At medium capacity levels, quoted price under C and
M increases in c and s up to a threshold, where µ is sufficient for charging a higher price
for better service. However, beyond this point, the quoted lead-time can only be decreased
slightly in c, and has to be increased sharply in s, given the capacity. Thus, the quoted




is beyond the feasible
range for s or c, respectively, given the parameters of the system, we may only observe an
increasing behavior in price. This contradicts with the result found in [114] for the fixed
capacity case, which states that a higher service level implies a lower price.
Observation 3 When marketing is the leader, the decentralized firm may experience an
increase in profits at medium capacity levels as the lead-time sensitivity or the service level
increases.
We demonstrate this observation in Figure 3 comparing the three settings for quoted prices
and profits. For the centralized firm, prices are relatively stable. Thus, the price increase is
less effective than the decrease in the generated demand as c or s increases, and the profits
decrease. On the other hand, under M, as marketing is evaluated based on revenue, price
increase may be more effective than the demand decrease, and the decentralized firm may
benefit from higher service levels or higher lead-time sensitivity of the customer demand.
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Note that when production is the leader, price and demand both decrease in c and s, hence,
the profits also decrease.
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(i) (s = 0.95) (ii) (c = 4)
Figure 3: Price and Profit vs. Lead-time Sensitivity and Service Level (Medium Capacity)
2.4 Transfer Price with Bonus Payments (TB) Contract
In this section, we propose a transfer price contract with bonus payments (hereafter the TB
contract) for coordinating marketing and production, where marketing pays w to production
for each unit produced, and both departments receive a bonus payment as the fraction of
the total revenues generated. We use subscript i = P, M to represent production as the








We study a flexible mechanism where the fractions of revenues received by the two
departments do not necessarily add to 1. Let α1 > 0 denote the share for marketing and
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α2 ≥ 0 the share for production. We assume that α1 + α2 ≤ 1.














= (α2 pi + w − m)(a − bpi − cLi)
s.t.
(
µ − (a − bpi − cLi)
)
Li ≥ k (12)
We solve for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction starting with
the follower’s problem in each setting.
Proposition 7 Decentralized setting i = P,M under the TB Contract has a nontrivial opti-
mal solution with positive profit if and only if for every α1 fraction of revenue for marketing







, α2 is chosen such
that αmin2i (α1,w) ≤ α2 ≤ (1−α1), where α
min
2i (α1,w) ensures that production receives a posi-
tive margin, i.e., α2 p∗i + w−m ≥ 0, and w
min
i (α1) is the minimum transfer price that ensures
α2 ≤ (1 − α1). For these (α1, α2,w) combinations:
(i=P) Production Leader, Marketing Follower:




a − 2µ − wb/α1 +
√






















(i=M) Marketing Leader, Production Follower:




) = (a − 2λ∗
M
− wb/α1)(µ − λ∗M )
2 − ckµ (13)













Note that the maximum transfer price that can be charged is decreasing in service level,
which seems counter-intuitive. However, this is only an upper bound to ensure that positive
demand is generated. One should also note that the set of feasible contract parameters do
not necessarily need to be identical for both decentralized settings.
2.4.2 Coordination under the TB Contract
In order to achieve coordination, we need to choose the contract parameters such that the





. This demand will also guarantee the lead-time and price quoted in the centralized
setting, since they are uniquely determined by the demand level. The following proposition
characterizes the coordinating contract parameters for both decentralized settings.











under P and w∗
M
= α1m under M for a given 0 < α1 ≤ 1 fraction




i ), (1 − α1)
]
fraction of the revenue for
production.
It can be observed from Proposition 8 that the coordinating transfer price only depends on
α1 and m when marketing is the leader, while it depends on all problem parameters except
m and requires knowledge of the centralized demand level when production is the leader.
Moreover, w∗
P
> α1m = w∗M , i.e., marketing needs to pay a larger transfer price to production
as the follower than as the leader. One should also note that the coordinating transfer price,
w∗i , increases linearly in α1 under both decentralized settings. In other words, as marketing
gets a higher fraction of the revenue, it needs to pay a higher per unit transfer price to
production.
Under coordination, marketing receives α1 fraction of the centralized revenue. Propo-
sition 9 indicates that the fraction of the centralized profit it achieves is not the same under
P and M.
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Proposition 9 The fraction of the centralized profit that is realized by marketing is α1 when
it is the leader and less than α1 when it is the follower.
Note that when production is the leader, the fraction of the centralized profit realized by









is increasing in µ, the absolute profit achieved by marketing is also increasing
in µ. Hence, marketing becomes better off with higher capacity.
Observation 4 For a given α1 and the coordinating transfer price as described in Proposi-
tion 8, production prefers α2 = (1−α1) to generate higher profits under both decentralized
settings. In this case, the fraction of the centralized profit that is realized by production is
equal to (1 − α1) when it is the follower and greater than (1 − α1) when it is the leader.
The TB contract with parameters as described in Observation 4, where α1 + α2 = 1, has
been frequently discussed in the literature as the “Revenue Sharing Contract". This contract
provides flexible allocation of profits between marketing and production, where the fraction





−m)b under P and anywhere from 0 to 1
under M.
Another special case of the TB contract is the transfer price-only contract with α1 =
1, α2 = 0, which has been addressed in the literature as the “Wholesale Price Contract".









for P and w∗
M
= m for M. Note that when marketing is the leader, production
breaks even, i.e., generates zero profit under this contract. However, we see that replacing
the objective function of marketing with the firm profit rather than the firm revenue will
achieve the centralized solution. Therefore, the proposed contract is in line with the view
of industry experts on adjusting the sales incentives to include margin [104].
Finally, under a TB contract with no transfer price (w = 0), coordination cannot be
achieved under either of the decentralized settings. In fact, such a contract generates the
same solution as the original decentralized settings, and thus, it is not possible to coordinate
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the two departments. For an extensive review of supply chain contracts, the reader may
refer to [23].
2.4.3 Robustness of the TB Contract
In this section, we examine the robustness (in terms of percent profit loss) of the TB contract
to estimation errors in the price sensitivity and lead-time sensitivity of the customers. Note
that when marketing is the leader, the coordinating transfer price is independent of the
problem parameters, except m. Thus, misestimation of the demand parameters may only
affect the feasibility of α2 for a given α1, which would not constitute a problem under a
Revenue Sharing Contract with α2 = 1 − α1. However, when production is the leader,
misestimating the demand parameters may have a significant effect on choosing the correct
coordinating transfer price. Thus, we investigate the robustness of the TB contract for
decentralized setting P and we use a transfer price-only contract with α1 = 1 and α2 =
0 for demonstration purposes. As the general contract setting offers more flexibility, its
robustness cannot be expected to be worse than this contract.
We perform the analysis as follows: (i) Calculate the transfer price that coordinates pro-
duction and marketing at an estimated value of the parameter, and (ii) calculate the optimal
decisions of the two parties under the contract with the true parameter value using the de-
centralized setting, P. Figure 4 shows the percent profit loss caused by the estimation errors
in b and c. We observe that underestimation of b or c leads to higher profit losses as com-
pared to overestimation. When b (c) is underestimated, the chosen transfer price motivates
a higher price (a longer lead-time) than the customer is willing to accept, which results in a
sharp decrease in demand and a high profit loss. When b is overestimated, the offered price
is lower than the customer is willing to pay, and the generated demand becomes higher
than optimal, which also results in lower profits. Although a similar reasoning follows for
c, we observe that large overestimation errors result in higher profit losses than underesti-
mation. As capacity increases, the gap between the decentralized and centralized solutions
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decreases and the contract becomes more robust to estimation errors in b. Interestingly, we
observe the highest profit loss at medium capacity levels for c as compared to low and high
capacities, since there is more room to make errors at medium capacity levels, given the
service level constraint. We finally note that estimation errors in price sensitivity are much
costlier than those in lead-time sensitivity.











































Figure 4: Percent Profit Loss when Price Sensitivity or Lead-time Sensitivity is misesti-
mated
2.5 Capacity Decision
In this section, we include capacity as a decision variable, and compare the decentralized
settings P, M and the centralized setting C. Let K denote the unit capacity cost. In the
centralized setting, the firm aims to maximize profit, which is given by revenue minus
production and capacity costs.
max
(λC ,LC ,µC )≥0
πC = (a − cLC − λC )λC/b − mλC − KµC
s.t. (µC − λC )LC ≥ k
As one unit of production will require at least one unit of capacity, the minimum cost
incurred per unit will be (m+K). Thus, we can revise Assumption A3 to a−b(m+K)−ck/µ >
0, and constrain the capacity decision to µC > ck/(a − (m + K)b) in order to satisfy it. We
also restrict our attention to values of K ≤ (a−mb)/b for non-triviality. In the decentralized
27
setting P, where production is the leader, production first chooses a capacity and a lead-time
and marketing then chooses a price. The best response of marketing to a given lead-time
and capacity is given by Equation (5). The following proposition describes the optimal
solution for C and P.






c2L3 − c(a − (m + K)b)L2 + 2Kkb = 0 (14)
(i) for K ≤ min(K1, K̄) under C,
(ii) for K ≤ min(K0, K̄) under P,
where K1 and K0 are the minimum values of K for which πC (LC ) = 0 and πP(LP) = 0,
respectively, and K̄ is the K value beyond which Equation (14) does not have a real root on[
0, a−(m+K)bc
]





























































Otherwise, capacity becomes too costly to generate positive profit.
It can be seen from Proposition 10 that the optimal capacity decision is given by the optimal
generated demand plus an adjustment amount to meet the service level.
Corollary 1 The difference in the optimal demand, capacity, price and profit between C

















= (m + K)2b/4 > 0.
The inefficiencies caused by the decentralization of price, lead-time and capacity decisions
can be clearly seen from Corollary 1. Although the lead-time decision is the same under
both settings, there is no markup in price for the average cost per unit under the decentral-
ized setting since marketing’s performance is solely based on revenue. On the other hand,
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for the centralized setting, the markup is given by (m+K)/2. This discrepancy also results in
an associated amount of extra demand and capacity under the decentralized setting, which
lowers the profit.
In the decentralized setting M, production first chooses a capacity, and the rest of the
game is exactly the same as the original marketing Stackelberg game. As a result of the
analytical intractability of this problem, we compare the optimal decisions under different
settings numerically. Figure 5 (a = 50, b = 4, c = 4, s = 0.95, m = 5) shows the optimal
profit and decisions with respect to the capacity cost, K. We do not include P beyond the
K value where positive profit cannot be generated. We can summarize our observations as
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Figure 5: Comparison of Settings with Capacity Decision
follows:
• When capacity is included as a decision variable, the ordering of optimal decisions
and profit under different settings is the same as in Proposition 4 at given capacity





• The decentralized setting M prefers a lower capacity than the centralized setting,
while the decentralized setting P prefers a higher one. This result is consistent with
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our previous findings, where M generated higher profits and was closer to C at low
capacity levels. When marketing is the leader, a lower capacity is sufficient, while
production needs to choose a high capacity to meet the generated demand as the
leader, which becomes too costly beyond a certain point.
• When production is the leader, as K increases, capacity decreases and lead-time in-
creases. Thus, marketing lowers price in response. When marketing is the leader,
it responds to a lower capacity level with a higher price. Therefore, in Figure 5, we




decreases. Moreover, the profit
generated under M approaches that under C, while the profit generated under P de-
viates.
2.6 Conclusion
We studied a firm with two independent functions, marketing and production, which serves
customer demand that is sensitive to both price and lead-time. Price and lead-time decisions
are made by marketing and production, respectively. Production needs to satisfy a certain
percentage of orders on time under limited capacity. We analyzed the types of inefficiencies
that result from the decentralization of these two functions.
In order to achieve coordination, we proposed a transfer price contract with bonus pay-
ments, where marketing pays production a transfer price per unit produced, and both de-
partments receive a fraction of the total revenues generated as a bonus payment. We showed
the existence of a unique transfer price for a given fraction of total revenues offered to mar-
keting, α1, that achieves coordination as long as production receives a satisfactory incentive
as a fraction of total revenues. Finally, we analyzed the optimal decisions and profit when
production can choose the capacity level.
Our key findings are as follows:
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Decentralized Settings
• Lead-times are longer, prices are lower, demand is larger and profits are lower as
compared to the centralized setting.
• The lead-time decision is independent of the changes in price sensitivity or produc-
tion cost as long as production receives a positive margin. In this case, the price
decision is not affected by a change in the unit production cost.
• The unique production Stackelberg equilibrium is dominated by the unique marketing
Stackelberg equilibrium. The dominance becomes more significant for firms having
tight capacity.
• Higher capacity results in higher profits under the centralized setting and the decen-
tralized setting, where production is the leader. However, higher capacity may result
in a decrease of profits when marketing is the leader.
• When capacity can be chosen by production and has a constant unit cost, the domi-
nance of the marketing Stackelberg game over the production Stackelberg game be-
comes more significant at higher capacity costs. As compared to the centralized
setting, the optimal capacity level is higher when production is the leader and lower
when marketing is the leader.
Under Coordination:
• Higher capacity does not necessarily lead to charging higher for better service.
• Under a Revenue-Sharing Contract, estimation errors in price sensitivity are much
costlier than those in lead-time sensitivity when production is the leader. On the
other hand, contract parameters are independent of the demand parameters when
marketing is the leader.
This research is to appear in IIE Transactions [97].
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CHAPTER III
CENTRALIZED VS. DECENTRALIZED COMPETITION FOR
PRICE AND LEAD-TIME SENSITIVE DEMAND
3.1 Introduction
Recent business trends and advances in consumer behavior modeling have shown that
demand for goods and services, and in turn, profits of companies, are shaped by price
and lead-time decisions. Quoting effective prices and reliable lead-times to match supply
and demand is especially important as many companies are moving from a make-to-stock
(MTS) to a make-to-order (MTO) model to reduce costs, increase profits, and improve mar-
ket responsiveness [80, 131]. Customers look for a tailor-made product that precisely fits
their needs, desires, and budgets and they want it delivered without waiting [89]. In fact,
the ability to offer customized products with short lead-times is becoming an important
area of competitive differentiation among suppliers in many industries [3]. Mike Eskew,
the chairman and chief executive officer of UPS, explains: “Globalization has raised the
competitive stakes, forcing companies to compete on more than just product features and
price. Companies can achieve competitive differentiation based on how well they deliver
the right product to the right place at the right time." [48].
Ideally, a firm should take a global perspective and coordinate its decisions on price
and lead-time quotes for increased profitability. In reality, however, different divisions of
large companies all too often fail to communicate on important business decisions [65, 28].
One of the reasons tied to the downfall of Silicon Graphics Inc. was its highly independent
product divisions, which did not coordinate introduction schedules and led to stacked prod-
ucts on the manufacturing floor by the end of the year. When the salespeople’s assurance
that products would ship on time lost credibility, customers started switching to competitor
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products [57].
In addition to communication failures, conflict can arise between the marketing and
operations functions as a result of the internal compensation schemes. Nell Williams, Mar-
riott’s VP of Global Revenue Management Organization, points out for the hospitality in-
dustry: “Salespeople have historically been compensated on volume and not profit, and
that’s part of the reason why they are at odds with revenue managers. The whole hotel
wins when both disciplines work together towards the same goal and that is bringing the
most profitable business into the hotel." [136]. Similarly, in several manufacturing oriented
firms, manufacturing is evaluated based on costs and operational efficiency while market-
ing is evaluated based on revenue and volume [6, 63]. From a consulting point of view,
Yama et al. ([138]) discuss how frequently they come across the misalignment of a com-
pany’s strategic goals and the pricing performance metrics that drive individual behavior,
where the sales force is incentivized on order volume with no tie to profitability metrics.
Similarly, Hogan and Nagle ([58]) and Preslan and Newmark ([104]) point out that the key
to driving profitability is to compensate sales people based on profit contribution or margin
and not just for sales volume or revenue.
In many firms, the division of functional responsibilities and conflicting incentives lead
to decentralization of price and lead-time decisions, meaning that these decisions are made
independently by separate agents with different objectives. Marketing quotes prices so
as to maximize revenue, while manufacturing quotes lead-times so as to ensure reliable
delivery given the production capacity and the incurred production costs. Clearly, a firm
would benefit from coordinating decentralized decisions by setting the proper incentives.
Several studies have noted performance improvements when marketing and manufacturing
divisions work together [93, 78, 55]. However, there are very few studies that measure the
impact of decentralization of price and lead-time decisions [74, 97].
We consider a duopoly where firms compete on the basis of their prices and uniform
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delivery time guarantees in a common market. In Chapter 2, we found that for a monopolis-
tic firm, when price and lead-time decisions are decentralized, i.e., made by the marketing
and production departments, respectively, lower prices and longer lead-times are quoted
generating larger demand but lower profits as compared to a centralized structure in which
prices and lead-times are quoted by a single decision maker. In this chapter, we extend that
work to a competitive setting. We explore if and when decentralization can be more prof-
itable than centralization under competition. We model this problem as a two-stage game,
where in the first stage, firms simultaneously choose their organizational structures so as to
operate in a centralized or decentralized fashion, and in the second stage, they simultane-
ously choose their price and lead-time decisions. Thus, we endogenize the strategic choice
of being centralized or decentralized through the first stage, while we model the tactical
price and lead-time competition in the second stage. When the outcome of the first stage is
centralization for a firm, there is a single decision maker who determines the price and lead-
time strategy. On the other hand, under decentralization, the strategy is established through
a Stackelberg game, where marketing first sets the price as the leader and then production
sets the lead-time as the follower, as the best response to competitor decisions. Once the
price and lead-time strategies are determined, both firms simultaneously announce their
price and lead-time decisions to the market, and subgame perfect equilibrium is reached
when none of the firms has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its decisions. We solve
this problem through backwards induction; given the best response of each firm to its com-
petitor’s decisions under the organizational structure choice from the first stage, we solve
the subgame perfect equilibrium in the second stage of the game. Afterwards, we deter-
mine the first stage choice of each firm comparing different decision making scenarios in
terms of the price and lead-time decisions and firm profits: (i) both firms are centralized,
(ii) a hybrid scenario where only one firm is centralized, (iii) both firms are decentralized.
We show the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium under all scenarios through an
iterative procedure, where each firm responds to a price or lead-time decrease (increase)
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by its competitor with a price and lead-time decrease (increase), and the game is played
in a monotonically decreasing (increasing) fashion until equilibrium is reached. We find
that under intense price competition, firms may suffer from a decentralized structure, par-
ticularly under high flexibility induced by high capacity, where revenue based sales incen-
tives motivate sales/marketing for more aggressive price cuts resulting in eroding margins.
Fierce price competition has been observed in several markets, where firms cut prices ag-
gressively in response to competition. For example, Unilever suffered from fierce price
competition in European supermarkets against other household and personal care suppliers
such as Procter & Gamble as well as suppliers in other grocery categories, which resulted
in eroding margins [88].
We find that when price competition is more intense than lead-time competition, where
the intensity is characterized by the underlying parameters of market demand, the net effect
of lower prices and longer lead-times under a decentralized structure is a decrease in the
potential market demand of the competitor that drives prices downward, hurting the profits
of both firms in the market. Nagle and Hogan ([90]) discuss that fierce price competition
may be more appropriate for low cost firms. We find that low cost firms may benefit from a
decentralized structure without hurting margins. However, although a decentralized struc-
ture may generate higher market share, it may not account for the decrease in margins as
the costs get higher. Particularly, losses may be significant for high capacity firms, where
marketing will be more aggressive in pricing to generate more demand. Therefore, a cen-
tralized structure becomes crucial for more profitable use of capacity, leading to shorter
lead-times as a competitive advantage. For example, the threat of competition from low
cost overseas manufacturers, particularly China, has been an ongoing concern for Ameri-
can manufacturers. Chinese manufacturers offer low prices, while domestic manufacturers
can offer shorter delivery times. For the metal parts industry, intense global competition has
hindered domestic producers from increasing their prices, and motivated them for shorten-
ing lead-times to improve competitiveness [119]. Similarly, the CEO of American Leather,
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Bob Duncan, discusses that although it is not possible to beat the Chinese furniture makers
on price, no Chinese furniture maker can deliver a sofa in four weeks: “The fact that you’re
across the ocean is adding a month to your lead time almost by definition... What I’m most
proud of is the fact that we still do ship in two to three weeks" [103]. Thus, a centralized
organizational structure becomes important for domestic manufacturers to offer a shorter
lead-time at the expense of higher prices instead of going into aggressive price cuts.
In contrast, we find that when price competition in the market is less intense than lead-
time competition, a decentralized organizational structure may dominate a centralized one.
For example, a firm may choose to compete against the low prices of a higher capacity
firm with a decentralized structure to maximize its market share. Finally, a firm with an
increased advantage over price competition, where customers are less sensitive to its prices
in comparison to competition, can also benefit from a decentralized structure.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a review of the lit-
erature on price and lead-time competition. In Section 3.3, we introduce our model and
assumptions. We describe the best response of a firm, given its competitor’s price and
lead-time decisions for both the centralized and decentralized structures, and the equilib-
rium solution for the duopoly problem in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we describe the first
stage equilibrium solution through the comparison of different decision making scenarios.
We also discuss the effect of capacity and production cost on the price and lead-time com-
petition in the market. After analyzing some special cases, namely, unconstrained price
competition and lead-time only competition for analytical insights in Section 3.6, we pro-
vide our conclusions in Section 3.7.
3.2 Literature Review
Most of the previous research on price and lead-time decisions in a competitive steady-state
setting uses queueing models and considers centralized firms. Several researchers model
lead-time decisions via a “waiting time standard" as determined by the time spent in a
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queue given the allocated capacity. Instead of modeling customers’ sensitivity to price and
lead-time independently, some researchers aggregate price and waiting time into a “full
price". Loch ([75]) and Armony and Haviv ([5]) study two competing service providers
operating as M/G/1 in the former and M/M/1 in the latter, and two customer classes, where
each class has a given waiting cost rate and chooses a provider based on its full price. In the
latter study, competition is modeled in two stages such that providers compete on the basis
of service charges in the first stage, and customer classes compete with allocation decisions
in the second stage. Chen and Wan ([29]) study two M/M/1 service providers that compete
for a single customer class on the basis of full price, but charge the same full price in the
long run. Providers are differentiated by their capacities, values of service and unit costs
of waiting. Lederer and Li ([71]) consider N M/G/1 service providers, which compete for
N customer classes by choosing prices, production rates and scheduling policies. They
assume that providers are full price takers. While capacity is treated as constant in these
studies, Cachon and Harker ([24]) present the option of outsourcing to a supplier for two
competing firms, which experience scale economies as their unit costs are decreasing in
the demand volume. Two types of competition are analyzed: an M/M/1 queueing game
with price and time sensitive demand and an EOQ game with fixed ordering costs and price
sensitive demand. For the queueing game, each firm’s demand rate is modeled as a function
of the full prices of both firms with two forms: linear and truncated logit.
In contrast to the full price approach of the first set of papers, Allon and Federgruen
([1, 2]) treat price and waiting time as independent factors in customer demand, which
decreases in own-price/time effects, increases in cross-price/time effects and accounts for
other factors such as brand in the intercept. Both papers model N M/M/1 firms, the former
for a single customer class and the latter for N customer classes. In [1], rather than using
waiting time as is in the demand model, the authors use service level, which is defined as
the difference between an upper bound benchmark for waiting time and the firm’s actual
waiting time standard, and expressed in terms of the expected waiting time or the φ fractile
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of the waiting time distribution. A cost per unit time proportional to adopted capacity is
included in the profit function. Three types of competition are studied: Two-stage games,
where service level is set in the first stage while price is set in the second stage and vice
versa, and simultaneous price and service competition. In [2], waiting time is explicitly
incorporated into the demand model. A class dependent cost and a cost per unit time
proportional to capacity are included in the profit function. Price only competition, waiting
time only competition, and simultaneous competition are studied using dedicated or shared
facilities for customer classes.
Along the same line of research, So ([113]) extends the work of [114] to a competi-
tive setting of N M/M/1 firms using a multiplicative competitive interaction model, where
the market size is constant and shared among firms based on their “attraction" given their
quoted prices and lead-times. Moreover, each firm needs to meet a predetermined service
level so as to satisfy a certain percentage of the orders on time. Boyaci and Ray ([21]) also
use a service level constraint to study two substitutable products, which are differentiated
in the quoted prices and lead-times and served by dedicated capacities in an M/M/1 firm.
However, in this case, the objective is to maximize the overall profit generated from both
products. Tsay and Agrawal ([123]) study a distribution system, where a manufacturer
supplies a common product to two retailers who use price and service quality (effort) to
directly compete for end customers in a deterministic setting.
Some researchers model duopolies, where customers strategically choose the firm that
maximizes their expected utilities. In [72], the utility function is based on price, quality
and response time. Customers can observe the congestion levels of the firms, may jockey
from one queue to another and their choices are dynamic. Besbes and Zeevi ([14]) model
utility as a function of price and waiting time, where price is the only decision variable.
Their focus is on the effect of uncertainty in model demand parameters on the decisions
and the competition. Ho and Zheng ([56]) consider a lead-time only utility model, where
customers are sensitive to quoted lead-time and service quality, which is defined as the
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difference between the quoted lead-time and customer expectation. The objective of each
firm is to maximize its demand rate.
All of the papers discussed above study competition among centralized firms. Papers
that study competition among decentralized firms mainly focus on price and/or quantity de-
cisions. Bhardwaj ([15]) and Mishra and Prasad ([85]) consider the problem of delegating
pricing decisions to the salesforce in a duopoly within a principal agent framework. The
demand for each firm is modeled as a function of the prices and the salesperson effort levels
of both firms. Parlar and Weng ([96]) consider a single period model for the price decision
faced by the marketing department and the production quantity decision faced by the pro-
duction department. They allow the two departments to coordinate their decisions to com-
pete against another firm with a similar organizational structure for price sensitive demand.
They compare the results under marketing - production coordination and no coordination.
In [83] and [20], the focus is on two supply chains, which consist of a wholesaler/manufac-
turer and a retailer, and compete on the basis of price in the former and customer service,
namely fill rate, in the latter. McGuire and Staelin ([83]) use a deterministic framework,
while Boyaci and Gallego ([20]) use a queueing model with generic lead-time distribution.
Three scenarios are analyzed: 1) Both supply chains are uncoordinated, i.e., each party
selects their own decisions (prices in [83] and service and inventory levels in [20]), 2) a
hybrid scenario where only one supply chain is coordinated, and 3) both supply chains are
coordinated. Bernstein and Federgruen ([9]) study a similar multi-period setting as in [8],
where there exist a common supplier and competing independent retailers. Customer de-
mand depends on all of the firms’ prices and a measure of service level, namely fill rate,
and is modeled in three forms: (i) Attraction type multinomial logit (ii) linear model with
own and cross effects (iii) log separable. They consider price competition only as well as
simultaneous price and service competition and develop coordination mechanisms. Finally,
Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj ([6]) model a duopoly in which firms with decentralized
marketing and manufacturing functions with conflicting objectives compete on the basis of
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price and quality in a deterministic setting. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to study centralized and decentralized decision making comparatively under price and
lead-time competition in a steady state setting.
3.3 Model Assumptions
We consider two competing firms in a MTO setting. Capacity is assumed to be constant,
while price and lead-time are decision variables. Firm operations are modeled as an M/M/1
queue. We use the following notation throughout the text:
Parameters: (i, j ∈ {1, 2})
ai : base market potential for firm i (maximum attainable demand under no cross-effects)
bi : own price sensitivity of demand for firm i
ci : own lead-time sensitivity of demand for firm i
βi j : cross price sensitivity of demand for firm i, j , i
γi j : cross lead-time sensitivity of demand for firm i, j , i
mi : unit production cost of firm i
µi : capacity of the production system (service rate) of firm i
si : service level (the minimum probability of meeting the quoted lead-time) for firm i
ki : used for computational simplicity, ki = ln(1/(1 − si))
Decision Variables
S i : Organizational structure decision of firm i = 1, 2 (C for centralized and D for decen-
tralized)
pi : price quoted by the marketing department of firm i (pi ≥ mi)
Li : lead-time quoted by the production department of firm i (Li ∈ [0, ki/µi])
λi : mean demand rate for firm i
πi : profit achieved by firm i
πMi , π
P
i : profit achieved by the marketing and production departments, respectively, of firm i
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If the two firms are identical, i.e., have the same parameter values, we drop the firm-
specific subscripts i, j. Our demand model is given by:
λi = ai − bi pi − ciLi + βi j p j + γi jL j j = 3 − i, i = 1, 2 (17)
Equation (17) is linear in the quoted price and lead-time and cross price and cross lead-time
effects, which is similar to the demand models used in [123, 21, 6]. However, we do not
require the base market potentials, ai, or other demand parameters of the firms to be equal,
generalizing earlier models. In that respect, our demand model is closest to the one used
in [1], where we use a linear form of their general concave waiting time function with an
intercept, i.e., the base market potential, and no explicit upper bound for the waiting time
standard. However, note that the research problems in the two papers are different. [1]
use the φ fractile of the waiting time distribution, which would correspond to our service
level s, to determine the capacity required and they incorporate it into the profit function
of each firm via a linear capacity cost. On the other hand, we choose what lead-time
to quote given the level of capacity and the required service level. In Section 3.4.1, we
show that the service level constraint is tight at optimality. Thus, for a specific capacity
cost, our centralized model may generate the same solution as in their model, although
different results may be obtained under different cost levels. Moreover, our focus is on the
comparison of centralized and decentralized decision making, while they do not consider
the decentralization of price and waiting time decisions.
In [21, 123], the total market size is decreasing in the quoted price and lead-time (ser-
vice in the latter) of both firms but is independent of cross-effects, while in [6] the total
market size is constant. As we allow demand parameters to vary between the two firms, the
total market size in our model is not constant:
λ1 + λ2 = (a1 + a2) − (b1 − β21)p1 − (b2 − β12)p2 − (c1 − γ21)L1 − (c2 − γ12)L2 (18)
One unit decrease in the price of Firm 1, p1, results in an increase of b1 customers (units of
demand) for Firm 1 of which β21 customers switch from Firm 2. Thus, the “new" customers
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that Firm 1 gains is given by b1 − β21. Note that, everything else being constant, one unit of
decrease in the price of Firm 1 steals β21 customers from Firm 2, while one unit of decrease
in the price of Firm 2 steals β12 customers from Firm 1. The difference in β12 and β21 would
be determined by other attraction factors, such as brand, loyalty or location. We make the
following assumptions1:
A1. There is a unit production cost, mi, for each firm (i = 1, 2).
A2. All parameters are positive and common knowledge to both parties:
ai > 0, bi > 0, ci > 0, βi j > 0, γi j > 0, mi > 0, µi > 0, 0 < si < 1 j = 3−i, i = 1, 2
A3. bi > β ji, ci > γ ji (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j , i)
A unit increase (decrease) in the price/lead-time quoted by a firm creates a larger
decrease (increase) in its own demand than an increase (decrease) in its competitor’s
demand. This assumption also ensures that the total market size is decreasing in the
price and lead-time of both firms.
A4. bi > βi j, ci > γi j (i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j , i)
The demand generated by a firm is affected more by a unit change in its own price/lead-
time than by a unit change in its competitor’s price/lead-time.
A5. (Positive Demand Assumption) There is positive demand for each firm in its base
market to provide its services when the smallest reasonable price, (mi), and the short-
est lead-time that satisfies its service level constraint, (ki/µi), are chosen:
λi = ai − bimi − ciki/µi > 0 j = 3 − i, i = 1, 2
This assumption is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the existence of a
competitive equilibrium in the market, i.e., a competitive equilibrium might exist
1Assumptions A3 and A4 are also used in [1] for the price terms.
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even if the condition of the assumption is not satisfied. However, if a profitable
equilibrium solution does not exist for either firm, one or both of the firms may need
to leave the market. Note that it is not unrealistic to expect that a firm should be able
to generate some demand in its base market even if a competitor does not exist. In
other words, a firm cannot continue to exist in the long run only through attracting
customers from its competitor’s base market. This assumption also facilitates the
derivation of some results through the paper.
Next, we describe our game structure, which consists of two stages. In the first stage,
both firms simultaneously choose an organizational structure so as to operate centralized
or decentralized for making price and lead-time decisions. Thus, the outcome of the first
stage is the pair of strategic decisions (S ∗i , S
∗
j) for firms (i, j) ∈ (1, 2), which is observed
by both firms. In the second stage of the game, we model the tactical price and lead-time
competition. If the outcome of the first stage is centralization for a firm, then there is a sin-
gle decision maker who chooses the price and lead-time strategy for the firm. On the other
hand, if the outcome of the first stage is decentralization (say for firm i), the strategy is
established through a Stackelberg game, where the marketing department chooses a price,
p
i(D,S ∗j )





as the follower. Note that we use subscripts to denote organizational structures to differenti-
ate between strategic and tactical decisions. Once the strategies are determined, both firms
simultaneously announce their price and lead-time decisions to the market, and the market
demand for each firm is realized. The subgame perfect equilibrium is reached when none of
the firms has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its decisions. Figure 6 demonstrates
the sequence of events under each organizational structure for both firms.
Note that this decentralized game framework is different from the one in [83] and [20],
where competition occurs in two stages; retail competition preceded by manufacturer com-
petition with manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader. As we model marketing and produc-
tion as functions of the same firm, we consider one unified stage of competition after prices
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Both firms simultaneously choose 
an organizational structure







selects a price and 
then production 










Firm i selects a 
price and a 
lead-time
Firm j selects 
a price and a 
lead-time
Marketing first 
selects a price and 
then production 
selects a lead-time 
for firm i
Marketing first 
selects a price and 
then production 
selects a lead-time 
for firm j
Firm j selects 
a price and a 
lead-time
Both firms simultaneously announce their 
price and lead-time decisions to the 
market and market demand is realized
Figure 6: Sequence of Events for the Two-Stage Game
and lead-times are determined within each firm in a Stackelberg framework with marketing
as the leader. We assume that both firms are rational players with common knowledge of
the problem parameters, and the divisions within the firms employ sequential rationality in
case of decentralization.
3.4 Stage 2 - Tactical Price and Lead-time Competition
For this stage, we first describe Firm i’s best response to its competitor’s decisions under
both centralized and decentralized structures. We then demonstrate the equilibrium solution
under competition.
3.4.1 Firm i Problem
We first analyze the optimization problem for firm i (i = 1, 2) as a best response to the price








), given the strategic outcomes from
stage 1 (S ∗i , S
∗
j). Let Ĵ denote firm j decisions (S
∗
j , p j(S ∗i ,S ∗j ) , L j(S ∗i ,S ∗j )). If S
∗
i = C, there is a
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If S ∗i = D, we assume that marketing’s performance is evaluated as a revenue center. Thus,










Then, production makes a lead-time decision as its best response to this price decision given
its own objective. We assume that production is evaluated as a cost center. Giving p
i(D,Ĵ)
as























) ≥ ki (20)
Note that as p j· and L j· are given, we can redefine the market potential for firm i under both
organizational structures as Ai = ai +βi j p j·+γi jL j·, which we refer to as the “derived market
potential". Then, the generated demand becomes λi· = Ai − bi pi· − ciLi·, which reduces firm
i problem to the monopolistic firm problem in Chapter 2. All proofs can be found in the
appendix.








), the optimal demand generated by firm i under the
centralized organizational structure, λ∗
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) = (Ai − 2λi(C,Ĵ) − mibi)(µi − λi(C,Ĵ))
2 − cikiµi (21)
Under the decentralized organizational structure, the optimal demand generated by firm




















) = (Ai − 2λi(D,Ĵ))(µi − λi(D,Ĵ))
2 − cikiµi (22)
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Note that the best response of firm i under a decentralized structure results in lower prices
and longer lead-times as compared to a centralized structure similar to Chapter 2.
Observation 5 The optimal prices, lead-times, generated demand and the optimal profit
for firm i under the centralized and decentralized organizational structures increase in p j·,
L j·, βi j and γi j.2
This observation directly follows from the monopolistic firm results in Chapter 2, where it
is shown that the optimal decisions and the firm profit increase in the market potential. An
increase in the sensitivity of firm i’s customers to its competitor’s prices/lead-times and/or
a direct increase in its competitor’s quoted prices/lead-times results in an increase in firm
i’s demand as more customers switch from firm j to firm i. Thus, the quoted lead-time
and price increase. (Alternatively, when its competitor cuts its prices or lead-times, firm
i answers with a price and lead-time decrease.). Price cutting in response to competition
has been observed in several industries. In 2002, after Sony announced that it would cut
the price of its PlayStation 2 game console from $299 to $199, Microsoft matched Sony’s
markdown the next day for its Xbox console at E3, which was followed by Nintendo’s
response of reducing the price of its GameCube platform from $149 to $50 [107]. Sim-
ilarly, in 2004, Wal-Mart’s price cut in its standard DVD rentals-by-mail plan by 7.5%
was followed by similar price cuts in the plans of its competitors, Netflix and Blockbuster
[18]. In order to gain a competitive advantage, companies have also strived to improve
their processes to cut their lead-times/service times. For example, the big three of the U.S.
automobile industry (Chrysler, Ford and General Motors) reduced their lead-times from 61
2Note that under the decentralized organizational structure, if λ∗
i(D,Ĵ)
= λ̄, i.e., p∗
i(D,Ĵ)
= mi, for a given
range of Ai, then optimal lead-times and generated demand still increase in competitor decisions and cross
sensitivities. However, the optimal price and profit are not affected within this range of Ai.
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months to 52 months in order to compete against the low lead-times of Japanese manufac-
turers [49].
Note that although [113] uses an attraction type demand model, Observation 5 is con-
sistent with his findings. As the “attractiveness" of its competitor increases, i.e., a decrease
in the βi j p j· + γi jL j· term for our model, firm i needs to compete with a lower price and
lead-time.
3.4.2 Duopoly Problem
Under competition, both firms simultaneously announce their price and lead-time decisions
to the market. Equilibrium is reached when none of the firms has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its decisions. The equilibrium solution is given by the simultaneous solution
of the price and lead-time equations for i = 1, 2 for the related organizational structures in
Proposition 11. As these equations do not have a closed-form solution, to draw insights
about the equilibrium decisions and profits, we solve this subgame using an iterative proce-
dure, similar to the one in [113], where the game is repeatedly played starting at an initial
solution until the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is reached. Note that this procedure
is also generalizable to the N-firm problem. We present the procedure only for two firms
under centralized and decentralized organizational structures:
Iterative Procedure for Computing the Nash Equilibrium:




= mi and Li(S ∗i ,S ∗j ) = ki/µi for i = 1, 2.
2. (Iterative Step) Without loss of generality, start with firm i = 1. Calculate the best








, as given by the solution of Equations (21) and
(23) for S ∗i = C, and of Equations (22) and (23) for S
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3. (Convergence criteria) Repeat Step (2) until the profits of both firms differ from their
previous values by less than a predetermined tolerance level ε.
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Proposition 12 The iterative procedure described above converges to the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for the simultaneous price and lead-time competition game given
the outcomes from the first stage (S ∗i , S
∗
j).
Given that prices and lead-times are bounded below and above, when the game is iteratively
played, the optimal decisions and profits monotonically increase or decrease (depending on
the starting point) for both firms converging to the unique subgame perfect Nash Equilib-
rium.
3.5 Stage 1 - Strategic Decisions for Organizational Structure
Having identified the subgame perfect equilibrium for the second stage, we now discuss
how each firm would choose an organizational structure. We first discuss the case of iden-
tical firms.
3.5.1 Identical Firms
In order to identify the equilibrium outcome of the first stage, we compare the profits gener-
ated under the four possible outcomes of this stage, which we hereafter refer to as scenarios:
(S ∗1, S
∗












2) = (D,D). We use 
to represent the dominance of one scenario over the other with a scenario subscript of 12
indicating dominance for both firms. The following proposition compares the second stage
equilibrium decisions for each scenario.
Proposition 13 For identical firms, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium solution for the
second stage is symmetric under (C,C) and (D,D). As compared to scenario (C,C), the
lead-time quoted under (D,D) is longer, the price is lower and the demand generated is
larger. On the other hand, under a hybrid scenario, the centralized firm quotes higher
prices and lower lead-times than the decentralized firm, which leads to lower demand and
not always higher profits.
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We demonstrate the second part of Proposition 13 with the following example in Table 2.
The first point to note from Table 2 is the significant decrease in profits when β (cross-price
Table 2: Equilibrium Decisions and Profits under (C,D) for Identical Firms.

















3 0.252 32.214 63.108 1080.007 0.741 30.743 70.957 1109.984
2 0.086 25.198 40.001 403.933 0.395 20.370 67.420 355.318
(a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, m = 15.1, s = 0.95, µ = 75, γ = 1.)
sensitivity) decreases. It follows from Observation 5 that under a lower β, the best response
decisions of firm i to firm j are lower, which in turn, results in a decrease in its competi-
tor’s best response decisions and profit. Following the logic from the iterative procedure,
when we re-start the game from this point onwards, the optimal decisions and profits will
be monotonically decreasing at each iteration until the equilibrium is reached. Thus, we
observe lower profits under a lower β. Conversely, we can explain this phenomenon as
follows. When the intensity of price competition (β/b) increases, the number of customers
lost through “net own" effects ((b− β)/b) decreases. It can be seen from Equation (18) that
the total market size is decreasing in the quoted price of each firm by a factor of b − β.
Both firms desire to capture as much demand as possible from the total market potential
(2a) to maximize profit (revenue) in a centralized (decentralized) organizational structure.
Thus, as β increases, b − β decreases and each firm can charge higher prices. Furthermore,
as more customers switch between the two firms but fewer customers leave the market, the
generated demand by both firms increases. Thus, profits increase in β.
We also observe that the centralized firm generates higher profits than the decentralized
firm when β = 2, while the opposite is true when β = 3. Under both cases, the centralized
firm prices higher than the decentralized firm, which puts the decentralized firm at an ad-
vantage3. However, when the intensity of price competition decreases, “net own" effects
3Although the decentralized firm quotes a longer lead-time than the centralized firm, the effect of lead-
times on the generated demand is smaller than the effect of prices, as lead-times are already short under high
capacity and the cross lead-time sensitivity is low.
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become more significant and quoted prices decrease as explained above. As the capacity is
high and flexible, the decentralized firm makes a more aggressive price decrease than the
centralized firm, which generates a larger demand but lower profits given its lower margin.
One should also note for this example that both firms would be better off under scenario
(C,C), where each firm would achieve a profit of 1211.509 at β = 3 and 539.054 at β = 2.
Proposition 14 When βb ≥
γ





(C,C) is the unique Nash equilibrium solution for the first stage game.
Proposition 14 states that when the percentage of customers lost through price competition
(with respect to the total number of customers lost through own price effects) is greater than
that lost through lead-time competition, both firms are better off under (C,C) than under
a hybrid scenario and worse off under (D,D). We can also interpret this result as in the
following observation.
Observation 6 When price competition is more intense than lead-time competition in the
market, a centralized organizational structure is dominant for both firms.
The best response of firm i to its competitor’s decisions is lower prices and longer
lead-times under a decentralized organizational structure as compared to a centralized one.
When price competition is more intense than lead-time competition, the net effect of this
price decrease and lead-time increase is a decrease in the derived market potential of the
competitor, which results in lower prices, lead-times, demand and profits for the competi-
tor. When we run the iterative procedure starting from this point, the game continues in
a monotonically decreasing fashion for decisions and profits until convergence to equilib-
rium, and both firms end up with lower profits. Wanless ([133]) suggests that firms need
to coordinate pricing decisions with operational decisions under intense price competition.
Nagle and Hogan ([90]) discuss that matching any price cut without considering whether
the cost is justified by the benefit can lead to a downward price spiral, where each compet-
ing firm cuts prices in response to one another until one stops, and it might be better to let
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the competitor have a price advantage at a high price than at a low one, which is consistent
with our findings. Not only will each firm prefer to operate with a centralized structure but
also will prefer its competitor to employ a centralized structure. Note that under a hybrid
scenario, either firm may generate higher profits as we saw in the previous example.
3.5.1.1 Effect of Capacity
In this section, we analyze the effect of capacity on the competition and firm profits. In
Figure 7, we demonstrate the change in the optimal profit of Firm 1 as capacity increases4.
As the firms are identical, Firm 2 generates the same profits as Firm 1 under (C,C) and
(D,D), while the profit curve of Firm 2 under (C,D) corresponds to the profit curve of
Firm 1 under (D,C). Note that in this example, the decentralized firm in a hybrid scenario
generates higher profits than the centralized firm since β is high as in the first example.
Observation 7 Higher capacity does not always result in higher profits under competition
even if it comes for free.
In the monopolistic firm setting studied in Chapter 2, it was found that higher capacity led
to higher flexibility and in turn, higher profits for a centralized firm. However, in a com-
petitive setting, we observe that the profit generated under (C,C) increases up to a certain
capacity level and then decreases. Thus, under competition, high capacity may increase the
aggressiveness of competition as higher demand can be met and result in lower profits for
both firms. This phenomenon is also observed in the industry. For example, Western Dig-
ital, one of the largest hard disk drive suppliers in the world, notes the following as a risk
factor in their business: “... the hard disk drive market has experienced periods of excess
capacity which can lead to liquidation of excess inventories and intense price competition.
If intense price competition occurs, we may be forced to lower prices sooner and more
than expected, which could result in lower revenue and gross margins." [135]. Note that a
4Parameter values are a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, m = 15.1, s = 0.95, β = 3, γ = 1.
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similar result was also found in [113] for firms competing with a centralized organizational
structure.
Observation 8 A centralized organizational structure dominates under high capacity.
This observation is consistent with the result in Chapter 2, which states that the gap between
the centralized and decentralized structures increases under high capacity. However, we
also observe that even if one firm employs a centralized structure under high capacity, it




















Figure 7: Profit vs. Capacity for Identical Firms.
3.5.1.2 Effect of Unit Production Cost
In this section, we analyze the effect of unit production cost for identical firms. In Figures 8
and 9, we provide a comparison of scenarios as measured in the percent profit increase over
(C,C)5. Part (ii) in each figure uses a different scale and displays the dominant scenario
at different cost levels. As we noted in the previous section, both firms generate the same
profits under (C,C) and (D,D), and one firm’s profit under (C,D) corresponds to the profit
5Parameter values for Figures 8 and Figures 9 are (a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, µ = 20, s = 0.95, β = 1, γ =
3.9) and (a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, µ = 20, s = 0.95, β = 2.2, γ = 3.9), respectively.
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of the other under (D,C). We also choose parameters such that βb <
γ
c and the production
capacity is relatively tight.
In Figure 8, the intensity of price competition is low. Similar to our observations for ca-
pacity, we see that firms may lose significantly under a decentralized organizational struc-
ture, when the unit production cost is high as a result of eroding margins. Moreover, a
centralized firm benefits more from competition if its competitor is decentralized. The gap
between the centralized and decentralized firms in a hybrid scenario increases as the unit
production cost increases. On the other hand, even when the operating costs are high, firms
may benefit from a decentralized structure when the intensity of price competition is high
as displayed in Figure 9. Note that under (D,D), the equilibrium decisions do not change
with respect to the unit production cost, while the profits decrease as the margins decrease.
Thus, in this case, we can argue that a centralized structure behaves over-protective of











0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26























0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26















(i) All (ii) Dominant
Figure 8: Comparison of Scenarios with respect to Unit Production Cost when the intensity
of price competition is low (β = 1) (Identical Firms)
Figures 8 and 9 also show that as the unit production cost gets very low, the profit differ-
ence between the scenarios becomes insignificant, which is expected as the best response
function under the centralized structure, Equation (21), approaches the one under the de-
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(i) All (ii) Dominant
Figure 9: Comparison of Scenarios with respect to Unit Production Cost when the intensity
of price competition is high (β = 2.2) (Identical Firms)
based incentive for marketing will generate the same best response function for both struc-
tures. Thus, even under high capacity or high production costs, firms may benefit from a
decentralized organizational structure, where the incentive for marketing incorporates the
margin and not just revenue. Michael V. Marn, a partner in McKinsey’s Cleveland office,
mentions that companies can be very successful with centralized or decentralized pricing.
However, when they employ decentralized pricing, it is important to tie a higher level of
incentives to the compensations of the salespeople [79]. Indeed, many firms are starting
to employ price optimization software, where they can control pricing centrally specify-
ing metrics such as revenue, volume and profit and leaving the execution to salespeople
[79, 106].
3.5.2 Nonidentical Firms
In this section, we study the first stage equilibrium decisions for nonidentical firms, which
do not necessarily have problem parameters as equal. We identify a similar condition as in
the identical firm case for the dominance of the equilibrium outcome (C,C).

















Similar to the interpretation for Proposition 14, Proposition 15 states that when the per-
centage of customers lost through price competition (with respect to the total number of
customers lost through own price effects) is greater for both firms than that lost through
lead-time competition, a centralized organizational structure is dominant for both firms.













In other words, the percentage of customers that Firm 2 loses through price competition is
higher than that by lead-time competition, while the opposite holds for Firm 1. We may
observe this when Firm 2’s reputation is based more on low prices, while Firm 1’s repu-
tation on speed of delivery, and thus, customers are more aware of competitor prices for
Firm 2 and competitor lead-times for Firm 1. For example, in the express postal deliv-
ery industry, generally, FedEx has been perceived as the most time sensitive carrier in the
business along with its successful tracking system, while the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
offers speed at a relatively low cost without the time guarantee and accurate tracking capa-
bility [118, 108]. Therefore, customers expect delivery speed and reliability from FedEx
and low prices from the USPS, and are in general more sensitive to when their package is
delivered by FedEx and what they pay for their delivery to USPS. In this respect, FedEx
competes for time sensitive customers more intensely against UPS and DHL for which the
USPS prices can be viewed as “the floor level [of pricing]" [7]. On the other hand, the
USPS may face competition in price sensitive market segments through different products
offered by these carriers. For example, catalog retailers who would trade delivery speed for
lower rates were some of the biggest customers of the USPS “Parcel Select" service. UPS
decided to target those price-sensitive large-volume shippers offering inexpensive products
who do not need expedited or guaranteed delivery through its “UPS Basic" Service, which
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was soon followed by a similar service from FedEx [64, 76]. In our context, condition (25)
could apply to FedEx as Firm 1 vs. the USPS as Firm 2 in express mail services, while the
latter case of catalog retailers would correspond to a market, where price competition is in
general more intense than lead-time competition, i.e., condition (24).
As price competition is more effective than lead-time competition for Firm 2 under
condition (25), the net effect of lower prices and longer lead-times of Firm 2’s decentral-
ized structure is a decrease on the derived market potential of Firm 1. Thus, it holds that
(C,C)12  (C,D)12 and (D,C)12  (D,D)12, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 15,
and a centralized organizational structure is dominant for Firm 2. Similarly, if the net effect
of Firm 1’s decentralized structure on the derived market potential of Firm 2 is a decrease,
(C,C)12  (D,C)12 and (C,D)12  (D,D)12 and a centralized structure is also dominant
for Firm 1. On the other hand, if the net effect is positive, Firm 2 generates higher profits
under (D,C) than (C,C) and under (D,D) than (C,D). We can observe this ordering of sce-
narios for Firm 2 in the example in Table 3. As the percentage of customers Firm 1 loses
through lead-time competition is high, Firm 2 benefits from the longer lead-times quoted
by a decentralized competitor and generates the highest profits under (D,C). On the other
hand, for Firm 1, we observe that a centralized structure is dominant under β12 = 2, while
a decentralized structure is dominant under a higher β12 = 3.9, which is consistent with our
expectations based on the previous example. Under β12 = 3.9, the cross-price sensitivity
of customers is much lower for Firm 1 than for Firm 2, and a unit price increase by Firm
2 results in a larger number of customers to switch to Firm 1 than vice versa. Thus, Firm
1 can not only charge prices higher than Firm 2, but it can also charge prices high enough
such that a decentralized structure does not hurt margins. We can summarize our findings
with the following observation.
Observation 9 The firm with a competitive advantage over the quoted prices can bene-
fit from a decentralized organizational structure in which case the competitor prefers a
centralized structure.
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Table 3: Comparison of Scenarios for Non-identical Firms with Different Cross Sensitivi-
ties.
β12 γ12 Firm 1 Firm 2
2 1 (C,C)1  (D,C)1  (C,D)1  (D,D)1 (D,C)2  (C,C)2  (D,D)2  (C,D)2
3.9 1 (D,C)1  (C,C)1  (D,D)1  (C,D)1
(a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, m = 15.1, s = 0.95, µ = 30, β21 = 2, γ21 = 3.)
3.5.2.1 Effect of Capacity
In this section, we analyze the effect of capacity on the competition and firm profits. Partic-
ularly, we consider the effects of a capacity difference between the two firms with all other
parameters being equal. In Figures 10 (i-ii) and 11 (i-ii), we provide a comparison of all
scenarios for each firm as the capacity of Firm 1 changes, while Firm 2 has a fixed capacity
(µ2 = 25)6. We display the dominant scenario right below each figure on a different scale
for better visibility (Figures 10 (iii-iv) and 11 (iii-iv)). Instead of providing absolute profit
figures, we measure the profit generated under each scenario in the percent profit increase
over (C,C). Note that all the following examples have price competition less intense than
lead-time competition (βb <
γ
c ) so that we can explore cases, where a decentralized structure
may be more profitable than a centralized structure.
Figure 10 represents a parameter setting, where the intensity of price competition is
low (β/b = 1/4) and the significance of “net own" price effects is high ((b − β)/b = 3/4).
Under this setting, both firms need to quote low prices to keep customers in the market and
concentrate more on their own prices than competitor prices. As the intensity of lead-time
competition is high (γ/c = 3.9/4), the firm with higher capacity will be able to use its
competitive advantage through lower lead-times. Given that the significance of “net-own"
price effects is high, both firms prefer a centralized structure regardless of the capacity
level at Firm 1, which is consistent with our observations based on Table 27. Similar to our
6Parameter values for Figures 10 and 11 are (a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, m = 15.1, s = 0.95, µ2 = 25, β =
1, γ = 3.9) and (a = 100, b = 4, c = 4, m = 15.1, s = 0.95, µ2 = 25, β = 3, γ = 3.9), respectively.
7(C,C)1  (D,C)1 and (C,D)1  (D,D)1 for Firm 1, and (C,C)2  (C,D)2 and (D,C)2  (D,D)2 for
Firm 2.
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(iii) Dominant (iv) Dominant
Figure 10: Comparison of Scenarios with respect to Firm 1 Capacity when the intensity of
price competition is low (β = 1)
observations in the identical firm case (Figure 7), not only does Firm 1 lose significantly
with a decentralized structure under high capacity, but it also harms its competitor (Figure
10 (i-ii)).
We also observe that (C,D) is the dominant scenario for Firm 1 at all capacity levels. As
more capacity becomes available, Firm 1 prefers a centralized structure to make better use
of the capacity. As the unit production cost is high, it is not able to cut prices aggressively.
However, it prefers a decentralized competitor to use its competitive advantage through
lead-times, as Firm 2 will quote longer lead-times with a decentralized structure than a
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centralized structure and lose more market share to Firm 18. For Firm 2, (D,C) is the
dominant scenario until the capacity level at Firm 1 becomes a competitive disadvantage.
In other words, Firm 2 also benefits from a decentralized competitor initially. However,
after a certain point, Firm 2 loses its lead-time advantage and starts to hurt from Firm 1’s
decentralized structure, as Firm 1 gains a larger market share given its aggressively low
prices.
Observation 10 When the intensity of lead-time competition is high and the intensity of
price competition is low, the firm with higher capacity benefits from a centralized orga-
nizational structure and a decentralized competitor, although a centralized organizational
structure is dominant for its competitor.
In Figure 11, the intensity of price competition is high (β/b = 3/4), while the signif-
icance of “net own" price effects is low. Under this setting, higher prices can be quoted,
and thus, both firms will be more aware of competitor prices and make their decisions
accordingly. The firm with higher capacity will be able to use its competitive advantage
through not only lower lead-times but also lower prices. We still observe that a decentral-
ized structure for Firm 1 under high capacity results in loss of profits for its own as well as
its competitor. Moreover, Firm 1 still benefits from a decentralized competitor, however,
it now prefers to employ a decentralized structure up to a certain capacity. Lower prices
under a decentralized structure can compete with Firm 2 prices effectively without hurting
profits, given that the margins are already high. Beyond this point, aggressive prices driven
by the marketing department generates too much demand given the flexibility provided by
high capacity, which makes a centralized structure dominant. Firm 2 also benefits from a
decentralized competitor until increasing capacity at Firm 1 becomes a disadvantage with
a large number of customers switching to Firm 1, given its aggressively low prices and
lead-times. Even though a decentralized structure provides Firm 2 lower prices to compete
8Note that although Firm 2 quotes lower prices in a decentralized organizational structure, Firm 1 is able
to match those given its high capacity.
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(iii) Dominant (iv) Dominant
Figure 11: Comparison of Scenarios with respect to Firm 1 Capacity when the intensity of
price competition is high (β = 3)
against Firm 1, in order to keep its market share as high as possible given its limited capac-
ity, a centralized structure becomes more profitable when it cannot lower its prices further
in response to Firm 1 (µ1 ≈ 80), and instead chooses to compete with lower lead-times.
Observation 11 When price competition is highly intense but less effective than lead-time
competition, each firm may benefit from a decentralized organizational structure until in-
creasing capacity at one firm becomes a disadvantage.
Concisely, although a firm may benefit from a decentralized structure under limited
capacity facing a limited capacity competitor, a centralized structure is dominant under high
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capacity or while competing against a high capacity firm. Docters et al. ([37]) discuss that
employing centralized or decentralized pricing depends on the market, i.e., competitors,
customers and economics, and point out the case of Home Depot. When Home Depot was
at the stage of expansion following its foundation, it did not face strong competitors and
employed decentralized pricing at the local store level. However, after starting to encounter
strong and comparable competitors such as Lowe’s, it switched to a centralized pricing
structure tightly controlling prices and costs at the corporate level, which is consistent with
our findings.
3.6 Special Cases
In this section, we discuss some special cases for analytical insights.
3.6.1 Price Competition for Uncapacitated Firms
In this section, we assume that both firms have constant lead-times, Li, i = 1, 2, and no
capacity restrictions, and thus, no reliability constraints. This corresponds to a pure mar-
keting problem with the objective of profit maximization in the centralized organizational
structure and revenue maximization in the decentralized organizational structure. The best













We solve for the unique equilibrium and observe the following:
• p∗i· decreases in L j if
βi j
b j
> 2γi jc j : If the percentage of customers that switch by price
differentiation is twice the percentage of customers that switch by lead-time differ-
entiation, price should be decreased as the lead-time of the competitor increases.
Otherwise, price should be increased.
• p∗i· − p
∗
j· increases in L j − Li: The intensity of price differentiation increases in the
intensity of lead-time differentiation.
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In Table 4, we compare all four scenarios for the optimal quoted prices and generated






. We observe the following:
Table 4: Unconstrained Price Competition
m1/m2 Price Demand
(0, β122b1 ) p1(C,C) > p1(D,C) > p1(C,D) > p1(D,D) λ1(C,D) < λ1(D,D) < λ1(C,C) < λ1(D,C)
p2(C,C) > p2(D,C) > p2(C,D) > p2(D,D) λ2(D,C) < λ2(C,C) < λ2(D,D) < λ2(C,D)
[ β122b1 , A1) p1(C,C) > p1(C,D) ≥ p1(D,C) > p1(D,D) λ1(C,D) < λ1(D,D) < λ1(C,C) < λ1(D,C)
p2(C,C) > p2(D,C) > p2(C,D) > p2(D,D) λ2(D,C) < λ2(C,C) < λ2(D,D) < λ2(C,D)
[A1, A2) p1(C,C) > p1(C,D) > p1(D,C) > p1(D,D) λ1(C,D) < λ1(C,C) ≤ λ1(D,D) < λ1(D,C)
p2(C,C) > p2(D,C) > p2(C,D) > p2(D,D) λ2(D,C) < λ2(C,C) < λ2(D,D) < λ2(C,D)
[A2, 2b2β21 ) p1(C,C) > p1(C,D) > p1(D,C) > p1(D,D) λ1(C,D) < λ1(C,C) < λ1(D,D) < λ1(D,C)
p2(C,C) > p2(D,C) > p2(C,D) > p2(D,D) λ2(D,C) < λ2(D,D) ≤ λ2(C,C) < λ2(C,D)
[2b2
β21
,−) p1(C,C) > p1(C,D) > p1(D,C) > p1(D,D) λ1(C,D) < λ1(C,C) < λ1(D,D) < λ1(D,C)
p2(C,C) > p2(C,D) ≥ p2(D,C) > p2(D,D) λ2(D,C) < λ2(D,D) < λ2(C,C) < λ2(C,D)
• Prices and profits are highest when both firms are centralized and lowest when both
are decentralized.
• The lowest demand for firm 1 (2) and highest demand for firm 2 (1) are generated
in a hybrid scenario when firm 1 (2) is centralized and firm 2 (1) is decentralized.
Moreover, being the centralized firm in a hybrid scenario does not always result in
higher prices or profits than being the decentralized firm.
• In the case of identical firms, where all parameters are equal for both firms including
L1 = L2 = L, we have m1 = m2 and m1/m2 = 1 ∈ (A1, A2). We observe that
being decentralized generates higher demand for both firms than being centralized.
Although the decentralized firm in a hybrid scenario quotes lower prices than the
centralized firm, it may generate higher profits if
bm




Note that as β increases, the term on the left-hand side decreases, while the term
on the right-hand side increases making it more likely for the inequality to hold.
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This result is consistent with our findings based on Table 2 that as the intensity of
price competition, (β/b), increases, the decentralized firm in a hybrid scenario may
generate higher profits than the centralized firm.





When prices are constant, the problem turns into a pure production problem. As long as
pi ≥ mi, i = 1, 2, which we can assume to avoid triviality, the problem for the best response
of firm i = 1, 2 under the centralized and decentralized organizational structures is given by
Equation (20) for i = 1, 2. Therefore, the equilibrium solution under all structures is equal
and given by the simultaneous solution of Equation (26) for i, j = 1, 2, j , i.
ciL2i − (ai + βi j p j + γi jL j − bi pi − µi)Li − ki = 0 (26)





a − (b − β)p − µ +
√
(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4k(c − γ)
2(c − γ)
We observe that the optimal lead-time decreases in the quoted price, increases in the cross
price sensitivity and cross lead-time sensitivity.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we study two firms that compete on the basis of price and lead-time de-
cisions in a common market. We analyze the impact of the decentralization of price and
lead-time decisions, as quoted by the marketing and production departments, respectively,
when one or both firms compete with a decentralized organizational structure. We show the
existence of a unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium under all outcomes from the first
stage of the game, where organizational structures are determined. We observe that a firm’s
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preference for a centralized or decentralized structure, given its competitor’s structure, may
change depending on market and firm characteristics. Our key findings are as follows:
• When price competition is more intense than lead-time competition in the market, a
centralized organizational structure is dominant for both firms.
• The firm with an increased advantage over price competition can benefit from a de-
centralized structure in which case the competitor prefers a centralized structure.
• A centralized structure is dominant under high capacity. Moreover, higher capacity
does not always result in higher profits under competition even if it comes for free.
For non-identical firms, when price competition is highly intense but less effective
than lead-time competition, each firm may benefit from a decentralized structure until
increasing capacity at one firm becomes a disadvantage.
• For identical firms, when the intensity of price competition is high but less effective
than lead-time competition, firms may benefit from a decentralized structure even
under high production costs.
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CHAPTER IV
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOR ESTIMATING PRICE
ELASTICITIES IN THE TRAVEL INDUSTRY
4.1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) refers to the strategy and tactics of managing capacity by con-
trolling price and availability to maximize revenue [100]. RM has originated from passen-
ger airlines, and is frequently used in the travel and hospitality industry, i.e., airlines, hotels,
rail operators, car rental agencies, etc., where inventory is perishable. In other words, once
a plane departs, unsold capacity is wasted.
In passenger travel industry, a product is defined by an itinerary, i.e. an origin-destination
pair and a departure date, on the resource (e.g., aircraft, train). Product differentiation be-
comes important when different types of customers have different willingness to pay. In
general, business customers are less sensitive to price and book closer to the day of depar-
ture, while leisure customers are more sensitive to price but can accept reduced flexibility in
a form of advanced booking or Saturday night stay for lower prices. Market segmentation,
which is used to define various types of products (or virtual products as referred in [100]),
is usually based on (i) compartments (e.g., first class, business, economy), (ii) restrictions
on the ticket (e.g. advance purchase, Saturday night stay, non-refundable).
In RM systems, inventory is controlled by buckets or fare classes. In traditional RM,
fare classes are defined by a set of restrictions on who can purchase the product and when
and associated prices. Protection/authorization levels need to be set for each fare class such
that high fare seats are protected until a few days before departure from the “low fare”
leisure travelers. A nested fare class approach, where each fare class has access to all of the
inventory available to lower-fare classes, is common for capacity allocation. The business
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problem in traditional RM is to choose which fare classes to open and close at a given
day-to-departure to maximize revenue.
Over the past few years, the passenger travel industry has been transformed by the
increasing availability of low-cost carriers, the visibility offered by the internet, and cus-
tomers becoming more conscious of low prices [60, 22]. Thus, carriers tend to decrease
the range of restrictions and offer a limited number of differentiated products at a range
of multiple prices, which are mapped to different fare classes. When fare classes become
different price points for the same product, customers tend to book in the class with the
minimum available fare. A traditional RM system will observe this phenomenon as de-
creased demand for higher fare classes, and forecasts will overestimate low-fare demand
at the expense of high-fare demand and set lower protection levels for higher fare classes.
Customers then book at the lower price point leading to a spiral-down of revenues as more
tickets are made available at the lower fare class [32].
In this new context, where there is no clear fare order and fare class demand depends
mainly on which other classes are open, new RM systems also need to assist in choosing
which products to offer and the associated price points for those products [60]. In order
to better serve this purpose, accurate estimation of the price sensitivity of customers plays
an important role. JDA Software Group, Inc., a leading solutions and software provider in
pricing and revenue optimization, reports that “Price-Sensitive Revenue Management is all
about understanding customer price sensitivity - not just about managing booking classes”
[60]. In this chapter, we explore how to obtain better price sensitivity estimates through an
empirical study based on the data of one of the international high speed rail operator clients
of JDA Software.
When estimating market response models and calculating price elasticities based on
historical data, a phenomenon that deteriorates the quality of the model estimates is en-
dogeneity. A price endogeneity problem can arise when the price determination process
66
involves significant interplay of supply and demand. Such interaction may result in si-
multaneous equation bias, which corresponds to bias and inconsistency in the least square
estimates of demand parameters. Price endogeneity is particularly relevant in analyzing
demand for differentiated products [36]. Bijmolt et al. ([16]) present a meta-analysis of
price elasticity with new empirical generalizations on its determinants based on 81 studies,
and find that accommodating price endogeneity has strong impact on price elasticities.
The endogeneity problem has been widely studied in retail contexts, and although it is
quite prevalent in RM contexts, published work in this area is lacking. Talluri and van Ryzin
([121]) discuss endogeneity and heterogeneity as two nonstandard estimation problems that
are of particular importance for RM applications. When carriers observe or anticipate high
demand, they often react by raising their prices, which results in high price-high demand
and low price-low demand pairs in the data. This is especially true as it gets closer to the
day of departure or during high season periods such as Christmas, summer, etc. Several
studies in the retail industry have shown that the estimate of the price response parameter
is biased downward when the endogeneity of prices are ignored ([11, 13, 31, 130]). In this
study, we empirically demonstrate the presence of the endogeneity problem in a passenger
travel context using data from an international high speed rail operator from Europe. We
consider the impact of both price and time-related factors on the number of tickets sold
for a specific origin-destination pair. We group trains that show a similar demand pattern
during the day through a mixture of Gaussians approach, creating departure time slots that
define ‘Morning’, ‘Afternoon’ and ‘Evening’. We estimate separate regression models for
each market classification group, which we define by point of sale country (outbound vs.
inbound trip), compartment (first/economy), advance vs. late purchase, Saturday night stay
and departure time slots. The major difficulty in this problem arises as a result of the signifi-
cant increase in the number of tickets sold as it gets closer to the day of departure, while the
prices also increase. Thus, the “days left to departure” component introduces a secondary
time dimension into the problem besides the departure date, which differentiates the nature
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of the problem from typical retail contexts. In order to control for endogeneity, we em-
ploy an instrumental variable approach via two stage least squares estimation (2SLS). As
instruments, we choose to include the average prices lagged by “reading days", which are
different days left points at which the observed demand is checked against inventory and
lower fare buckets are closed as necessary, for each departure date and classification group.
We contrast the results from the 2SLS estimation with those from the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation. We show that if one does not account for endogeneity, price elasticities
may induce an upward-sloping demand curve suggesting that high price produces high
demand, or may be biased downward to the extent that elastic demand curves are incor-
rectly classified as inelastic. The estimated price elasticities are also found to be intuitive
as advance purchasers with Saturday night stay being the most elastic market segment.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. We begin by presenting a theoretical
background on the endogeneity problem in market response models along with a summary
of the relevant literature both in retail and travel contexts. In Section 4.3, we provide a pre-
liminary analysis for insights on the data characteristics identifying important factors and
defining market segments. We also show the results from a “naïve” OLS regression model.
In Section 4.4, we redefine our regression model and introduce instrumental variables. We
provide a comparison of the estimation results from OLS and 2SLS models, and discuss
the insights for both the economy and first classes. We conclude the chapter in Section 4.5.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Endogeneity in Market Response Models
Endogeneity is a common problem encountered while estimating coefficients of market re-
sponse models based on historical data, and results from the interaction between supply
and demand. The endogeneity problem is more prevalent in naturally occurring data than
in traditional market research data such as those collected by questionnaires or surveys, and
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is less of a problem for experimental data [111]. It has been studied widely in retail con-
texts, especially on brand choice models, where it arises when there are variables for which
data are not available, i.e., demand shocks that are unobservable to the researcher such as
shelf space allocation, unobserved advertising or coupon availability, changes of prices of
competing goods, changes in the economic outlook or weather, etc. or demand shocks that
are difficult to quantify for the researcher such as aspects of style, prestige, reputation, past
experience, which could influence a brand’s sales in the given period [129]. These other
marketing activities are part of the error term in the estimation and the endogeneity prob-
lem arises as a result of the correlation between the price variable and the error term. Not
accounting for this correlation will give incorrect estimates for the effects of the included
marketing variables or demand curves sloping upward in price [30, 12].
In empirical studies, researchers have used two approaches to control for price en-
dogeneity. The first approach is the full information approach, which involves the ex-
plicit specification of supply equations reflecting strategic firm behavior and the simulta-
neous estimation of both demand and supply equations. Several researchers employ a full-
information approach, and find that the estimates of the price response parameter are biased
downward when the endogeneity of prices are ignored. Dhar et al. ([36]) test for price and
expenditure endogeneity on market-level sales data of soft drinks using a disaggregate non-
linear almost ideal demand system (AIDS) model, and find that both price and expenditure
endogeneity significantly impacts the consistency of demand parameter estimates. Dra-
ganska and Jain ([39]) develop a likelihood-based method and specify an individual-level
discrete-choice model of demand and derive the supply side assuming Bertrand-Nash com-
petition in prices among manufacturers. Prices and choice probabilities are simulated by
solving for the market equilibrium. Yang et al. ([139]) develop a hierarchical Bayesian
method for estimating simultaneous demand and supply models with applications to both
the analysis of household panel data and aggregated demand data. The method is developed
within the context of a heterogeneous discrete choice model coupled with pricing equations
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derived from competitive structures, such as Bertrand equilibrium, or linear equations used
in instrumental variable estimation. Villas-Boas and Zhao ([130]) model the demand side
through a latent utility framework that allows for a no-purchase option and the supply side
through the profit-maximizing decisions of multiple manufacturers and a multi-product re-
tailer. The authors find that not accounting for demand endogeneity can create bias in the
estimation, where the retailer prices are below the profit-maximizing prices for two of the
three brands, and the marginal wholesale prices are below the Nash equilibrium uniform
wholesale prices for two brands. Besanko et al. ([13]) model prices as the equilibrium
outcomes of a Nash competition among manufacturers and retailers with a logit demand
model, and find that the price endogeneity effect is statistically significant and the estimates
of the price response parameter are biased downward when the endogeneity of prices are
ignored.
Capturing the strategic properties of pricing in a simple model may be difficult, and
imposing the wrong supply-side model will contaminate the estimates for the demand pa-
rameters [31, 129]. In [128], it is shown that if the assumptions made in the full information
model are not true, then the full information approach may yield inconsistent estimates for
the parameters, while a limited information approach may still yield consistent estimates
if the “limited” information is true. The limited information approach is more flexible
and involves the instrumental variables (IV) technique, where a set of instruments that are
correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with residual errors need to be de-
termined [92]. Although nonlinearity of the demand model makes the application of the IV
technique difficult in a discrete-choice utility framework, the IV technique is a straightfor-
ward application for consistent estimation of demand parameters in linear models such as
the constant elasticity model. For a comparison of full information estimation with limited
information estimation in non-linear models, the reader is referred to [128]. All exogenous
variables in the utility/demand equation plus lagged prices [30, 129, 139, 68], wholesale
prices (or costs) [129, 31, 115] and own/cross product characteristics [11] are among the
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commonly used instrumental variables. Note that in cases where forward buying and stock-
piling are prevalent, lagged prices could be correlated with the utility equation error terms,
which would make lagged prices inappropriate instruments [129].
Villas-Boas and Winer [129] test price endogeneity using simulated maximum likeli-
hood on scanner panel data from two product categories, while Kuksov and Villas-Boas
([68]) present a quasi-likelihood method to consistently estimate parameters and test for
endogeneity under unobserved consumer heterogeneity, common shocks, and endogenous
firm behavior through differences in GMM coefficient estimates of a model with and with-
out instrumenting for the explanatory variables. Blundell and Powell ([17]) develop semi-
parametric methods for estimating binary choice models with continuous endogenous re-
gressors. The approach to detect the presence of endogeneity in [129, 17] is generally re-
ferred to as a control function approach, where the endogenous variable is regressed against
exogenous instruments, and the residual from this regression is entered as an additional ex-
planatory variable in utility. Another widely used approach for dealing with endogeneity
in discrete choice models is the BLP approach [12, 11], which uses an inversion procedure
to transform the nonlinear choice function into a linear one in price, allowing standard IV
procedures to be used. The BLP method is particularly useful since the distribution of er-
rors around their conditional means need not be known or estimated. Using this procedure
on aggregate data in the automobile market, Berry et al. ([11]) find that ignoring price
endogeneity lead to price response coefficients that are only about half as large as they
are under instrumental variables techniques. Chintagunta ([30]) proposes a probit model,
which avoids the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property that affects the logit
model at the individual consumer level, to specify the aggregate demand functions of firms
competing in oligopoly markets. Chintagunta et al. ([31]) use a random-coefficients logit
model to account for the presence of unobservable product attributes and employ an IV ap-
proach. They use household panel margarine data for empirical analysis. Song and Chinta-
gunta ([115]) study the cross-category effects of marketing activities using a second-order
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Taylor series approximation to an arbitrary utility function to represent bundle utility on
aggregate store level data. Petrin and Train ([99]) develop a class of overidentification tests
of specification, which include both conditional moment and control function type tests,
for the problem of omitted attributes in differentiated product models. The first stage in
the estimation method is a regression and the second stage is maximization of a likelihood
function. The approach is tested on three empirical applications; television reception op-
tions for household-level cross-sectional data in [99] and automobile market for aggregate
data and margarine for household-level panel data in a later work [98].
So far, we have mainly discussed the endogeneity problem in discrete choice models.
However, double-logarithmic, or equivalently, constant elasticity models are still very pop-
ular in RM practice, although there is a movement towards choice modeling [120, 126].
When a linear demand model is compared with a discrete choice model, one favors the
latter as it requires estimation of fewer parameters (including own and cross effects), as
compared to the former. Moreover, it seldom results in parameter estimates with incorrect
signs for own and cross effects, as is the case with linear demand systems and their vari-
ants. Chintagunta ([30]) estimates the demand function parameters of a log-log model in
comparison with a probit model for brand choice and finds that the estimated elasticities
could be signed in such that they are not useful for firm-level pricing decisions. Song and
Chintagunta ([115]) compare the estimated elasticities from their logit model to those ob-
tained from the log-log regression model and also find that the proposed model produces
more reasonable estimates. The biggest drawback of a discrete choice model under the RM
context is that it requires the total market size as well as competitor information, which are
not readily available. It is still possible to construct a discrete choice model using different
itineraries/product types as alternatives, but it is quite challenging. As most of the current
RM systems still use a log-log model, we also use a log-log model for our analysis, and
leave discrete choice modeling for future research.
We next give a brief theoretical summary for endogeneity. Consider the following
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regression model:
y = α + βx + ε (27)
where y is the dependent variable (n x 1), x is the set of independent variables (n x K)
and ε is the error term. One of the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) is that
COV(x, ε) = 0, where COV represents the covariance function. In case of endogeneity,
COV(x, ε) , 0 and standard OLS estimates are inconsistent, i.e., as the sample size ap-
proaches infinity, the estimates of the parameters on average will not equal the population
estimates. One of the most common approaches to control for endogeneity is the two-stage
least squares regression (2SLS) method, which is a type of IV procedure. In order to imple-
ment 2SLS and obtain consistent parameter estimates, the selected instruments, z (n x L),
must satisfy two conditions:
1. COV(z, ε) = 0.
2. COV(z, x) > 0.
The only condition for identification is that there should be a sufficient number of instru-
ments for the independent endogenous variables that are fully correlated with these vari-
ables. Typically, all exogenous variables in the original OLS equation and external vari-
ables at least as many as the number of independent endogenous variables are used as
instruments in the first stage OLS (L ≥ K). Then, the 2SLS procedure gives the parameter
estimates as follows:
1. Run the first stage OLS regression for x on z, and get predictions for x; x̂.
2. Run the second stage OLS regression for y on x̂.
There are mainly two methods to test for the presence of endogeneity.
• Regression of an endogenous variable on a set of exogenous variables generates
residual errors that uncover information related to the bias in demand-side errors.
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The resulting residuals are used as an independent variable in the demand specifi-
cation and tested for the significance of the corresponding parameter, which would
indicate that the unexplained variation of the endogenous variable also affects the
variations in demand, implying the endogeneity of the variable. This method is em-
ployed in [129].
• The other approach tests for the consistency of parameter estimates, and is known
as the Hausman (or Durbin-Wu-Hausman) test [54]. First, the potential endogenous
variables in the demand system are identified. The test is based on the difference
between parameter estimates with and without controlling for potential endogeneity.
The null hypothesis is that parameters estimated without controlling for endogeneity
are consistent. Rejecting the null hypothesis implies endogeneity of the explanatory
variables. SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) estimator provides consistent esti-
mates of the demand parameters under the null hypothesis. 2SLS (two-stage least
squares) estimator is consistent under both cases. 3SLS (three-stage least squares)
is consistent when prices are endogenous. In [68], endogeneity is tested via the dif-
ferences in generalized method of moments (GMM) coefficient estimates of a model
with and without instrumenting for the explanatory variables. The Hausman test
statistic is
H = (βIV − βOLS )T
[
S E2(βIV) − S E2(βOLS )
]−1
(βIV − βOLS ) (28)
and is distributed as a chi-square variable with degrees of freedom equal to the num-
ber of variables being tested for endogeneity.
If valid instruments are selected, the correlation between the error term and the indepen-
dent variable becomes corrected using the fitted values of the independent variable through
the instruments. Note that the standard errors from the two-step procedure will be incorrect,
and therefore, it is recommended to use a direct 2SLS/IV approach from statistical pack-
ages such as SAS, STATA, etc. As the number of instruments gets larger, more efficiency is
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obtained. However, the small sample bias of the estimator may get worse and since degrees
of freedom are lost, the power of statistical tests will weaken. Sargan ([109]) suggests an
over-identification test that checks whether the extra instruments, which over-identify the
model, are valid for the specification.
1. Regress the second stage residuals against all the instruments and get the R2.
2. Form the test statistic: NR2, where N is the sample size.
3. The test statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of instruments less the number of right hand side (RHS) variables in the
original equation (L − K).
4. If the statistic is significant, then an over-identification problem exists.
4.2.2 Price Elasticity Estimation in Passenger Travel Industry
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first empirical work to consider price endogene-
ity in the passenger travel industry incorporating concepts specific to RM, such as price
changes at different days left to departure and availability controls, along with the time
component, such as departure date and time, and market segmentation. There have been
some recent studies that try to find out the determinants of air fares such as [117, 127, 82].
In [117], the research question is whether price discrimination increases with competition
in the market. A log-linear price regression model is used, where some of the factors con-
sidered are the market share of the airlines, distance between origin and destination, last
day prior to the departure where the fare was offered, advance purchase, Saturday night
stay and a first class dummy. The data is cross-sectional pertaining to Thursdays only. In
[82], a dynamic price discrimination model with price commitment is considered. Price
regression is performed on data collected from airline/agent websites for three days of the
week for five weeks. Some of the independent factors that are included in the model are
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days left to departure, weekly indicators, time of day indicators, airline indicators and ori-
gin specific factors. In [127], the effect of internet on air fares is explored and it is found
that the internet transparency increases the spread between restricted and unrestricted fares.
A market-level hierarchical random effects model is used for price regression. The factors
that are considered are origin-destination specific factors (such as income and population
size), distance, oil prices and time-level random effects, where time refers to the time spent
in internet search activities.
There have also been studies that estimate price elasticities for passenger air travel with
endogeneity considerations. In [25, 51, 62], intercity air travel is considered on cross-
sectional aggregate demand data. Both papers include flight frequency, aircraft size, travel
time and income as independent variables. In [51], price is chosen as the weighted average
airfare per class, where the classes are economy, unrestricted economy and business, and
is treated as an endogenous variable. The instrument for 2SLS is selected as a Herfindahl
index calculated as the sum of the squares of flight frequency shares of each airline in the
market. In [62], the price variable is chosen as the cheapest unrestricted economy fare,
and indicators for the existence of moderately and highly discounted fares are included.
Flight frequency, aircraft size and price are treated as exogenous, and total capacity volume
on the route, country specific dummies and dummy for deregulated markets are used as
instruments for 2SLS. In [25], a similar setting is considered, however, fare elasticities are
estimated per route at a specific airline level. Time component is also considered. Daily
demand for two months in three years is aggregated at the level of two main fare classes;
business and economy. Year and weekend indicators are also included as independent
variables. Frequency of flights is the only endogenous variable in the model, however, the
authors do not find a significant difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates with fuel
costs as instruments.
In [4], the effect of quality of service, which is defined as the frequency delay difference
between the desired and nearest offered departure time and unavailability of one’s preferred
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nearest departure date, is explored. Monthly data for business and leisure classes between
different origin and destination pairs are considered in simultaneous equations. Price is
defined as the “full trip price”, which is the airfare plus the value of time. Lagged dependent
variables are included in the model. 1-month lagged price variables are used as instruments
for 2SLS. In [52], price transparency from online agents is studied using cross-sectional
data for one year between origin destination pairs. Tickets sold are aggregated by agency
type (Expedia, Travelocity, Orbitz, Hotwire, airline website or offline), time of purchase
(days left to departure) and season (peak/off-peak). Travel time, agency dummies and
income are also included. Instruments for price are selected as mileage, online agency
dummy and Herfindahl index, which is the sum of squares of the market shares of the
different airlines that serve a city-pair, but endogeneity is not found to be significant. In
[94], the full information approach is employed for endogeneity. Simultaneous duopoly
and monopoly equations are estimated using aggregated quarterly data of two competitors,
American Airlines and United Airlines. The price is defined as the average weighted price
charged per passenger on a given route by an airline. Cost per passenger mile is included
for supply side modeling. A similar setting is also considered in [10], where the available
data are aggregated to the level of the airline/route/fare on a quarterly basis. In either
paper, capacity, days left to departure or ticket restrictions are not considered. Finally, [10]
introduces an explicit unobserved product characteristic, which is correlated with prices, to
help control for these unobserved restrictions and uses the BLP approach on a logit model,
where product price, product market shares and spoke densities are treated as endogenous.
Instruments for spoke densities are chosen as population and network characteristics at the
endpoint cities, and additional instruments for price and markups include the characteristics
of other products in the market.
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4.3 Preliminary Data Analysis
The passenger rail industry is very close to the passenger air industry in terms of the prin-
ciples of the RM systems with some differences on the product definition; a smaller range
of restrictions, and fewer price points. The structural differences are that:
1. Passengers can usually buy tickets on the train,
2. There are various stations between the end points of a train’s origin and destination,
so passengers can get on/off at any station
3. There is usually excess/inflexible capacity,
4. There is a large number of trains that run per day for the same origin-destination pair.
As in [25], we consider price elasticity estimation at a specific company level in contrast
to all the studies based on aggregate origin-destination demand. The company of interest
is one of the international high speed rail operator clients of JDA Software Group, Inc.
High-speed/long-haul rail operators are closer to airlines, and their major competitors are
low cost air carriers. They use advanced booking and 100% check-in. Given the long-haul
structure of the business, only the major origin-destination pairs are of interest for us. We
also note that since the trains are almost never full, capacity is rarely an issue. Therefore,
we do not consider unconstrained demand within the scope of this study.
The company’s RM system lies between a traditional RM system and a “lowest avail-
able fare” system:
• There are two compartments; first class and economy.
• There are several product types per compartment. Each product type is mapped to a
fare class, where fare classes represent different fare levels.
• Only one fare class is effectively on sale at any one time (lowest available fare for the
product type).
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• Fare classes are opened and closed with control over availability to change prices for
a range of product types.
We use the SAS software for all statistical analyses in this chapter. We analyze ticketing
data for all trains operating in the time period of April 2004 - March 2005 from station
“ABC” to station“DEF”, which is a major international market1. Note that we consider
directional routes, i.e., ABC to DEF is a different market than DEF to ABC. Therefore, for
round-trip tickets, we calculate the price paid for each direction of the trip as half of the
price for the round-trip ticket. Note that for this company, one-way tickets are mostly half
the price of round-trip tickets, so passengers cannot save much by purchasing round-trip
tickets as it is usually the case for airlines. We also exclude group and special pass ticket
sales out of the analysis as the pricing structure for those fare types are different. Moreover,
we exclude trains that constitute less than 1% of the total ticket sales over the period of
study, as those were found not to be trains of regular operation. Table 5 lists the major
factors/components that we consider in this chapter. The rest of the factors are introduced
later in the chapter. We also use the prefix of ‘ln’ to denote the log-transformation of each
variable (ln_Pax = log(Pax)).
We expect to have differences in price elasticity at a minimum with respect to origin,
destination, compartment and advance purchase. Therefore, we consider four market seg-
ments (MktS egType):
• ‘FrstAdvn’: First Class compartment, advance ticket purchase (≥ 21 days left to
departure)
• ‘FrstLate’: First Class compartment, late ticket purchase (< 21 days left to departure)
• ‘EconAdvn’: Economy Class compartment, advance ticket purchase (≥ 21 days left
to departure)
1Due to confidentiality concerns, we mask company specific information.
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Table 5: Factors/components for the data analysis
Factor Name Factor Description
Pax Number of tickets sold
AvgFare Average price paid for the (one-way) trip
MedFare Median price paid for the (one-way) trip
Cmpt Compartment, ‘Frst’ for first class and ‘Econ’ for economy
MktS egType Market (customer) segment type
PoS Point of sale country, ‘A’ for ‘ABC and ‘D’ for ‘DEF’
Dow Departure day of week
Month Departure month
DeptT ime Departure time
DeptDate Departure date
DaysLe f t Days left to departure
PubHol Public holiday indicator
S atS tay Indicator for ticket purchases with a Saturday night stay
Nconn Number of intermediate stops if the train is not direct
• ‘EconLate’: Economy Class compartment, late ticket purchase (< 21 days left to
departure)
The reason for having a cutoff at 21 days is that purchases at least 21 days in advance
are announced to be discounted at the company website. Thus, the customer is aware of
this information at the time of making a purchase. After converting all prices into a single
currency unit, we saw that prices paid by ‘A’ customers could be different than those paid
by ‘D’ customers for the same trip. So, we also expect to see a differences in price elasticity
with respect to point of sale country. Note that in general, ‘ABC’ to ‘DEF’ would denote
the outbound trip for a ticket sold in ‘A’, while it would denote the inbound or return
trip for a ticket sold in ‘D’. Next, we examine how the number of tickets sold changes
with respect to the time factors in the problem. In all of the following figures, we display
the aggregated demand with respect to the variables in the x − y axes and the specified
classification variables. Although time series forecasting is common for passenger travel
data, given the shortness of the history in our study, we capture seasonality with indicator
variables for day of week and month. Figure 12 displays the number of tickets sold with
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SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT
ECONADVN ECONLATE
(i) PoS =‘A’ (ii) PoS =‘D’
Figure 12: Number of tickets sold vs. Departure day of week
We can make the following observations from Figure 12:
• First class late purchases are relatively low during weekends and uniformly dis-
tributed during week days, which suggests that those purchases are mostly by busi-
ness travelers. For return trips, Monday’s volume is not as high as that of the other
days within the week, which is expected since return trips are more likely to occur
towards the end of the week for business travelers.
• Clearly, Friday is a peak day for outbound economy class purchases, which suggests
that those are leisure travelers that are traveling for the weekend. Likewise, Sunday
and Monday are peak days for return trips, which suggests that those are also leisure
travelers who spent the weekend in ‘A’ and are now returning back to ‘D’.
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• First class advance purchases for outbound trips have a peak on Friday suggesting
that those are also leisure travelers who are willing to pay more or are willing to
travel first class. A similar observation (although not as strong) can be made for
return trips peaking on Sunday for first class advance purchases.
• There is not a strong difference between late vs. advance economy class purchases in
terms of the day of week preference. However, late purchases are mostly higher than
advance purchases. This might be due to the fact that some cost-conscious business
travelers prefer economy class travel for week days, and/or that for some travelers,
purchasing a ticket more than 21 days in advance is still too early for rail travel.
We next analyze the behavior of ticket sales with respect to the departure month in Figure
13. We see that month preference is not as strong as day of week preference. Also, the
advance ticket purchases in April are quite low as compared to those in the other months,
which might be caused by the company changing some of their advance products. Thus, we
exclude the month of April from advance purchase analysis not to bias our results down,
and from late purchase analysis for consistency. For the first class late purchases, we see
that August has the lowest volume, as it is the most common month in Europe for use of
vacation days. For economy class advance purchasers, December is an active month, most
probably due to Christmas, followed by a decrease in sales in January. A similar behavior
is observed in August followed by September for return trips of economy class advance
purchasers, which might be due to back-to-school activity.
The third time component is the departure time of each train. For this route (‘ABC’
to ‘DEF’), on the average, 10-12 trains operate every day. The specific times and the
frequency of service depends on the day of the week. Since including each individual
train leads to sparsity in the problem, we create time slots (define ‘Morning’, ‘Afternoon’
and ‘Evening’) to group trains that show a similar behavior. One might consider arbi-
trarily defining Morning to end at, say, 10am and Afternoon at 4pm. However, no sharp


























































































































































































(i) PoS =‘A’ (ii) PoS =‘D’
Figure 13: Number of tickets sold vs. Departure month
and Evening, and furthermore, the time slot characteristics differ by day of week. Accord-
ingly, we pursue the following data-driven approach for determining appropriate temporal
boundaries between the Morning, Afternoon and Evening time slots. Given the histogram
of the ticket sales distribution with respect to departure time, we find a multi-modal Gaus-
sian distribution that covers the histogram as much as possible through the expectation-
maximization method. Hence, the valleys (local minima) of this aggregate distribution de-
fines the end points of our time slots. Since the departure times depend on the day of week,
and point of sale country and compartment are the major factors for determining the day
of week preference, we create distinct time slots (clusters; TimeS lot) for each PoS , Cmpt
and Dow combination. We model the ticket sales distribution for outbound trips (PoS =‘A’)
as a mixture of three Gaussian functions while that for inbound trips (PoS =‘D’) as a mix-
ture of two Gaussian functions since there was not much ticket sales for the early hours for
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return trips. The specifics of the expectation-maximization method and the complete list
of the parameters and valleys of each time slot is given in the Appendix. Examples of our
derivation for each point of sale country can be seen in Figures 14 and 15. In both figures,
the histogram of ticket sales with respect to departure time is given in the lower portion of
the figure. A mixture of three (two in Figure 15) individual Gaussian distributions, which
are displayed in the upper portion of each figure, is created as the weighted sum of those
distributions, and is displayed as the light blue series in both the upper and lower portions
of each figure. The valleys of these distributions give time slots of 5:00-9:50, 9:51-16:15





































































Figure 14: Multi-modal Gaussian fit for creating outbound trip departure time clusters
































































Figure 15: Multi-modal Gaussian fit for creating inbound trip departure time clusters
(PoS =‘D’, Cmpt=‘Frst’, DOW=‘Tue’)
The final time component is the days left to departure, which makes this problem more
difficult than typical time series problems because of the addition of a second time dimen-
sion related to how the tickets are sold over time. Figure 16 clearly signals the potential
endogeneity phenomenon that we have in this context. The number of tickets sold increases
as it gets closer to the departure date, but so does the average ticket price that was paid.
Because of data sparsity, we aggregate individual ticket sales at the level of PoS ,
TimeS lot, MktS egType, DaysLe f t, DeptDate and S atS tay, and we drop each level for
which no ticket sales were observed. We calculate the average price paid (AvgFare) and



































































































































(iii) PoS =‘A’, CMPT=‘Econ’ (iv) PoS =‘D’, Cmpt=‘Econ’
Figure 16: Number of tickets sold vs. Days Left to Departure
sold. We use 6 indicator variables corresponding to each day of the week (Mon, Tue, Wed,
Thu, Fri, S at, S un), where one indicator is dropped for the reference day of the week, 10
indicators corresponding to each month (Jan, Feb, Mar, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, S ep, Oct,
Nov, Dec), where one indicator is dropped for the reference month, and two indicators for
each time slot (TimeS lot1, TimeS lot2, TimeS lot3), where one time slot is dropped for the
reference time slot. We start with the following log-log regression model, where Tue is
the reference day of the week, Mar is the reference month, and TimeS lot3 is the reference
time slot of the day (TimeS lot1 is the reference time slot of the day when PoS =’D’ and it
86
is dropped from the model):
ln_Pax = ln(α) + β(ln_AvgFare) + b0(DaysLe f t)
+b1S un + . . . + b6S at + b7Jan + . . . + b16Dec
+b17TimeS lot1 + b18TimeS lot2
+b19PubHol + b20ln_AvgConn (29)
We first analyze the Pearson correlation coefficients of all the factors in Equation (29). Ta-
ble 6 displays the significant correlations related with the main variables of interest, ln_Pax
and ln_AvgPrice, that are greater/less than +/−0.20. We can see negative correlation be-
tween days left to departure and the number of tickets sold as well as the average price paid,
confirming our observations from Figure 16 that more tickets are sold and higher prices are
paid as it gets closer to the departure date. The correlation is stronger for late purchases.
We also observe that average prices tend to decrease if the ticket includes a Saturday night
stay, particularly for late purchases. Therefore, we use S atS tay as a classification variable
in our regression. Basic statistics on gross ticket fare can be found in the Appendix, which
further illustrate the difference in the prices paid when there is a Saturday night stay.
Table 7 summarizes the OLS regression results on Equation (29). We only display the
R2 and the estimated coefficient of ln_AvgFare, β̂, for each classification group. Note that
the regression coefficient of price in a constant elasticity model directly gives the price
elasticity. We can see that if a “naïve” regression model is used, all price coefficients
(except one) come out as positive. Moreover, although we do not expect high R2’s because
of the high variability that is inherent in the problem, the R2’s from Model 0 still look quite
low for all classification groups. In the next section, we redefine our model structure and
incorporate instrumental variables to account for endogeneity.
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Table 6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Model 0
Group Pair of Pearson Corr.
PoS MktS egType Variables Coefficient
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ ln_Pax DaysLe f t -0.24
Fri +0.22
ln_AvgFare DaysLe f t -0.26
Fri +0.23
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ ln_Pax ln_AvgFare +0.32
DaysLe f t -0.41
Fri +0.20
ln_AvgFare DaysLe f t -0.40
S atS tay -0.40
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ ln_Pax ln_AvgFare +0.38
DaysLe f t -0.44
S atS tay -0.25
ln_AvgFare DaysLe f t -0.31
S atS tay -0.38
S at -0.22
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ ln_Pax DaysLe f t -0.27
S un +0.26
S atS tay +0.24
ln_AvgFare DaysLe f t -0.26
Fri +0.28
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ ln_Pax TimeS lot2 +0.31
ln_AvgFare DaysLe f t -0.42
S atS tay -0.48
Fri +0.21
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ ln_Pax DaysLe f t -0.21
ln_AvgFare S atS tay -0.55
S un -0.31
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ ln_Pax ln_AvgFare +0.28
DaysLe f t -0.24
S atS tay -0.32
TimeS lot2 +0.29
ln_AvgFare S atS tay -0.54
S un -0.35
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Table 7: OLS Regression Results for Model 0 (R2 and Price Elasticity Estimate)
PoS MktS egType S atS tay R2 β̂
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 0.204 0.102***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 0.370 0.380***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 0.472 0.472***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 0.556 0.382***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 0.071 0.087***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 0.124 0.066***
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 0.454 0.433***
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 0.350 0.219***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 0.233 0.121***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 0.353 0.205***
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 0 0.438 0.407***
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 0.526 -0.213***
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 0.153 NS
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 0.124 0.037**
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 0.407 0.380***




4.4 Redefining the Regression Model Structure - Incorporating Endo-
geneity
In this section, we redefine our model structure to help us better capture the dynamics of
the problem and incorporate endogeneity. First, we consider the days left to departure
component, which still brings considerable sparsity into the problem as it is not quite likely
to observe ticket sales at every days left value, particularly when it is further out from the
departure date. The reason that we desire to include this component is that it is the main
driver of price variation. Prices for different product types are controlled via availability,
i.e., opening and closing of different fare classes or buckets. Note that the rail operator in
this study employs a nested bucket approach. In other words, closed buckets do not usually
get re-opened and the order of closing starts from the lower level (lower fare) bucket. The
revenue manager checks inventory at certain days left points and decides whether to close
a lower level bucket given the current ticket sales and the protection levels for upper level
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(higher fare) buckets. This can also explain why we observe increasing average prices as
it gets closer to the departure date. Those inventory check points are generally referred to
as the “inventory reading days”. Since reading days are the control points that result in
the interaction between supply and demand through the revenue manager’s decisions, we
use reading days for creating days left intervals, and perform aggregation at the reading
days level instead of at the days left level. We call this new variable “RddIndex". Figure 17
shows the mapping between RddIndex and DaysLe f t values. For example, RddIndex = 15
covers the interval from 28 to 34 days left to departure, while RddIndex = DaysLe f t = 0
corresponds to the departure date. It can be observed from Figure 17 that inventory reading
days are less frequent when it is further away from the departure date, and become more
frequent as it gets closer to the departure date converging to one-day intervals (days left
values), which would correspond to checking inventory every day. Note that we combined
RddIndex = 1 and RddIndex = 0 into RddIndex = 1 for POS = ‘D′ as same day purchases
were quite low as compared to purchases on the day prior to the departure date for return
trips.
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Figure 17: Mapping between DaysLe f t and RddIndex
One possible approach to control for the endogeneity in the data is the full-information
approach, where the supply equation would be determined by the capacity allocation prob-
lem of the rail company. However, it is not straightforward to identify an accurate supply
equation in this complex business environment. Moreover, as we discussed before, using
an inaccurate supply equation may give inconsistent estimates while a limited information
approach may still give consistent ones. Therefore, we employ the IV approach for this
problem. The difficulty with the IV technique is that there is no global solution that applies
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to all industries and datasets [92, 121]. We choose to include the average prices lagged by
reading days for each departure date and classification group as instruments. Thus, it is
similar to the common usage of lagged prices as instruments in retail-based studies. How-
ever, we define the “lagging” according to the specifics of this environment, and expect
the increase in the lagged average prices to give a signal of the inventory control decisions
at each reading day, i.e., closing of lower fare buckets, implicitly providing a reason for
increasing prices as it gets closer to the departure date. We call this new lagged average
price variable “lag_AvgFare”.
The other change that we make in our model is re-defining the price term as a ratio
rather than an absolute value. Note that our regression model has time-related terms besides
a price term, and we are interested in the percent change in demand for a percent change
in price, i.e., the elasticity. If the rail operator had known the true “reference price” of
customers and sold tickets only at that price, then, it would have observed some “reference
demand”, which would be due to factors other than price such as time, preference, etc.
In [81], reference prices are defined as the standards against which the purchase price
of a product is judged. Although it is not easy to find out the true reference price of
customers, we use the median price paid in each classification group at each departure
date as approximately reflective of the true reference price, “Re f Price”, and we calculate
the changes in demand relative to “reference” values. Thus, the reference price for advance
purchasers would be different than that for late purchasers. We saw that such a “unitless”
way of price measurement gives much better elasticity estimates than using the absolute
values, as it also alleviates the impact of spurious price variation. We refer to these new
price ratio variables as “PRatio” given by (AvgFare/Re f Price), and “lag_PRatio” given
by (lag_AvgFare/Re f Price).
Finally, similar to the creation of our lagged average prices, we also create a lagged
variable for the number of tickets sold with respect to reading days considering that a linear
relationship might not exist between RddIndex and ln_Pax in all cases, and the number
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of tickets sold at the previous reading day might give a better signal about the number
of tickets sold on the current reading day. We call this new variable “lag_Pax”. Given
the definition of our lagged variables, the last reading day index at each departure date is
dropped from the model since it does not have any prior observations. Our new regression
model, Model 1, is given by Equation (30). Note that we also include TimeS lot as a
classification variable as we anticipate better fit for more popular time slots, which makes
each classification group to be defined by PoS , MktS egType, S atS tay and TimeS lot.
ln_Pax = ln(α) + β(ln_PRatio) + b0(RddIndex)
+b1S un + . . . + b6S at + b7Jan + . . . + b16Dec
+b17PubHol + b18(ln_AvgConn) + b19(ln_lag_Pax) (30)
In the 2SLS method, the first stage regression model for price includes all independent
variables from Equation (30) and ln_lag_PRatio as instruments:
ln_PRatio = ln(θ) + γ(ln_lag_PRatio) + c0(RddIndex)
+c1S un + . . . + c6S at + c7Jan + . . . + c16Dec
+c17PubHol + c18(ln_AvgConn) + c19(ln_lag_Pax) (31)
The second stage regression model for demand replaces the ln_PRatio term in Equation
(30) with the predicted value of ln_PRatio from Equation (31), which we refer to as
“FittedFare". Section C.3 in the Appendix gives the significant Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients that are greater/less than +/-0.20 in the new model. It can be seen that the correlation
between ln_Pax and RddIndex is not as strong as the one between ln_Pax and DaysLe f t,
while that between ln_Pax and ln_lag_Pax is quite significant justifying our expectation
for defining lagged ticket sales. Except for some late purchase groups, we drop RddIndex
from the demand model and use it as an extra instrument in the price model given the
strong correlation between ln_PRatio and RddIndex, which also eliminates possible multi-
collinearity introduced by those variables in the demand model.
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We initially ran a full model regression for estimation of price elasticities for Model 1
through the following procedure:
1. Run a full model regression (SAS Procedure: Proc Reg) for the OLS in Equation
(30).
2. Run the first stage model in Equation (31).
3. Run the second stage model in Equation (30) including the residual from Equation
(31) as an extra variable. Check for the significance of the residual variable. If
significant, run the second stage model in Equation (30) with FittedFare in place of
ln_PRatio.
4. Check model diagnostics; particularly variance inflation factors of parameter esti-
mates, VIF, for multi-collinearity and Durbin-Watson statistics for autocorrelation
of residuals.
5. Confirm the significance of endogeneity through the Hausman-specification test (SAS
Procedure: Proc Model).
6. If RddIndex is only used as an instrument in the price equation, check the statistical
significance of over-identification.
7. Run SAS Procedure: Proc Syslin for direct estimation of the 2SLS model in order to
get correct standard error calculations for the parameter estimates.
Given that we have 10 monthly indicators and 6 daily indicators, our observations from the
full model showed that several of the variables were not significant for either demand or
price. Therefore, we decided to run a stepwise regression on the OLS in Step 1, and only
use the significant variables from this estimation in the subsequent steps. We used a signifi-
cance level of 0.10 for entry into and exit from the model. We also performed a comparison
of these results with those from the full model to ensure that we were not excluding any
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variables that would have been significant in the price equation or the final demand equa-
tion. Note that we forced the price variable into the model as it is the main variable of main
interest for its effect on demand, although it might turn out to be insignificant. In Appendix
C, we provide the SAS output for the stepwise OLS regression and the 2SLS estimation
from Proc Syslin for each classification group. We do not provide the results from the full
model regression and the first stage regression due to space concerns, but they are available
upon request.
Model diagnostics did not show any immediate problems. A common rule of thumb is
to use VIF > 4 for parameter estimates as an indicator of multi-collinearity. The majority
of the VIF values in our models was within the range of 1-2, and the maximum observed
values were less than 4. A rule of thumb for detection of autocorrelation in the residuals
from regression models is that the Durbin-Watson statistic should be between the values
of 1.5 and 2.5. Although this statistic is argued to underestimate autocorrelation when
lagged variables are present, we note that our definition of lagged variables makes them
interdependent on the associated departure date but independent across departure dates.
Thus, the Durbin-Watson statistic can still provide valuable results for our model. We
checked the Durbin-Watson statistic up to 7 lags, and all values were between 1.5 and
2.5 with majority of the values being centered around 2. For further confirmation, we
tested the results from SAS Procedure: Proc Autoreg against those from SAS Procedure:
Proc Reg. We saw that even for autoregressive terms that were marked as significant, the
coefficient values were small and the parameter estimates or the R2 of the model were not
highly affected. Thus, we decided not to include autoregressive terms. Finally, we tested
heteroskedasticity through the White, Breusch and Pagan, and Brown and Forsythe tests.
We could not reject the existence of heteroskedasticity in the data, however, its impact was
reduced when the predicted versus residual values were analyzed by day of week. It was
observed that the error distribution was more homogeneous for Friday and Saturday for
outbound trips, and for Sunday and Monday for return trips. Thus, the heteroskedasticity
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was mostly caused by sparse ticket distribution and several single ticket sales at different
reading days intervals for the other days of the week. We combined some of the intervals
with single ticket sales, but did not change the current structure significantly as we did not
want to affect the supply-demand dynamics that exist in the data. For specifics on these
statistical tests, the reader is referred to [70]. In the following two sections, we provide a
discussion on the estimation results for economy and first class purchases.
4.4.1 Analysis of the Results for the Economy Class
Table 8 provides a comparison of the price elasticity estimates obtained from the stepwise
OLS regression and the 2SLS regression for each classification group for the economy
class. For the majority of the cases, we can immediately observe from Table 8 the signif-
icant change in the price elasticities when endogeneity is accounted for. If endogeneity is
not accounted for, one could end up with upward sloping demand curves (e.g., PoS =‘A’,
MktS egType =‘EconLate’, S atS tay = 0), elastic curves incorrectly classified as inelas-
tic curves (e.g., PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘EconAdvn’, S atS tay = 1), insignificant price
terms (e.g., PoS =‘D’, MktS egType =‘EconAdvn’, S atS tay = 0) or under-estimated price
elasticities (e.g., PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘EconLate’, S atS tay = 1, TimeS lot=1). For
each of these regressions, the residual from the first stage model was significant in the
stepwise OLS regression of the demand equation, and the Hausman specification test con-
firmed the presence of endogeneity (unless otherwise stated in the Appendix). For late
purchases, we observed that some reading day intervals had considerably less or more
sales as compared to the other intervals, which was not due to a change in price. For these
cases, we included indicator variables for the specific interval (RDD5 would correspond
to RddIndex = 5). We saw that there was a significant decrease in the number of tickets
sold on the day of departure (RDD0 = 1), if the travel was for the early hours of the day
(TimeS lot = 1). We can interpret this observation such that if passengers need to travel
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early, they do not delay purchasing the ticket until the departure date, not to risk the possi-
bility of not finding a ticket on the train.
Table 8: Stepwise OLS vs. 2SLS Regression Results for Model 1 for the Economy Class
(Adj. R2 and Price Elasticity Estimate)
PoS MktS egType S at_ Time_ OLS 2SLS
S tay S lot Adj. R2 β̂ Adj. R2 β̂
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 1 0.781 -0.407*** 0.748 -1.972***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 2 0.795 -0.630*** 0.776 -2.002***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 3 0.719 -0.200** 0.670 -2.023***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 1 0.441 -0.403*** 0.429 -1.106***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 2 0.415 -0.300*** 0.373 -1.756***
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 3 0.213 NS 0.211 NS
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 1 0.685 NS 0.674 -0.674**
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 2 0.719 NS 0.715 -0.472***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 3 0.592 NS 0.582 -0.709***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 1 0.411 0.660*** 0.324 -1.012***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 2 0.374 0.468*** 0.259 -2.080***
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 3 0.448 0.550*** 0.328 -1.435***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 1 0.719 -0.607*** 0.663 -2.183***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 2 0.756 -0.709*** 0.719 -2.107***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 1 0.392 NS 0.340 -0.983***
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 2 0.521 NS 0.513 -0.358***
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 1 0.656 -0.411*** 0.638 -1.138***
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 2 0.672 -0.831*** 0.666 -1.238***
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 0 1 0.190 0.096*** 0.179 -0.267**





We can summarize our observations as follows:
• Advance purchasers with Saturday night stay constitute the most price sensitive mar-
ket segment.
• Passengers with Saturday night stay are in general more price sensitive than the ones
without Saturday night stay except for the outbound trip late purchases, which was
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not anticipated. We can interpret this observation such that leisure travelers are less
sensitive to the prices paid for last minute weekend trips to ‘DEF’.
• Passengers from ‘D’ with Saturday night stay are slightly more price sensitive than
those from ‘A’ for advance purchases; and significantly more price sensitive for late
purchases. The business expectation was also in the direction of the customers from
‘D’ being more price sensitive. However, we see that the opposite holds when there
is no Saturday night stay. We can interpret those purchases as of customers traveling
mainly for business in the economy class; hence, being less price sensitive when it is
a return trip from work to home.
• Contrary to the business expectation that outbound economy class travel would peak
on weekends, we observe a peak on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays for purchasers
with Saturday night stay, which would be leisure oriented, whereas the volume is
higher during the initial days of the week for purchasers without Saturday night stay,
which would be business oriented. For leisure travelers, we can be claim that “day-
trips” are not as popular as “stay-away” trips for weekends; i.e., travelers are more
inclined to spend at least a night when traveling from ‘ABC’ to ‘DEF’ for the week-
end.
• As inbound trips are return trips to ‘D’, we observe a similar day of week behavior
as in the case of outbound trips but in an opposite fashion. Sunday and Monday
are the peak days for travelers with a Saturday night stay, which would be leisure
oriented, whereas the volume is higher towards the end of the week (before Sunday)
for purchasers without Saturday night stay, which would be business oriented.
• Departure month is not as strong a factor as the departure day of week. In general,
we observe a consistent decrease in January.
• In general, there are no substantial differences between the price sensitivities with
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respect to time slots, although ‘Afternoon’ hours for outbound trips with no Saturday
night stay look more popular and more price sensitive. Performing the analysis by
time slots also helped us isolate the noisy effects from unpopular time slots such as
the ‘Evening’ hours for advance purchases with no Saturday night stay for better
estimation in more popular slots.
4.4.2 Analysis of the Results for the First Class
Table 9 provides a comparison of the price elasticity estimates obtained from the stepwise
OLS regression and the 2SLS regression for each classification group for the first class.
Overall, the explanatory power of the OLS models are lower and the results for the 2SLS
are less strong for the first class as compared to those for the economy class. This obser-
vation is partly due to the relatively low volume in ticket sales, particularly for advance
purchases for early hours of return trips, which introduces considerable sparsity into the
problem. Moreover, for late purchases, we observed high ticket sales at some lower fare
levels along with higher fare levels with respect to the reading day. Thus, our endogeneity
approach of using the closing of lower fare buckets could not completely explain the rela-
tively spontaneous ticket sales in the first class as compared to the economy class. More-
over, for some cases in advance purchases, the prices paid did not change considerably with
respect to the reading day interval giving no clear signal of closing of lower fare buckets.
However, we can still see for several classification groups that accounting for endogeneity
can significantly change price elasticity estimates as compared to those that are obtained
from OLS models. Note that the findings for the first class are very similar to those in the
economy class such as advance purchases with Saturday night stay being the most price
elastic market segment, and the day of week preferences. We can also observe for several
classification groups that the economy class purchases are more price sensitive than the
first class purchases.
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Table 9: Stepwise OLS vs. 2SLS Regression Results for Model 1 for the First Class
(Adj. R2 and Price Elasticity Estimate)
PoS MktS egType S at_ Time_ OLS 2SLS
S tay S lot Adj. R2 β̂ Adj. R2 β̂
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 1 0.501 -0.326*** 0.370 -2.453***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 2 0.488 -0.422*** 0.428 -1.793***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 3 0.503 -0.351*** 0.381 -2.246***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 1 0.105 0.084* 0.098 -0.325*
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 2 0.306 0.103** 0.224 -1.199***
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 3 0.149 0.254*** 0.088 1.380**
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 1 0.254 NS 0.247 -0.393**
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 2 0.325 NS 0.312 -0.527***
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 3 0.411 0.100** 0.409 NS
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 1 0.390 0.778*** 0.257 -1.495**
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 2 0.371 0.374*** 0.235 -1.389**
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 3 0.460 0.456*** 0.328 NS
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 1 0.216 0.100* 0.208 NS
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 2 0.342 NS 0.256 -1.339**
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 1 0.082 NS 0.084 NS
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 2 0.274 NS 0.062 4.788**
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 1 0.298 0.151*** 0.287 NS
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 2 0.557 0.324*** 0.457 -0.931**
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 1 0.306 0.244*** 0.192 NS






In this study, we empirically demonstrated the presence of the endogeneity problem in a
passenger travel context using data from an international high speed rail operator. In order
to control for endogeneity, we used an instrumental variable approach via two stage least
squares estimation. We showed that particularly for economy class purchases, if one does
not account for endogeneity, price elasticities may induce an upward-sloping demand curve
suggesting that high price produces high demand, or may be biased downward to the extent
that elastic demand curves are incorrectly classified as inelastic.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we first studied a firm with two independent functions, marketing and pro-
duction, which serves customer demand that is sensitive to both price and leadtime. Price
and leadtime decisions are made by marketing and production, respectively. Production
needs to satisfy a certain percentage of orders on time under limited capacity. In Chapter 2,
we analyzed the types of inefficiencies that result from the decentralization of these two
functions under a monopoly. In order to achieve coordination, we proposed a transfer
price contract with bonus payments, where marketing pays production a transfer price per
unit produced, and both departments receive a fraction of the total revenues generated as
a bonus payment. We showed the existence of a unique transfer price for a given frac-
tion of total revenues offered to marketing that achieves coordination as long as production
receives a satisfactory incentive as a fraction of total revenues. Finally, we analyzed the
optimal decisions and profit when production can choose the capacity level. A possible
extension of this work would be generalizations to other queueing settings. It would also
be interesting to study a Nash bargaining framework rather than a Stackelberg framework.
Moreover, extensions to operational settings, such as a multi-period model, would be of
interest, as the steady-state results (e.g., the service level constraint) would not always hold
in the day-to-day operations of a firm.
In Chapter 3, we extended this work to a duopoly setting and analyzed the impact of the
decentralization of price and lead-time decisions, when one or both firms compete with a
decentralized organizational structure. We show the existence of a unique subgame perfect
Nash Equilibrium under all outcomes from the first stage of the game, where organizational
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structures are determined. We observed that a firm’s preference for a centralized or decen-
tralized structure, given its competitor’s structure, could change depending on market and
firm characteristics. As an extension of this second study, one can compare the results of
the linear demand model with a constant elasticity model to see how the decisions and the
impact of decentralization change. Another extension would be including capacity as a de-
cision variable. Finally, competition under dynamic price and lead-time quotations would
also be of interest for future work.
In Chapter 4, we empirically demonstrated the presence of the endogeneity problem
in a passenger travel context using data from an international high speed rail operator.
We showed that if one does not account for endogeneity, price elasticities may induce an
upward-sloping demand curve suggesting that high price produces high demand, or may be
biased downward to the extent that elastic demand curves being incorrectly classified as in-
elastic. In order to control for endogeneity, we employed an instrumental variable approach
and used the average prices lagged by “reading days", which are different days left points at
which the observed demand is checked against inventory and lower fare buckets are closed
as necessary, as instruments for each departure date and classification group. We were also
interested in testing the “goodness” of the fare or level of the lowest fare bucket available
(open) at each reading day as instruments. However, the inventory availability information
in the current dataset was not complete, and missing values would have resulted in loss of
half of the records. Thus, we decided to leave this for future research collecting a new, more
complete dataset, and conducting a train-level analysis. With a new dataset that covers a
longer period of time, we could also estimate seasonality through Fourier series and similar
models, and compare the results against an indicator variable approach, which becomes the
most convenient way to model time-related effects when less than a year of data is available
as it was the case in this study. A final note on Chapter 4 is that although we did not have
a capacity issue with our current dataset, in general, given the capacity of a train and the
availability controls of inventory, what is observed about the customer demand would be
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the number of tickets sold and not the true underlying demand. This problem would fall
under the general class of censored models with limited dependent variables. The analy-




ADDENDUM FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
As in [95], Constraint (2) is tight at optimality. Thus, it is sufficient to treat two of
the three variables, pC , LC , and λC as decision variables and determine the other vari-
able via the equality, λC = D(pC , LC ). We choose to eliminate price from this formu-
lation for computational simplicity. Moreover, since Constraint (1) can be rewritten as
(µ − λC )LC ≥ ln(1/(1 − s)), denoting ln(1/(1 − s)) by k we get the following formulation:
max
(λC ,LC )≥0
πC = λC (a − cLC − λC − mb)/b
s.t. (µ − λC )LC ≥ k
Note that the stability condition λC ≤ µ is implied by the service constraint since k ≥ 0 and
LC ≥ 0. The service constraint must be binding at optimality as in [95] and [114], since
the objective function is linearly decreasing in LC , and the minimum possible lead-time is









into πC gives an unconstrained optimization problem. First order conditions
(FOC) provide Equation (4) for λ∗
C
. To show uniqueness, note that
∂ fC (λC )
∂λC
= −2(µ − λC )
2 − 2(a − 2λC − mb)(µ − λC ) < 0
since (µ − λC ) > 0 on the interval [0, µ] and (a − 2λC − mb) > 0 by Equation (4) for the
objective function to have a maximizer. This implies that fC (λC ) is decreasing. Thus, if
fC (λC ) has a root on the interval [0, µ], then it will give the unique optimal arrival rate,
λ∗
C
for the centralized problem. Noting that fC (µ) = −ckµ < 0, we also need fC (0) =
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(a − mb)µ2 − ckµ > 0 for the existence of a root on [0, µ], which holds due to Assumption
A3.
Second order conditions ensure that the root of Equation (4) is a global maximum,
since the objective function is concave in λC . The optimal price p
∗
C
can then be obtained by







A.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2




2b , we should have
a−cLP
2b ≤ m or equivalently, LP ≤
a−2mb
c . Thus,
























(a − 2µ) +
√
(2µ − a)2 + 8ck
2c
Hence, in a feasible solution, LP ∈ [y
1
P
, ac ] since demand is downward sloping in LP , and is
zero at ac . Note that we have y
1
P
≤ ac if and only if µ ≥
ck
a , which holds under Assumption
A3. Since the objective function is convex, the optimal solution lies on the boundaries of
the interval [y1
P













= a−2mbc . Figure 18 shows an illustration of π
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generates zero or negative profits, so the optimal price would
be constrained to the unit production cost, m, and the optimal lead-time, which lies on the
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Figure 18: Illustration of case-(ii)






is the unique maximizer of π
MR
M
over the interval pM ∈ [0, (aµ − ck)/bµ]. Concavity of π
MR
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− µ)2 + 4ck
 < 0
Moreover, g(0) = 12
[
a + µ −
√
(a − µ)2 + 4ck
]





< 0 as a >
ck/µ from Assumption A3. Therefore, p0
M
is the unique maximizer of π
MR
M




with a change of variables give Equation (11). 
A.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
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. The results for lead-times and prices follow from the fact that







b . Note that since p
∗
C
> m, which holds through Assumption A3, we do not
have equalities between the decisions of the centralized and the decentralized settings.
































































, µ > λ∗
M
and µ > λ∗
C
, the first term of this equation is negative, while the
other three terms are positive. Therefore, we need to examine the relation between these








































































































































































































































































A.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Let R() denote revenue. The positive revenue difference between M and P (R(M)−R(P) >




≥ 0 with m = 0. As for
the comparison of revenues under C and M, we change the proof for profits slightly:



















































, after simplification, the
revenue difference becomes:












































































) < 1. Hence, we conclude that R(M) −
R(C) > 0. 
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A.6 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR OPTIMAL DECISIONS
We first provide an example for the centralized setting, namely the derivation of the change
in λ∗
C





ck − 2(µ − λ∗
C











It can be seen from Equation (4) that (a − 2λ∗
C
− mb) ≥ 0 since the right hand side and
(µ − λ∗
C
)2 are positive. We also know that (µ − λ∗
C
) ≥ 0 for the stability condition to hold.
Hence, the denominator of Equation (35) is positive. From Equation (4) it follows that
(a − 2λ∗
C
− mb) = ckµ(µ−λ∗
C































) + (a − mb − 2λ∗
C
)]
≥ 0 (since (−λ∗
C
− µ) ≤ 0)
Therefore, the optimal demand rate for the centralized system is increasing in capacity. In
































a − mb − 2λ∗
C
)] ≤ 0
So, optimal lead-time for the centralized system is decreasing in capacity.
We next give an example for the decentralized setting, P. For simplicity, we choose the
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For this case, optimal price is decreasing in price sensitivity, while optimal lead-time and
optimal demand rate are not affected. The other entries of Table 1 have been developed
similarly.
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∂m 0 0 0
∂k 2√
(2µ−a)2+8ck































A.7 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Let xC = mb and xM = 0, and i = C, M . Then, the following analysis will hold for both






(a − xi − 4λ∗i + µ)
(µ − λ∗i )[(µ − λ
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If (a−xi−4λ∗i +µ) < 0, then p
∗
i is increasing in c. If (a−xi−4λ
∗
i +µ) > 0, then
∂p∗i
∂c < 0 and p
∗
i
is decreasing in c, which is satisfied when fi
(
1
4 (a − xi + µ)
)
< 0, since fi(λi) is decreasing
in λi on [0, µ]. Note that if 14 (a − xi + µ) > µ, then since λ
∗
i ≤ µ, p
∗
i will be decreasing in c.





(a − xi + µ)
)
=
(a − xi − µ
2




Note that fi() < 0 when µ > a − xi as seen from Equation (36). Similarly, for the change






(a − xi − 4λ∗i + µ)
(µ − λ∗i )[(µ − λ
∗








4 (a − xi + µ), we obtain the same capacity interval for each related setting, and s
0
i and
k0i are given by the k, which sets Equation (37) to 0. 
A.8 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
We first analyze the problems of marketing and production under P. We start with market-
































= (w − m)λ∗
P































LP ≥ k (39)





ensures positive margin for marketing and positive demand. Let y1
P




a − 2µ − wb/α1 +
√
(a − 2µ − wb/α1)2 + 8ck
2c
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The two roots of π
PR
P














− 2 (m−w)bcα2 . The feasible



















. As long as α2 ≥ 0, π
PR
P
is convex, and the optimal solution













































Case (i) is developed similar to the proof of Proposition 2, and case (ii) is trivial. If w ≥ m,
production will have a positive margin, i.e., α2 p∗P + w − m ≥ 0, for any α2 ≥ 0. In other
words, production does not require a fraction of the revenues as long as the transfer price













 4b(m − w)a + 2µ + 3wb/α1 − √(a − 2µ − wb/α1)2 + 8ck , 0

As the maximum fraction of revenue that can be offered to production is 1 − α1, we should
guarantee αmin
2P













For the (α1, α2,w) combinations stated in Proposition 7, the optimal solution for Model

















We next analyze the Marketing-Stackelberg game, M. As long as α2 p∗M + w − m ≥ 0,
the service level constraint will be tight at optimality and the best response of production




(a − bpM − µ) +
√
(a − bpM − µ)2 + 4ck
2c
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We prefer to solve marketing’s problem in terms of λ∗
M
and employ a change of variables.
In this case, L∗
M







α1 a − λM − ckµ−λMb − w
 λM
FOC give Equation (13) after rearranging terms. As fM (µ) = −ckµ < 0, we desire to have
fM (0) = (a − wb/α1)µ








Now that fM () has a root over [0, µ], it should hold that (a−2λ
∗
M
−wb/α1) > 0. Uniqueness
is guaranteed as fM () is decreasing over [0, µ]:
∂ fM (λM )
∂λM
= −2(µ − λM )
2 − 2(a − 2λM − wb/α1)(µ − λM ) < 0



















> wb/α1 ⇒ p∗M > w/α1
√
We also need to provide a positive margin to production for optimality, i.e., α2 pM +w−m ≥
0. Note that this margin is positive for all α2 ≥ 0 if w ≥ m. When w < m, we need to solve
α2(a − λM −
ck
µ−λM







α2(µ + a) − (m − w)b −
√





(α1,w) is equal to the α2 value that sets fM (λ
0
M
(α2)) = 0 for w < m and 0 for
w ≥ m. We also need to find the minimum transfer price for a given α1 that will ensure
α2 ≤ 1 − α1. If we solve (1 − α1)pM + w −m = 0 for λM , we will obtain Equation (40) with
α2 = 1− α1, i.e., λ0M (w). Then, w
min
M
(α1) will be equal to the maximum of 0 and the w value
that sets fM (λ
0
M
(w)) = 0. 
A.9 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
For the (α1, α2,w) combinations stated in Proposition 7, the service level constraints will














Thus, we only need to ensure that w∗i lies in the feasible range for each decentralized setting
as defined in Proposition 7. We start with the Production-Stackelberg game, P. First, we
show that w∗
P





































 > α1m √
Note that w∗
P


















, which reduces to 2λ∗
C







) . According to Proposition 7, it should










− α1m. If we solve g(m0) = 0 for m0, we find the root to be m0 = − ckbµ +
a
b . We






α1 (1 − α1)
[
(α1µ − a + bm + µ) +
√
(α1µ − a + bm + µ)2 + 4ck(1 + α1)
]
2 (1 + α1)
√
(α1µ − a + bm + µ)2 + 4ck(1 + α1)
≥ 0
As the function g is nondecreasing in m, g(m) ≤ 0 and wmin
P
≤ α1m. Finally, Proposition 1
states that λ∗
C
is unique as long as Assumption A3 is satisfied. Hence, w∗
P









For the Marketing-Stackelberg game, M, we know that w∗
M








Assumption A3. Since (1−α1)p∗C + w
∗
M
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A.11 ANALYSIS OF TB CONTRACT WITH NO TRANSFER PRICE
The contract parameters of the revenue-sharing contract and the transfer price-only contract
satisfy the conditions described in Proposition 8. However, when w = 0, we demonstrate
that coordination cannot be achieved. Under P, the feasible region of production’s problem
is the same as in the original production Stackelberg game, and hence, this contract cannot
perform better. The second root of π
PR
P















the fraction of revenue offered to marketing, α1, should not be greater than 1 − 2mba , which










, as long as a > 2mb. Similarly, we can easily show that under the TB contract with
w = 0, FOC on π
MR
M
give Equation (11). In order to generate positive profit, the firm needs
to choose α2 such that production receives positive margin, i.e., α2 p∗M − m ≥ 0. 
A.12 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
As πC is decreasing in µC , the service level constraint is tight at optimality, and µC = λC +
k/LC . When we plug µC in πC , we get πC (λC , LC ) = (a− cLC −λC )λC/b− (m + K)λC −Kk/LC .
First and second order conditions give:
∂πC (λC , LC )
∂λC
=
a − cLC − 2λC
b













Next, we plug λC (LC ) in πC (λC , LC ), and we get
πC (LC ) =





























Thus, the maximizer of πC (LC ), L
∗
C








where πC (LC ) is concave (Equation (42)). Here are some observations:
• LC should not be greater than (a − (m + K)b)/c for λC ≥ 0.
• As LC → 0,
∂πC (LC )
∂LC










• As LC → 0, πC (LC )→ −∞, and πC
(
LC = (a − (m + K)b)/c
)
= − Kkca−(m+K)b < 0






























































. Thus, for all K ≤ K̄, πC (LC ) will be concave
and its maximizer will be given by the root of Equation (41). Moreover, if K̄ < K1, the firm
will generate positive profit. For K > K̄, ∂πC (LC )
∂LC
> 0 for all LC , and πC (LC ) is increasing,
which gives L∗
C
= (a − (m + K)b)/c. However, πC (L
∗
C
) < 0, and the firm cannot generate
positive profit. Similarly, for K values which make L0 > (a− (m + K)b)/c, the firm can also
not generate positive profit.
A change of variables gives the following set of equations at optimality for C, which is
consistent with the findings of [95]:(
a − 2λ∗
C





































. When we plug µP in πP , we get
πP(LP) =


















which is the same equation as Equation (41). Note that production will require the margin
per unit that it gets to be positive, i.e., pP ≥ (m + K), which gives LP ≤ (a − (m + K)b)/c.
Moreover, K1 and K0 do not need to equal each other, as the objective functions values are
different for different K values under the two settings.
In the decentralized setting M, the optimal capacity can be determined by FOC for the







λM + (pM − m)
∂λM
∂µM
− K = 0 .
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APPENDIX B
ADDENDUM FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
Optimality equations under both organizational structures, Equations (21) and (22), directly
follow from the results in Chapter 2. Note that λ̄ is used to ensure that p
i(D,Ĵ)









≥ mi ⇒ (Ai − bimi − λi(D,Ĵ))(µi − λi(D,Ĵ)) − ciki ≥ 0
Rearranging the terms, we find the following inequality, (43), which will be satisfied if
λ
i(D,Ĵ)
≤ y1 or λi(D,Ĵ) ≥ y2, where y1 and y2 are the two roots, where Equation (43) becomes
zero, and y1 is the smaller root:
λ2
i(D,Ĵ)
− (Ai − bimi + µi)λi(D,Ĵ) + (Ai − bimi)µi − ciki ≥ 0 (43)
As y2 > µi while y1 ≤ µi, it should hold that λi(D,Ĵ) ≤ y1 = λ̄. The only requirement
for the existence of the optimal solution for both organizational structures and for λ̄ > 0
was shown to be the assumption of Ai − bimi − ciki/Li > 0 in Chapter 2. Note that Ai =
ai + βi j p j· + γi jL j· ≥ ai + βi jm j + γi j
k j
µ j
as p j· ≥ m j and L j· ≥
k j
µ j
. Thus, if firm i can still
generate some positive demand selling at cost and quoting the minimum possible lead-time
given its service level constraint even if its competitor is selling at cost and quoting the
minimum possible lead-time that satisfies its service level constraint, i.e.,
ai + βi jm j + γi j
k j
µ j
− bimi − ciki/Li ≥ 0 (44)
the requirement for the existence of the optimal solution is satisfied for both organiza-
tional structures. Note that condition (44) is already satisfied if each firm has a nontrivial
customer base to be able to exist on its own, i.e., through Assumption A5. As shown in
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Chapter 2, since the objective functions under both structures is concave, the optimal solu-
tion is unique. 
B.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12
Following a similar logic as in [113], we first show that the iterative procedure converges
to a Nash Equilibrium. Let p(n)i· and L
(n)
i· be the solution found at the n
th iteration of the
procedure. We will show that both p(n)i· and L
(n)
i· are increasing in n. As p
(n)
i· is bounded above
(loosely) by (a1 + a2)/(bi − β ji) and L
(n)
i· is bounded above (loosely) by (a1 + a2)/(ci − γ ji)
for j = 3 − i, i = 1, 2, this will establish that the iterative procedure converges.
From the initialization step, p(0)i· = mi and L
(0)







i· for all n. Let A
(n)
i be the derived market potential for firm i at
iteration n. We can begin our induction:






i· for i = 1, 2.






i· for i = 1, 2.
3. (Step n): Given the inductive assumption from Step n − 1, we find

















1· . It then follows
that

















2· , which completes our induction.
We next show the uniqueness of the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium solution by con-
tradiction. We can express the equilibrium solution as a function of the derived market
potentials of both firms, Ai, i = 1, 2. Note that for any given (A1, A2), the optimal solution
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should be uniquely defined as stated in Proposition 11. Suppose that there exists two dif-
ferent equilibrium solutions Φ = (A1, A2) and Φ′ = (A′1, A
′
2). By numbering the firms and
the two solutions appropriately, we can assume that A′1 > A1, which results in p
′
1· > p1·
and L′1· > L1· as stated in Observation 5 and we have A
′
2 > A2. Thus, it should hold that
λ′1· > λ1· and λ
′
2· > λ2·. We will show that such two solutions cannot both satisfy the opti-
mality equations. First, we will write optimality equations only in terms of λ1·, λ2·. Given
the best response of each firm, the generated demand at equilibrium under all organizational
structures should satisfy
λ1· = a1 + β12 p1· + γ12
k2
(µ2 − λ2·)
− b1 p1· − c1
k1
(µ1 − λ1·)
λ2· = a2 + β21 p2· + γ21
k1
(µ1 − λ1·)
− b2 p2· − c2
k2
(µ2 − λ2·)





b2(a1 − λ1·) +
(β12γ21 − b2c1)k1
(µ1 − λ1·)









b1(a2 − λ2·) +
(β21γ12 − b1c2)k2
(µ2 − λ2·)





First, we consider (S ∗1, S
∗
2) = (C,C). If we write the optimality equation of demand (Equa-
tion (21)) for both firms, we find:(
a1 + β12 p2(C,C) + γ12
k2
(µ2 − λ2(C,C))
− 2λ1(C,C) − m1b1
)
(µ1 − λ1(C,C))
2 − c1k1µ1 = 0 (47)(
a2 + β21 p1(C,C) + γ21
k1
(µ1 − λ1(C,C))
− 2λ2(C,C) − m2b2
)
(µ2 − λ2(C,C))
2 − c2k2µ2 = 0 (48)
After substituting p2(C,C) and p1(C,C) into Equations (47) and (48) from Equations (46) and
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(45), respectively, and rearranging, we find the following two equations:
f 1CC(λ1(C,C) , λ2(C,C)) =





+(β12β21 − 2b1b2)λ2(C,C) − b2β21λ1(C,C) + b2β21a1 + b1b2a2
−(b1b2 − β12β21)m2b2 = 0 (49)
f 2CC(λ1(C,C) , λ2(C,C)) =





+(β12β21 − 2b1b2)λ1(C,C) − b1β12λ2(C,C) + b1β12a2 + b1b2a1 −
















) = 0. It should also hold that f 1∆CC = f
1






) = 0 and f 2∆CC = f
2







) = 0, and therefore,




CC = 0. If λ
′
1(C,C) = λ1(C,C) and λ
′
2(C,C) = λ2(C,C), then f
∆
CC = 0. Moreover, given
Assumptions A2, A3, and A4, f ∆CC > 0 for λ
′
1(C,C) > λ1(C,C) and λ
′
2(C,C) > λ2(C,C). Thus, we
conclude that there is a unique equilibrium solution for (S ∗1, S
∗
2) = (C,C). Note that even if
Assumption A5 is not satisfied, if there exists a (0 < λ1(C,C) < µ1, 0 < λ2(C,C) < µ2) pair such
that a simultaneous solution to Equations (49) and (50) exists with [(π1(C,C) > 0, π2(C,C) > 0)],
then this equilibrium solution is unique. If such a solution does not exist, then, one or both
of the firms may need to leave the market, and the problem turns into a monopoly. The
same argument applies for the other organizational structures.
For (S ∗1, S
∗
2) = (D,D), Equations (47) and (48) do not have the m1b1 and m2b2 terms,
respectively, but are otherwise identical. Then, f 1DD(λ1(D,D) , λ2(D,D)) = f
1
CC(λ1(C,C) , λ2(C,C)) +
(b1b2 − β12β21)m2b2 and f 2DD(λ1(D,D) , λ2(D,D)) = f
2
CC(λ1(C,C) , λ2(C,C)) + (b1b2 − β12β21)m1b1, and










2) = (D,D) directly fol-
lows from the reasoning under (S ∗1, S
∗




2) = (C,D), Equation (48)
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lacks the m2b2 term1. Then, f 1CD(λ1(C,D) , λ2(C,D)) = f
1
CC(λ1(C,C) , λ2(C,C)) + (b1b2 − β12β21)m2b2
and f 2CD(λ1(C,D) , λ2(C,D)) = f
2









uniqueness under (S ∗1, S
∗
2) = (C,D) also directly follows from the reasoning under scenario
(S ∗1, S
∗




2) = (D,D) or a hybrid first stage outcome, the above
results are derived assuming that the decentralized firm(s) have λ0
i(D,Ĵ)
≥ λ̄. If the solution to
the optimality equations is such that λ0
i(D,Ĵ)
< λ̄ for firm i, then λ∗
i(D,Ĵ)
= λ̄ and p∗
i(D,Ĵ)
= mi. As
the best response of firm j , i to these decisions will be uniquely determined, the subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game will still be unique. 
B.3 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13
As the firms are identical and use the same organizational structure under (C,C) and (D,D),
if (λ1·, λ2·) is an equilibrium solution, then so must (λ2·, λ1·), which contradicts the unique-
ness of the Nash Equilibrium. Thus, for identical firms, Equations (49) and (50) from the
proof of Proposition 12 become identical. After rearranging, the optimality equations of













































Note that as β gets closer to b, fCC (λ) approaches fDD(λ). As the difference between the
decisions decreases, (D,D) may generate higher profits than (C,C) under a higher β, as
discussed in the text. However, profits increase in β for both organizational structures and
the difference in profits will decrease as β approaches b.
In order to compare the decisions under the two scenarios, we need to study the opti-










also know the following:
fCC (0) = (a − (b − β)m)µ
2 − (c − γ)kµ > 0 (Assumption A5)
fDD(0) = aµ
2 − (c − γ)kµ > 0 (Assumption A5)
fCC (µ) = fDD(µ) = (
β
b
− 1)ckµ < 0
f ′
CC
(λ) = −(2 −
β
b
)(µ − λ)2 − 2
(











(λ) = −(2 −
β
b
)(µ − λ)2 − 2
(









Thus, fCC starts at a lower point than fDD at λ = 0, but both functions end at the same point
at λ = µ. If cβb − γ < 0, then f
′
DD
< 0, f ′
CC




at all λ. As fDD decreases
at a faster rate than fCC , the point at which it crosses the 0 line should be larger than the





. On the other hand, if cβb − γ > 0, then f
′
DD







up to a certain λ for each function, which we denote by x(C,C) and x(D,D) . Now, note
that f ′
CC
(x(C,C)) = 0 = f
′
DD




(2 − βb )µ + 2a − 3(2 −
β
b )x(D,D)
(2 − βb )µ + 2a − 3(2 −
β
b )x(C,C) − 2(b − β)m
If x(C,C) ≥ x(D,D) , the left hand side of this equation becomes ≤ 1, while the right hand side
becomes greater than 1. Thus, we should have x(C,C) < x(D,D) , which indicates that fCC starts
















. Thus, also under this case, the point at which fDD crosses the 0 line should be





. As the optimal lead-time and price are given
by L· = kµ−λ· and p· =
a−λ·−(c−γ)L·



























Replacing (c − γ)kµ with
(



































































(1− βb ) < λ
∗
(D,D)
, the first term of this equation








may be higher than π∗
(C,C)
. Note that the condition βb ≥
γ
c will be explored
and interpreted in detail in Proposition 14.
For scenario (C,D), given that f 1CD(λ1(C,D) , λ2(C,D)) and f
2
CD(λ1(C,D) , λ2(C,D)) are defined as in
the proof of Proposition 12, we find:




(γβ − cb)bkµ − (bγ − cβ)βkλ2(C,D)
(µ − λ2(C,D))2
−








+(β2 − 2b2)(λ2(C,D) − λ1(C,D)) + bβ(λ2(C,D) − λ1(C,D)) + (b
2 − β2)mb
which can equal zero only when λ2(C,D) > λ1(C,D) . Then, it follows that L2(C,D) > L1(C,D) as
L· = kµ−λ· . Using Equations (45) and (46), we can see that p2(C,D) < p1(C,D) as µ > λ2(C,D) and
µ > λ1(C,D):
p1(C,D) − p2(C,D) =
(λ2(C,D) − λ1(C,D))
[
(µ − λ2(C,D))(µ − λ1(C,D)) + (c + γ)k
]
(β + b)(µ − λ2(C,D))(µ − λ1(C,D))
However, either firm may generate higher profits as shown in the example in Table 2. 
B.4 PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 14 and 15
We prove the non-identical firms setting, as the identical firms setting is a special case of










Without loss of generality, assume that firm 2 decides to switch to a decentralized organiza-
tional structure. Thus, we use the equilibrium solution under (C,C) as the starting point of




}, Firm 2 will




} with a decentralized structure





}. If the net effect of this change is a decrease in the derived market potential
for Firm 1, the iterative procedure will proceed in a monotonically decreasing fashion for
the decisions and profits until the equilibrium is reached, and both firms will end up worse
under (C,D) than under (C,C). However, if the net change is an increase, then, Firm 1 will
end up generating higher profits, while Firm 2 may or may not generate generate higher
profits under (C,D) than under (C,C). Thus, a centralized organizational structure may or
may not be dominant for Firm 2 when the competitor employs a centralized structure.
We are interested in the negative net effect case on Firm 1 for the centralized structure
to be guaranteed to be dominant for Firm 2. Then, it should hold that
A(1)1 = a1 + β12 p
(1)
2(C,D)
+ γ12L(1)2(C,D) < A
∗




⇒ γ12(L(1)2(C,D) − L
∗
2(C,C)





A∗2 − λ∗2(C,C) − c2L∗2(C,C) − (A∗2 − λ(1)2(C,D) − c2L(1)2(C,D))b2

= β12











































, which reduces to γ12c2 ≤
β12
b2
, then, A(1)1 < A
∗
1
and (C,C)12  (C,D)12. The same condition applies when we compare (D,C) vs. (D,D),






, a centralized organizational structure
is dominant for Firm 2. A similar logic can be used to compare (C,C) vs. (D,C) and (C,D)
vs. (D,D) to find that if γ21c1 ≤
β21
b1
, (C,C)12  (D,C)12 and (C,D)12  (D,D)12, and a
centralized organizational structure is dominant for Firm 1. 
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B.5 DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 3.6.1


















































βi j(a j + γ jiLi − c jL j) + 2b j(ai + γi jL j − ciLi)
)
> 0 for p∗
i(D,D)
> 0. It can
be shown that p∗
i(C,C)
> mi (i = 1, 2), p∗1(C,D) > m1 and p
∗
2(D,C)
> m2 by Assumption







(i = 1, 2) are at least the unit production cost. Otherwise,
the firm will be selling at cost. It can be observed that p∗i· decreases in L j if (c jβi j −
2b jγi j) > 0 or equivalently,
βi j
b j



























Given the optimal prices, the optimal demand under each organizational structure will be:
λ∗
i(C,C)
= bi(p∗i(C,C) − mi), λ
∗
i(D,D)
= bi p∗i(C,C) , i = 1, 2
λ∗
1(C,D)
= b1(p∗1(C,D) − m1); λ
∗
1(D,C)
= b1 p∗1(C,D); λ
∗
2(D,C)















i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j , i. In other words,
λ∗ix − λ
∗













































































































































































+β12β21 (2b1(a2 − c2L2 + γ21L1) + β21(a1 − c1L1 + γ12L2))
]
> 0











. Table 12 provides identification of the op-
timal prices, generated demand and profits under different first stage outcomes for identical
firms. 
B.6 DERIVATIONS FOR SECTION 3.6.2
For the case of identical firms, define A = a − (b − β)p. The best response function of each
firm is given by:
f (Li) = cL2i − (A + γL j − µ)Li − k ≥ 0, (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}, i , j (51)
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Table 12: Unconstrained Price Competition for Identical Firms
(C,C) (C,D)-(D,C) (D,D)
p1(C,C) = p2(C,C) p1(C,D) = p2(D,C) = p1(C,C) −
βbm
4b2−β2 p1(D,D) = p2(D,D)
p2(C,C) =
a+bm−(c−γ)L
2b−β p1(D,C) = p2(C,D) = p1(C,C) −
2b2m
4b2−β2 p2(D,D) = p2(C,C) −
bm
2b−β
λ1(C,C) = λ2(C,C) λ1(C,D) = λ2(D,C) = b(p1(C,D) − m) λ1(D,D) = λ2(D,D)
λ2(C,C) = b(p2(C,C) − m) λ1(D,C) = λ2(C,D) = b(p1(D,C)) λ2(D,D) = b(p2(D,D))
π1(C,C) = π2(C,C) π1(C,D) = π2(D,C) =
λ2
1(C,D)




b π1(D,C) = π2(C,D) =
λ2
1(D,C)




Suppose that L1 = L2. Then, Equation (51) becomes:
f (L) = (c − γ)L2 − (A − µ)L − k ≥ 0
The optimal solution is given by the positive root of f (L):
L∗ =
a − (b − β)p − µ +
√
(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
2(c − γ)




























a − (b − β)p − µ +
√






(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
We find that ∂L
∂γ
> 0 since:
• If a − (b − β)p − µ ≥ 0:√






(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
⇒ (a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k > 2(c − γ)k
√
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• If a − (b − β)p − µ < 0:
a − (b − β)p − µ +
√






(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
⇒ (a − (b − β)p − µ)
√
(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
+(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 2(c − γ)k >? 0
⇒ (a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 2(c − γ)k
>? (µ − a + (b − β)p)
√
(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)k
⇒ (a − (b − β)p − µ)4 + 4(c − γ)k(a − (b − β)p − µ)2 + 4(c − γ)2k2
>? (a − (b − β)p − µ)4 + 4(c − γ)k(a − (b − β)p − µ)2
⇒ 4(c − γ)2k2 > 0
√
Therefore, L∗ increases in γ. 
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APPENDIX C
ADDENDUM FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 FITTING MIXTURE OF GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CLUS-
TERING DEPARTURE TIME
Mixture of Gaussian functions is obtained as a weighted sum of individual Gaussian func-
tions. Thus, the probability distribution of a mixture of k Gaussian functions in n dimen-






















One of the most common methods to learn the parameters of a Gaussian mixture is the
expectation-maximization (EM) method [34]. The EM method is an efficient iterative pro-
cedure that computes the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate of the unknown model pa-
rameter(s) for which the observed data are generated most likely from. Each iteration of
the EM algorithm consists of two steps. In the expectation step, E-step, the missing data
are estimated given the observed data and current estimate of the model parameters through
conditional likelihood computation. In the maximization step, M-step, the likelihood func-
tion is maximized under the assumption that the missing data are known using the estimate
of the missing data from the E-step. The method tries to maximize the difference between
the likelihood values computed at each iteration, and the likelihood value increases at each
iteration. For computational details, the reader is referred to [34, 122, 19]. We tested three
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publicly available codes from the MATLAB Central File Exchange website, and used the
result that was agreed by all [124, 125, 50].
Tables 13 and 14 show the parameters of the multi-modal Gaussian distribution fit of
departure time for PoS =‘A’ and PoS =‘D’, respectively. Three time slots are created for
PoS =‘A’ and two time slots are created for PoS =‘D’. The valleys of the multi-modal dis-
tribution represent where the end points of each time slot are defined. For example, “1-2"
represents where the first time slot ends and the second time slot starts. For this analy-
sis, we measure the departure time in number of minutes using 5:00 AM as our reference
point, i.e., t = 0. In the “VALLEYS" column, we give the value in minutes as well as the
translation back to the actual time of day.
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Table 13: Multi-modal Gaussian Distribution of Time Slots for PoS =‘A’
TimeS lot VALLEYS
PoS Cmpt Dow Parameters 1 2 3 1-2 2-3
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Sun’ Mean 205.22 442.79 765.32 283 / 592 /
Std. dev. 30.68 105.42 94.91 9:43 14:52
Weight 0.15 0.38 0.46
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Mon’ Mean 151.07 741.55 424.62 315 / 567 /
Std. dev. 68.65 87.10 134.99 10:15 14:27
Weight 0.36 0.31 0.33
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Tue’ Mean 150.48 424.29 744.61 316 / 570 /
Std. dev. 68.09 144.30 85.06 10:16 14:30
Weight 0.35 0.35 0.30
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Wed’ Mean 150.71 448.04 758.73 317 / 584 /
Std. dev. 69.00 152.98 80.64 10:17 14:44
Weight 0.34 0.37 0.29
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Thu’ Mean 152.01 461.75 771.76 314 / 607 /
Std. dev. 69.02 159.34 79.16 10:14 15:07
Weight 0.32 0.42 0.26
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Fri’ Mean 190.52 572.46 816.01 381 / 690 /
Std. dev. 97.53 136.74 53.30 11:21 16:30
Weight 0.36 0.39 0.24
‘A’ ‘Frst’ ‘Sat’ Mean 162.36 386.93 783.10 288 / 674 /
Std. dev. 52.92 129.65 52.20 9:48 16:14
Weight 0.37 0.55 0.07
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Sun’ Mean 205.09 413.69 745.81 281 / 598 /
Std. dev. 30.65 92.70 107.79 9:41 14:58
Weight 0.22 0.46 0.32
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Mon’ Mean 145.65 405.60 728.75 316 / 580 /
Std. dev. 74.57 144.43 101.41 10:16 14:40
Weight 0.34 0.42 0.24
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Tue’ Mean 149.54 468.63 778.96 324 / 662 /
Std. dev. 78.44 164.83 79.75 10:24 16:02
Weight 0.36 0.50 0.14
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Wed’ Mean 153.75 483.32 799.62 326 / 675 /
Std. dev. 79.07 167.32 68.88 10:26 16:15
Weight 0.34 0.51 0.15
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Thu’ Mean 154.03 526.42 816.55 327 / 688 /
Std. dev. 83.08 167.31 59.00 10:27 16:28
Weight 0.31 0.50 0.19
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Fri’ Mean 130.30 508.67 814.05 290 / 675 /
Std. dev. 77.39 171.55 56.59 9:50 16:15
Weight 0.23 0.50 0.27
‘A’ ‘Econ’ ‘Sat’ Mean 158.64 414.08 789.40 276 / 677 /
Std. dev. 49.55 133.37 50.10 9:36 16:17
Weight 0.32 0.56 0.12
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Table 14: Multi-modal Gaussian Distribution of Time Slots for PoS =‘D’
TimeS lot VALLEYS
PoS Cmpt Dow Parameters 1 2 1-2
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Sun’ Mean 517.33 788.94 549 /
Std. dev. 161.02 84.79 14:09
Weight 0.33 0.67
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Mon’ Mean 374.15 768.45 532 /
Std. dev. 197.98 80.33 13:52
Weight 0.29 0.71
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Tue’ Mean 381.03 760.83 515 /
Std. dev. 195.45 79.35 13:35
Weight 0.22 0.78
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Wed’ Mean 361.52 758.17 512 /
Std. dev. 186.65 80.25 13:32
Weight 0.20 0.80
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Thu’ Mean 341.95 757.44 510 /
Std. dev. 182.72 81.66 13:30
Weight 0.20 0.80
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Fri’ Mean 344.25 737.88 472 /
Std. dev. 179.14 90.98 12:52
Weight 0.22 0.78
‘D’ ‘Frst’ ‘Sat’ Mean 439.49 803.82 663 /
Std. dev. 171.90 49.40 16:03
Weight 0.52 0.48
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Sun’ Mean 522.05 817.82 631 /
Std. dev. 168.70 73.73 15:31
Weight 0.50 0.50
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Mon’ Mean 338.11 776.16 537 /
Std. dev. 213.53 92.42 13:57
Weight 0.45 0.55
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Tue’ Mean 414.73 778.26 526 /
Std. dev. 223.26 91.22 13:46
Weight 0.45 0.55
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Wed’ Mean 440.42 774.10 498 /
Std. dev. 213.51 91.36 13:18
Weight 0.40 0.60
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Thu’ Mean 415.16 772.45 501 /
Std. dev. 217.25 91.55 13:21
Weight 0.36 0.64
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Fri’ Mean 455.97 783.33 518 /
Std. dev. 226.97 86.10 13:38
Weight 0.41 0.59
‘D’ ‘Econ’ ‘Sat’ Mean 479.73 808.28 674 /
Std. dev. 179.04 46.75 16:14
Weight 0.54 0.46
132
C.2 BASIC STATISTICS FOR GROSS TICKET FARE
We display the number of observations, N, mean, standard deviation, coefficient of vari-
ation, CV (std.dev. / mean), the minimum and maximum values of the gross ticket fare
amounts by PoS , MktS egType and S atS tay in Table 15 (before aggregation is performed
at the classification group level). It can be observed that the average prices paid were sig-
nificantly different in economy and first class compartments. The difference can also be
observed if there was a Saturday night stay, particularly for late purchases.
Table 15: Basic Statistics for Gross Ticket Fare
S at_ Std.
PoS MktS egType S tay N Mean Dev. CV Min Max
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 64236 38.25 19.01 49.70% 14.50 149
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 109038 40.91 13.80 33.74% 14.50 149
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 163865 79.73 42.65 53.50% 14.50 149
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 154000 54.29 19.55 36.00% 14.50 149
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 16764 91.24 57.57 63.09% 25.00 280
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 19921 74.66 28.78 38.55% 39.46 280
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 89810 170.62 58.69 34.40% 25.00 280
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 32766 109.15 52.44 48.04% 25.00 280
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 28976 38.47 25.42 66.09% 10.00 149
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 101135 32.87 13.70 41.69% 10.00 158
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 0 68058 82.68 44.62 53.97% 15.00 399
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 102965 43.08 18.05 41.91% 10.00 230
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 5422 164.46 51.61 31.38% 25.00 280
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 6387 89.03 43.43 48.79% 25.00 347
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 55605 180.33 34.43 19.09% 42.59 280
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 13463 104.91 53.91 51.39% 25.00 280
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C.3 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR MODEL 1
In this section, we provide the significant Pearson correlation coefficients for ln_Pax for
PoS =‘A’ and PoS =‘D’ in Figures 16 and 17, respectively, and for ln_Pratio in Figure




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for ln_Pratio in Model 1
PoS MktS egType S at_ Time_ ln_lag_ ln_lag_ Rdd_ S un S at
S tay S lot Pax PRatio Index
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 1 0.36 -0.39
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 2 0.28 -0.31
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 3 -0.24
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 1 0.21 -0.30
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 2 0.43 -0.44
‘A’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 3 0.25 -0.27
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 1 0.21 0.52 -0.59
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 2 0.22 0.50 -0.62
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 0 3 0.21 0.42 -0.50
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 1 0.37 -0.47
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 2 0.60 -0.61
‘A’ ‘EconLate’ 1 3 0.57 -0.58
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 1
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 2
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 3
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 1
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 2
‘A’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 3
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 1 0.33 -0.36
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 2 0.25 -0.36
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 3 -0.27
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 1 0.35 -0.51
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 2 0.25 -0.42
‘A’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 3 0.32 -0.48
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 1 -0.32
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 0 2 0.27 -0.35
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 1 0.31 -0.36
‘D’ ‘EconAdvn’ 1 2 0.41 -0.36
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 0 1 0.32 -0.39
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 0 2 0.54 -0.46
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 1 0.37 -0.54
‘D’ ‘EconLate’ 1 2 -0.38 0.71 -0.63
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 1 -0.46
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 0 2 0.24
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 1
‘D’ ‘FrstAdvn’ 1 2
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 1
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 0 2 0.27
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 1 0.21
‘D’ ‘FrstLate’ 1 2 0.21 -0.24 0.25
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C.4 OLS and 2SLS Results for Outbound Trips, Economy Class Ad-
vance Purchases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘EconAdvn’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 1469
Number of Observations Used 1469
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 1823.87859 130.27704 375.16 <.0001
Error 1454 504.90560 0.34725
Corrected Total 1468 2328.78419
Root MSE 0.58928 R-Square 0.7832




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.37340 0.07447 18.44 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.40710 0.09001 -4.52 <.0001 1.03445
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.41786 0.02258 18.50 <.0001 3.69800
PUBHOL 1 -0.61376 0.11511 -5.33 <.0001 1.12138
SUN 1 -0.99363 0.07509 -13.23 <.0001 1.91052
MON 1 -0.66820 0.06335 -10.55 <.0001 1.92062
TUE 1 -0.87439 0.06601 -13.25 <.0001 2.09459
WED 1 -0.56334 0.05966 -9.44 <.0001 1.94593
FRI 1 0.55094 0.06101 9.03 <.0001 2.07904
SAT 1 0.51044 0.06032 8.46 <.0001 2.06838
JAN 1 -0.22964 0.05755 -3.99 <.0001 1.07502
FEB 1 -0.18233 0.05768 -3.16 0.0016 1.05592
MAY 1 -0.18873 0.05977 -3.16 0.0016 1.09042
SEP 1 -0.09551 0.05417 -1.76 0.0781 1.04964
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.22427 0.05670 3.96 <.0001 1.08796
Figure 19: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 1833.924 130.9946 312.34 <.0001
Error 1454 609.8037 0.419397
Corrected Total 1468 2328.784
Root MSE 0.64761 R-Square 0.75046




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.572459 0.089881 17.49 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.97150 0.308314 -6.39 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.396246 0.025145 15.76 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.66474 0.126863 -5.24 <.0001
SUN 1 -1.09372 0.084607 -12.93 <.0001
MON 1 -0.70444 0.069952 -10.07 <.0001
TUE 1 -0.93834 0.073524 -12.76 <.0001
WED 1 -0.55123 0.065605 -8.40 <.0001
FRI 1 0.527993 0.067180 7.86 <.0001
SAT 1 0.457119 0.067033 6.82 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.19035 0.063673 -2.99 0.0028
FEB 1 -0.17343 0.063415 -2.73 0.0063
MAY 1 -0.24126 0.066412 -3.63 0.0003
SEP 1 -0.06893 0.059736 -1.15 0.2487
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.173024 0.063047 2.74 0.0061
Figure 20: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1642
Number of Observations Used 1642
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 15 1801.72347 120.11490 426.24 <.0001
Error 1626 458.20971 0.28180
Corrected Total 1641 2259.93317
Root MSE 0.53085 R-Square 0.7972




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.26436 0.08192 15.43 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.62968 0.09306 -6.77 <.0001 1.03989
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.45662 0.02108 21.66 <.0001 3.66426
SUN 1 -0.47719 0.04989 -9.56 <.0001 1.77257
MON 1 -0.67225 0.05259 -12.78 <.0001 1.73137
TUE 1 -0.42592 0.04979 -8.55 <.0001 1.72703
THU 1 0.47935 0.05137 9.33 <.0001 1.90562
FRI 1 0.82363 0.06050 13.61 <.0001 2.56899
SAT 1 0.57958 0.05279 10.98 <.0001 1.99141
JAN 1 -0.32121 0.04932 -6.51 <.0001 1.19070
FEB 1 -0.11623 0.05020 -2.32 0.0207 1.11541
MAY 1 -0.22934 0.05136 -4.47 <.0001 1.25265
JUN 1 -0.12727 0.04814 -2.64 0.0083 1.12075
SEP 1 -0.13548 0.04825 -2.81 0.0050 1.11231
NOV 1 -0.08320 0.04842 -1.72 0.0859 1.11332
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.28258 0.07431 3.80 0.0001 1.07599
Figure 21: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 1823.043 113.9402 357.16 <.0001
Error 1625 518.4081 0.319020
Corrected Total 1641 2259.933
Root MSE 0.56482 R-Square 0.77860




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.448440 0.090477 16.01 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.00257 0.194333 -10.30 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.442309 0.022522 19.64 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.18758 0.099807 -1.88 0.0604
SUN 1 -0.52915 0.054838 -9.65 <.0001
MON 1 -0.73311 0.057651 -12.72 <.0001
TUE 1 -0.44589 0.054516 -8.18 <.0001
THU 1 0.460479 0.056536 8.14 <.0001
FRI 1 0.717524 0.067041 10.70 <.0001
SAT 1 0.547359 0.058097 9.42 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.33390 0.052511 -6.36 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.15210 0.053621 -2.84 0.0046
MAY 1 -0.25046 0.054803 -4.57 <.0001
JUN 1 -0.11779 0.051315 -2.30 0.0218
SEP 1 -0.13024 0.051422 -2.53 0.0114
NOV 1 -0.09847 0.051593 -1.91 0.0565
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.265522 0.079096 3.36 0.0008
Figure 22: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1568
Number of Observations Used 1568
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 11 1533.01409 139.36492 366.30 <.0001
Error 1556 592.00922 0.38047
Corrected Total 1567 2125.02332
Root MSE 0.61682 R-Square 0.7214




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.00609 0.06226 16.16 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.19961 0.08823 -2.26 0.0238 1.04725
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.41728 0.02108 19.79 <.0001 2.66669
MON 1 -0.19760 0.05905 -3.35 0.0008 1.60595
TUE 1 -0.43052 0.06239 -6.90 <.0001 1.79285
WED 1 -0.21336 0.05851 -3.65 0.0003 1.72737
THU 1 0.64769 0.05818 11.13 <.0001 1.78993
FRI 1 1.12009 0.06845 16.36 <.0001 2.41701
SAT 1 -0.30375 0.06031 -5.04 <.0001 1.73180
JAN 1 -0.27269 0.05526 -4.93 <.0001 1.02327
SEP 1 -0.21409 0.05525 -3.87 0.0001 1.02301
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.34533 0.06072 5.69 <.0001 1.22522
Figure 23: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 11 1551.504 141.0458 290.86 <.0001
Error 1556 754.5550 0.484932
Corrected Total 1567 2125.023
Root MSE 0.69637 R-Square 0.67279




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.102635 0.072005 15.31 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.02323 0.311655 -6.49 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.409489 0.023832 17.18 <.0001
MON 1 -0.20275 0.066670 -3.04 0.0024
TUE 1 -0.39902 0.070622 -5.65 <.0001
WED 1 -0.13303 0.067320 -1.98 0.0483
THU 1 0.714949 0.066582 10.74 <.0001
FRI 1 1.024183 0.078824 12.99 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.41327 0.070361 -5.87 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.29813 0.062521 -4.77 <.0001
SEP 1 -0.17289 0.062733 -2.76 0.0059
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.440669 0.070268 6.27 <.0001
Figure 24: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1603
Number of Observations Used 1603
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 328.40405 25.26185 98.22 <.0001
Error 1589 408.67313 0.25719
Corrected Total 1602 737.07718
Root MSE 0.50714 R-Square 0.4455




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.49414 0.07096 21.06 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.40341 0.06939 -5.81 <.0001 1.03644
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.35514 0.02167 16.39 <.0001 1.43654
PUBHOL 1 0.31590 0.09410 3.36 0.0008 1.17880
MON 1 0.38900 0.05174 7.52 <.0001 1.89965
TUE 1 0.35803 0.04925 7.27 <.0001 1.88440
WED 1 0.27323 0.04857 5.63 <.0001 1.84591
THU 1 0.20511 0.04926 4.16 <.0001 1.89893
FRI 1 -0.22689 0.05163 -4.39 <.0001 1.92982
SAT 1 -0.33440 0.05225 -6.40 <.0001 1.99937
JAN 1 -0.25704 0.04579 -5.61 <.0001 1.08208
FEB 1 -0.12763 0.04648 -2.75 0.0061 1.05228
MAY 1 -0.21483 0.05056 -4.25 <.0001 1.12857
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.28736 0.06221 4.62 <.0001 1.22579
Figure 25: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 333.1026 25.62328 93.60 <.0001
Error 1589 435.0146 0.273766
Corrected Total 1602 737.0772
Root MSE 0.52323 R-Square 0.43366




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.581937 0.075303 21.01 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.10562 0.158076 -6.99 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.357870 0.022364 16.00 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.359566 0.097484 3.69 0.0002
MON 1 0.431848 0.054072 7.99 <.0001
TUE 1 0.394947 0.051346 7.69 <.0001
WED 1 0.312633 0.050730 6.16 <.0001
THU 1 0.264852 0.052220 5.07 <.0001
FRI 1 -0.20354 0.053478 -3.81 0.0001
SAT 1 -0.26701 0.055579 -4.80 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.28891 0.047679 -6.06 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.16241 0.048456 -3.35 0.0008
MAY 1 -0.22030 0.052172 -4.22 <.0001
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.232066 0.065134 3.56 0.0004
Figure 26: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1648
Number of Observations Used 1648
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 456.26228 45.62623 118.03 <.0001
Error 1637 632.79487 0.38656
Corrected Total 1647 1089.05715
Root MSE 0.62174 R-Square 0.4190




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.09673 0.08161 25.69 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.29956 0.07218 -4.15 <.0001 1.02729
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.27856 0.02316 12.03 <.0001 1.61626
TUE 1 0.11503 0.04685 2.46 0.0142 1.14398
THU 1 -0.18980 0.04786 -3.97 <.0001 1.20644
FRI 1 -0.62861 0.05272 -11.92 <.0001 1.40193
SAT 1 -0.72416 0.05326 -13.60 <.0001 1.40968
JAN 1 -0.44381 0.05611 -7.91 <.0001 1.11054
MAY 1 -0.46429 0.05797 -8.01 <.0001 1.14244
NOV 1 -0.12567 0.05470 -2.30 0.0217 1.04254
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.32786 0.07506 -4.37 <.0001 1.02321
Figure 27: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 477.6275 47.76275 98.95 <.0001
Error 1637 790.1587 0.482687
Corrected Total 1647 1089.057
Root MSE 0.69476 R-Square 0.37674




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.324598 0.097252 23.90 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.75581 0.230433 -7.62 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.244191 0.026373 9.26 <.0001
TUE 1 0.155302 0.052689 2.95 0.0032
THU 1 -0.16713 0.053582 -3.12 0.0018
FRI 1 -0.71742 0.060360 -11.89 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.84025 0.061954 -13.56 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.45131 0.062711 -7.20 <.0001
MAY 1 -0.48831 0.064875 -7.53 <.0001
NOV 1 -0.16232 0.061361 -2.65 0.0082
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.25602 0.084544 -3.03 0.0025
Figure 28: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1357
Number of Observations Used 1357
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 153.44037 12.78670 31.56 <.0001
Error 1344 544.53381 0.40516
Corrected Total 1356 697.97417
Root MSE 0.63652 R-Square 0.2198




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.85414 0.04369 19.55 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.06139 0.05830 1.05 0.2925 1.02443
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.28826 0.02493 11.56 <.0001 1.15046
PUBHOL 1 0.24306 0.10996 2.21 0.0272 1.04591
MON 1 0.32642 0.05144 6.35 <.0001 1.09502
SAT 1 -0.32647 0.06166 -5.29 <.0001 1.09555
JAN 1 -0.26811 0.06522 -4.11 <.0001 1.09647
MAY 1 -0.12646 0.07314 -1.73 0.0841 1.08662
JUL 1 -0.18749 0.05997 -3.13 0.0018 1.10731
SEP 1 -0.14741 0.06382 -2.31 0.0211 1.09970
OCT 1 -0.11934 0.06355 -1.88 0.0606 1.09045
NOV 1 -0.17293 0.06123 -2.82 0.0048 1.11023
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.14261 0.05193 2.75 0.0061 1.03809
Figure 29: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 153.1844 12.76536 31.16 <.0001
Error 1344 550.5969 0.409670
Corrected Total 1356 697.9742
Root MSE 0.64005 R-Square 0.21766




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.881065 0.051917 16.97 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.16414 0.238992 -0.69 0.4923
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.288602 0.025075 11.51 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.225962 0.111960 2.02 0.0438
MON 1 0.332094 0.052049 6.38 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.35010 0.066587 -5.26 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.26207 0.065880 -3.98 <.0001
MAY 1 -0.12096 0.073765 -1.64 0.1013
JUL 1 -0.20125 0.061933 -3.25 0.0012
SEP 1 -0.13412 0.065612 -2.04 0.0411
OCT 1 -0.11993 0.063908 -1.88 0.0608
NOV 1 -0.17816 0.061808 -2.88 0.0040
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.142386 0.052220 2.73 0.0065
Figure 30: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 3
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C.5 OLS and 2SLS Results for Outbound Trips, Economy Class Late
Purchases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘EconLate’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 3932
Number of Observations Used 3932
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 3170.70279 198.16892 536.00 <.0001
Error 3915 1447.43634 0.36972
Corrected Total 3931 4618.13914
Root MSE 0.60804 R-Square 0.6866




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.10762 0.04169 26.57 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.05558 0.05018 1.11 0.2681 1.36727
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.24537 0.01591 15.43 <.0001 3.22309
PUBHOL 1 -0.23111 0.07427 -3.11 0.0019 1.06905
RDDINDEX 1 -0.01573 0.00328 -4.80 <.0001 1.58161
RDD5 1 -0.53248 0.03697 -14.40 <.0001 1.05570
RDD9 1 -0.17384 0.03723 -4.67 <.0001 1.06397
RDD0 1 -1.04715 0.04360 -24.02 <.0001 1.35894
SUN 1 -0.61623 0.03862 -15.96 <.0001 1.43311
TUE 1 -0.16584 0.03241 -5.12 <.0001 1.30269
THU 1 0.56458 0.03324 16.99 <.0001 1.55639
FRI 1 1.14670 0.04098 27.98 <.0001 2.30024
SAT 1 1.22047 0.04105 29.73 <.0001 2.34938
JAN 1 -0.12689 0.03465 -3.66 0.0003 1.03799
FEB 1 -0.07627 0.03556 -2.14 0.0320 1.02518
NOV 1 -0.06011 0.03505 -1.72 0.0864 1.02646
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.20925 0.03696 5.66 <.0001 1.13371
Figure 31: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 3173.347 186.6674 478.94 <.0001
Error 3914 1525.472 0.389747
Corrected Total 3931 4618.139
Root MSE 0.62430 R-Square 0.67535




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.297018 0.077063 16.83 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.67382 0.258101 -2.61 0.0091
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.244534 0.016343 14.96 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.24938 0.076820 -3.25 0.0012
RDDINDEX 1 -0.03417 0.007230 -4.73 <.0001
RDD5 1 -0.52149 0.038138 -13.67 <.0001
RDD9 1 -0.18278 0.038356 -4.77 <.0001
RDD0 1 -0.97237 0.051658 -18.82 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.64932 0.041331 -15.71 <.0001
TUE 1 -0.14943 0.033768 -4.43 <.0001
THU 1 0.555010 0.034312 16.18 <.0001
FRI 1 1.148878 0.042096 27.29 <.0001
SAT 1 1.178500 0.044912 26.24 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.11814 0.036176 -3.27 0.0011
FEB 1 -0.06243 0.037330 -1.67 0.0945
MAY 1 -0.01603 0.036296 -0.44 0.6588
NOV 1 -0.05618 0.036363 -1.54 0.1225
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.118904 0.049309 2.41 0.0159
Figure 32: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 4236
Number of Observations Used 4236
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 18 3596.56367 199.80909 602.23 <.0001
Error 4217 1399.12101 0.33178
Corrected Total 4235 4995.68468
Root MSE 0.57600 R-Square 0.7199




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.58265 0.05199 30.44 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.06200 0.05806 1.07 0.2857 1.65073
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.27013 0.01475 18.32 <.0001 3.38502
PUBHOL 1 -0.41526 0.06348 -6.54 <.0001 1.16266
RDDINDEX 1 -0.00729 0.00307 -2.38 0.0175 1.68389
RDD5 1 -0.55179 0.03405 -16.21 <.0001 1.03656
RDD9 1 -0.12109 0.03392 -3.57 0.0004 1.06414
SUN 1 -0.60444 0.03523 -17.16 <.0001 1.92071
MON 1 -0.75153 0.03833 -19.61 <.0001 1.93934
TUE 1 -0.41830 0.03460 -12.09 <.0001 1.83543
THU 1 0.48112 0.03441 13.98 <.0001 1.89649
FRI 1 1.02743 0.03998 25.70 <.0001 2.47365
SAT 1 0.84712 0.03757 22.55 <.0001 2.22490
JAN 1 -0.14194 0.03212 -4.42 <.0001 1.07826
FEB 1 -0.11939 0.03291 -3.63 0.0003 1.06205
SEP 1 0.08747 0.03175 2.75 0.0059 1.06625
OCT 1 0.09730 0.03146 3.09 0.0020 1.07345
DEC 1 -0.07085 0.03199 -2.21 0.0268 1.06943
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.08697 0.04657 1.87 0.0619 1.10622
Figure 33: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 18 3597.886 199.8826 590.07 <.0001
Error 4217 1428.482 0.338744
Corrected Total 4235 4995.685
Root MSE 0.58202 R-Square 0.71580




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.770579 0.058616 30.21 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.47234 0.163241 -2.89 0.0038
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.272784 0.014928 18.27 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.43063 0.064313 -6.70 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02441 0.005786 -4.22 <.0001
RDD5 1 -0.54616 0.034425 -15.87 <.0001
RDD9 1 -0.11613 0.034308 -3.38 0.0007
SUN 1 -0.61630 0.035793 -17.22 <.0001
MON 1 -0.78412 0.040032 -19.59 <.0001
TUE 1 -0.42525 0.034973 -12.16 <.0001
THU 1 0.451299 0.035607 12.67 <.0001
FRI 1 0.975548 0.042336 23.04 <.0001
SAT 1 0.809474 0.039720 20.38 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.11919 0.033585 -3.55 0.0004
FEB 1 -0.12252 0.033697 -3.64 0.0003
SEP 1 0.089011 0.032528 2.74 0.0062
OCT 1 0.107916 0.032311 3.34 0.0008
NOV 1 0.005097 0.033160 0.15 0.8779
DEC 1 -0.06439 0.032843 -1.96 0.0500
Figure 34: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 4154
Number of Observations Used 4154
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 2583.24063 161.45254 377.86 <.0001
Error 4137 1767.66829 0.42728
Corrected Total 4153 4350.90892
Root MSE 0.65367 R-Square 0.5937




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.26997 0.04494 28.26 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.05233 0.05485 0.95 0.3401 1.54170
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.35746 0.01486 24.05 <.0001 2.28772
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02876 0.00334 -8.62 <.0001 1.51822
RDD5 1 -0.54575 0.03882 -14.06 <.0001 1.03276
MON 1 -0.10914 0.03808 -2.87 0.0042 1.56420
TUE 1 -0.24422 0.03886 -6.28 <.0001 1.67098
WED 1 -0.11442 0.03750 -3.05 0.0023 1.62091
THU 1 0.52625 0.03846 13.68 <.0001 1.80672
FRI 1 1.14110 0.04523 25.23 <.0001 2.45092
SAT 1 0.20317 0.03685 5.51 <.0001 1.62473
JAN 1 -0.21335 0.03737 -5.71 <.0001 1.08267
FEB 1 -0.11553 0.03762 -3.07 0.0021 1.05881
MAY 1 -0.07127 0.03606 -1.98 0.0482 1.06793
JUL 1 0.07842 0.03569 2.20 0.0281 1.06795
DEC 1 -0.19860 0.03712 -5.35 <.0001 1.07914
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.14042 0.03865 3.63 0.0003 1.12475
Figure 35: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 3
154





Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 2592.415 152.4950 340.92 <.0001
Error 4136 1850.054 0.447305
Corrected Total 4153 4350.909
Root MSE 0.66881 R-Square 0.58355




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.465598 0.060376 24.27 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.70946 0.157333 -4.51 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.351274 0.015250 23.03 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.05566 0.006211 -8.96 <.0001
RDD5 1 -0.51413 0.040185 -12.79 <.0001
MON 1 -0.14467 0.039543 -3.66 0.0003
TUE 1 -0.25880 0.039860 -6.49 <.0001
WED 1 -0.10966 0.038406 -2.86 0.0043
THU 1 0.486313 0.040087 12.13 <.0001
FRI 1 1.121762 0.046424 24.16 <.0001
SAT 1 0.194754 0.037739 5.16 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.21402 0.038752 -5.52 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.10569 0.038988 -2.71 0.0067
MAY 1 -0.04781 0.037534 -1.27 0.2028
JUN 1 0.012166 0.038195 0.32 0.7501
JUL 1 0.093539 0.037080 2.52 0.0117
DEC 1 -0.18412 0.038504 -4.78 <.0001
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.161012 0.039831 4.04 <.0001
Figure 36: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 4266
Number of Observations Used 4266
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 1484.04119 87.29654 176.17 <.0001
Error 4248 2104.94470 0.49551
Corrected Total 4265 3588.98589
Root MSE 0.70393 R-Square 0.4135




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.56288 0.05617 27.82 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.66009 0.04328 15.25 <.0001 1.62574
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.17248 0.01464 11.78 <.0001 1.59239
RDDINDEX 1 -0.04319 0.00390 -11.06 <.0001 1.84044
RDD6 1 0.28375 0.04086 6.94 <.0001 1.02860
RDD0 1 -0.62712 0.04753 -13.20 <.0001 1.39562
MON 1 0.75520 0.04377 17.25 <.0001 1.84112
TUE 1 0.66105 0.04196 15.75 <.0001 1.85527
WED 1 0.54725 0.04114 13.30 <.0001 1.81233
THU 1 0.45495 0.04107 11.08 <.0001 1.80178
FRI 1 0.10274 0.04204 2.44 0.0146 1.77979
SAT 1 -0.24329 0.04065 -5.98 <.0001 1.71969
JAN 1 -0.06818 0.03860 -1.77 0.0774 1.06794
JUL 1 0.08320 0.03828 2.17 0.0298 1.07694
AUG 1 0.13476 0.03835 3.51 0.0004 1.07345
SEP 1 0.12176 0.03873 3.14 0.0017 1.07000
OCT 1 0.07017 0.03818 1.84 0.0662 1.06890
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.50087 0.05310 9.43 <.0001 1.16395
Figure 37: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 19 1385.529 72.92257 108.85 <.0001
Error 4246 2844.518 0.669929
Corrected Total 4265 3588.986
Root MSE 0.81849 R-Square 0.32754




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.305736 0.108599 21.23 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.01220 0.202990 -4.99 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.176331 0.017025 10.36 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.12248 0.010370 -11.81 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.501874 0.053996 9.29 <.0001
RDD0 1 -0.46093 0.058613 -7.86 <.0001
MON 1 0.746207 0.050991 14.63 <.0001
TUE 1 0.676606 0.048895 13.84 <.0001
WED 1 0.553133 0.047914 11.54 <.0001
THU 1 0.400593 0.048226 8.31 <.0001
FRI 1 0.045961 0.049375 0.93 0.3520
SAT 1 -0.36307 0.049333 -7.36 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.09078 0.046521 -1.95 0.0511
FEB 1 0.022064 0.048458 0.46 0.6489
MAY 1 0.015728 0.046550 0.34 0.7355
JUL 1 0.139225 0.046838 2.97 0.0030
AUG 1 0.152563 0.046352 3.29 0.0010
SEP 1 0.166865 0.047100 3.54 0.0004
OCT 1 0.084783 0.046132 1.84 0.0662
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.320479 0.065354 4.90 <.0001
Figure 38: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 4293
Number of Observations Used 4293
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 15 1271.21369 84.74758 172.02 <.0001
Error 4277 2107.09919 0.49266
Corrected Total 4292 3378.31289
Root MSE 0.70190 R-Square 0.3763




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.00937 0.06203 32.39 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.46751 0.04729 9.89 <.0001 1.67525
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.21651 0.01490 14.53 <.0001 1.30571
RDDINDEX 1 -0.06316 0.00398 -15.86 <.0001 1.93793
RDD6 1 0.27733 0.04049 6.85 <.0001 1.01640
RDD1 1 0.30719 0.04356 7.05 <.0001 1.18617
TUE 1 0.12573 0.03306 3.80 0.0001 1.15963
WED 1 0.12152 0.03260 3.73 0.0002 1.14771
FRI 1 -0.27983 0.03428 -8.16 <.0001 1.20381
SAT 1 -0.41599 0.03454 -12.04 <.0001 1.23766
JAN 1 -0.21577 0.03865 -5.58 <.0001 1.07280
FEB 1 -0.08705 0.03967 -2.19 0.0282 1.05861
MAY 1 -0.16340 0.03834 -4.26 <.0001 1.06986
NOV 1 -0.14732 0.03865 -3.81 0.0001 1.06503
DEC 1 -0.17561 0.03894 -4.51 <.0001 1.07091
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.26749 0.05778 4.63 <.0001 1.06356
Figure 39: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 1249.647 73.50866 89.04 <.0001
Error 4275 3529.141 0.825530
Corrected Total 4292 3378.313
Root MSE 0.90859 R-Square 0.26150




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.922087 0.157227 18.59 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.08033 0.376768 -5.52 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.238832 0.019580 12.20 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.18755 0.018863 -9.94 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.470783 0.059531 7.91 <.0001
RDD1 1 0.245712 0.057093 4.30 <.0001
TUE 1 0.193976 0.043927 4.42 <.0001
WED 1 0.090706 0.042451 2.14 0.0327
FRI 1 -0.29931 0.044473 -6.73 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.49338 0.046111 -10.70 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.13053 0.052822 -2.47 0.0135
FEB 1 -0.11518 0.053293 -2.16 0.0307
MAY 1 -0.07927 0.052402 -1.51 0.1304
JUL 1 0.125752 0.052867 2.38 0.0174
SEP 1 0.124118 0.052897 2.35 0.0190
NOV 1 -0.15293 0.051740 -2.96 0.0031
DEC 1 -0.17865 0.052100 -3.43 0.0006
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.447831 0.079434 5.64 <.0001
Figure 40: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 4029
Number of Observations Used 4029
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 1843.40319 115.21270 204.93 <.0001
Error 4012 2255.53152 0.56220
Corrected Total 4028 4098.93470
Root MSE 0.74980 R-Square 0.4497




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.09352 0.05572 37.58 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.54950 0.04061 13.53 <.0001 1.38746
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.16539 0.01596 10.36 <.0001 1.43213
PUBHOL 1 -0.15515 0.08221 -1.89 0.0592 1.16080
RDDINDEX 1 -0.10055 0.00393 -25.58 <.0001 1.55145
RDD6 1 0.28031 0.04406 6.36 <.0001 1.01439
MON 1 0.37816 0.04528 8.35 <.0001 1.68943
TUE 1 0.12286 0.04435 2.77 0.0056 1.74955
WED 1 -0.19903 0.04411 -4.51 <.0001 1.71580
THU 1 -0.21230 0.04403 -4.82 <.0001 1.71673
FRI 1 -0.38430 0.04527 -8.49 <.0001 1.69361
SAT 1 -0.63921 0.04665 -13.70 <.0001 1.73015
JAN 1 -0.14838 0.04328 -3.43 0.0006 1.04565
MAY 1 -0.10352 0.04240 -2.44 0.0147 1.05372
JUL 1 0.08491 0.04107 2.07 0.0388 1.04740
DEC 1 -0.12750 0.04234 -3.01 0.0026 1.05569
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.21555 0.04234 5.09 <.0001 1.07171
Figure 41: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 20 1764.477 88.22385 99.26 <.0001
Error 4008 3562.386 0.888819
Corrected Total 4028 4098.935
Root MSE 0.94277 R-Square 0.33124




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.652387 0.111767 23.73 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.43476 0.303166 -4.73 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.187124 0.020368 9.19 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.056983 0.108450 0.53 0.5993
RDDINDEX 1 -0.18933 0.014243 -13.29 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.532477 0.067163 7.93 <.0001
MON 1 0.481197 0.059022 8.15 <.0001
TUE 1 0.178026 0.056429 3.15 0.0016
WED 1 -0.12178 0.056744 -2.15 0.0319
THU 1 -0.05487 0.060240 -0.91 0.3625
FRI 1 -0.19036 0.064035 -2.97 0.0030
SAT 1 -0.54453 0.060406 -9.01 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.29438 0.062506 -4.71 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.23285 0.066319 -3.51 0.0005
MAY 1 -0.22169 0.060047 -3.69 0.0002
JUN 1 -0.07680 0.059112 -1.30 0.1939
JUL 1 0.080444 0.055777 1.44 0.1493
OCT 1 -0.22070 0.066347 -3.33 0.0009
NOV 1 -0.29266 0.071331 -4.10 <.0001
DEC 1 -0.25502 0.060418 -4.22 <.0001
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.381369 0.059102 6.45 <.0001
Figure 42: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 3
161
C.6 OLS and 2SLS Results for Inbound Trips, Economy Class Advance
Purchases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘D’, MktS egType =‘EconAdvn’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 1546
Number of Observations Used 1546
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 1063.09446 88.59120 330.75 <.0001
Error 1533 410.61290 0.26785
Corrected Total 1545 1473.70735
Root MSE 0.51754 R-Square 0.7214




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.36064 0.07685 17.71 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.60696 0.06917 -8.77 <.0001 1.02937
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.51568 0.02033 25.37 <.0001 2.31937
PUBHOL 1 0.22049 0.08902 2.48 0.0134 1.09673
SUN 1 0.50809 0.04611 11.02 <.0001 1.60966
MON 1 0.32519 0.04514 7.20 <.0001 1.37517
WED 1 -0.43869 0.04760 -9.22 <.0001 1.51037
THU 1 -0.48083 0.04816 -9.98 <.0001 1.50132
FRI 1 -0.43891 0.04778 -9.19 <.0001 1.45882
SEP 1 -0.12250 0.04599 -2.66 0.0078 1.03121
NOV 1 0.17792 0.04738 3.76 0.0002 1.04644
DEC 1 0.13418 0.04754 2.82 0.0048 1.10204
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.15299 0.06680 -2.29 0.0221 1.02707
Figure 43: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1092.013 84.00102 234.32 <.0001
Error 1532 549.1948 0.358482
Corrected Total 1545 1473.707
Root MSE 0.59873 R-Square 0.66537




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.724790 0.098723 17.47 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.18323 0.186188 -11.73 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.486938 0.023894 20.38 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.316388 0.107940 2.93 0.0034
SUN 1 0.526634 0.061814 8.52 <.0001
MON 1 0.349003 0.060338 5.78 <.0001
WED 1 -0.48702 0.060865 -8.00 <.0001
THU 1 -0.56081 0.061743 -9.08 <.0001
FRI 1 -0.50692 0.061297 -8.27 <.0001
SAT 1 0.067175 0.057183 1.17 0.2403
SEP 1 -0.08965 0.053320 -1.68 0.0929
NOV 1 0.146187 0.054946 2.66 0.0079
DEC 1 0.247206 0.056351 4.39 <.0001
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.22752 0.077696 -2.93 0.0035
Figure 44: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1610
Number of Observations Used 1610
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1071.76504 82.44346 383.66 <.0001
Error 1596 342.95598 0.21488
Corrected Total 1609 1414.72102
Root MSE 0.46356 R-Square 0.7576




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.23514 0.05915 20.88 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.70876 0.07298 -9.71 <.0001 1.03162
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.56625 0.01826 31.00 <.0001 2.44663
PUBHOL 1 0.42980 0.08098 5.31 <.0001 1.16129
SUN 1 0.53915 0.04566 11.81 <.0001 1.98142
MON 1 0.37533 0.04092 9.17 <.0001 1.41723
FRI 1 0.07139 0.03716 1.92 0.0549 1.26234
SAT 1 -0.44387 0.04107 -10.81 <.0001 1.35704
JAN 1 -0.15695 0.04162 -3.77 0.0002 1.07007
JUL 1 0.13589 0.04139 3.28 0.0010 1.11014
AUG 1 0.13255 0.04168 3.18 0.0015 1.13225
SEP 1 -0.16430 0.04168 -3.94 <.0001 1.07975
DEC 1 -0.08588 0.04223 -2.03 0.0422 1.10196
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.10993 0.06268 1.75 0.0796 1.09568
Figure 45: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1093.580 84.12151 318.27 <.0001
Error 1596 421.8406 0.264311
Corrected Total 1609 1414.721
Root MSE 0.51411 R-Square 0.72163




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.471180 0.070085 20.99 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.10714 0.166999 -12.62 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.559746 0.020267 27.62 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.382062 0.089947 4.25 <.0001
SUN 1 0.471397 0.051132 9.22 <.0001
MON 1 0.327658 0.045656 7.18 <.0001
FRI 1 0.025991 0.041486 0.63 0.5311
SAT 1 -0.49765 0.045892 -10.84 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.10264 0.046503 -2.21 0.0274
JUL 1 0.185059 0.046187 4.01 <.0001
AUG 1 0.126038 0.046227 2.73 0.0065
SEP 1 -0.16924 0.046225 -3.66 0.0003
DEC 1 -0.02542 0.047263 -0.54 0.5908
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.079417 0.069584 1.14 0.2539
Figure 46: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 904
Number of Observations Used 904
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 6 139.26206 23.21034 97.97 <.0001
Error 897 212.51616 0.23692
Corrected Total 903 351.77822
Root MSE 0.48674 R-Square 0.3959




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.77804 0.04451 17.48 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.06056 0.05375 -1.13 0.2602 1.01523
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.36399 0.03042 11.96 <.0001 1.46732
SAT 1 0.48155 0.04611 10.44 <.0001 1.47081
FEB 1 0.12910 0.05593 2.31 0.0212 1.03821
NOV 1 0.11430 0.05818 1.96 0.0498 1.03015
DEC 1 0.16689 0.05216 3.20 0.0014 1.07440
Figure 47: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 148.4142 21.20202 67.31 <.0001
Error 896 282.2150 0.314972
Corrected Total 903 351.7782
Root MSE 0.56122 R-Square 0.34464




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.941303 0.076682 12.28 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.98273 0.184294 -5.33 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.358605 0.035146 10.20 <.0001
SAT 1 0.527897 0.054797 9.63 <.0001
FEB 1 0.059006 0.065780 0.90 0.3699
NOV 1 0.165953 0.067865 2.45 0.0147
DEC 1 0.142163 0.060340 2.36 0.0187
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.023167 0.070781 0.33 0.7435
Figure 48: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,





Number of Observations Read 1502
Number of Observations Used 1502
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 435.50230 36.29186 136.85 <.0001
Error 1489 394.86343 0.26519
Corrected Total 1501 830.36574
Root MSE 0.51496 R-Square 0.5245




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.11236 0.05720 19.45 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.02318 0.04733 -0.49 0.6243 1.08176
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.43537 0.02131 20.43 <.0001 1.56371
SUN 1 -0.33337 0.05548 -6.01 <.0001 1.52067
MON 1 -0.22591 0.05190 -4.35 <.0001 1.53116
WED 1 0.32030 0.04731 6.77 <.0001 1.66159
THU 1 0.39835 0.04852 8.21 <.0001 1.78406
FRI 1 0.24919 0.04949 5.04 <.0001 1.79254
SAT 1 0.32623 0.04978 6.55 <.0001 1.83945
MAY 1 -0.09970 0.05209 -1.91 0.0558 1.05201
SEP 1 -0.16647 0.04656 -3.58 0.0004 1.05106
DEC 1 0.16793 0.04701 3.57 0.0004 1.07811
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.14097 0.06419 2.20 0.0282 1.08249
Figure 49: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 11 436.6900 39.69909 144.64 <.0001
Error 1490 408.9476 0.274461
Corrected Total 1501 830.3657
Root MSE 0.52389 R-Square 0.51640




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.194186 0.067400 17.72 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.35805 0.125466 -2.85 0.0044
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.438571 0.021419 20.48 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.37556 0.058665 -6.40 <.0001
MON 1 -0.23029 0.052833 -4.36 <.0001
WED 1 0.333753 0.048432 6.89 <.0001
THU 1 0.401082 0.049351 8.13 <.0001
FRI 1 0.214163 0.051307 4.17 <.0001
SAT 1 0.266954 0.053562 4.98 <.0001
SEP 1 -0.12937 0.047911 -2.70 0.0070
DEC 1 0.157969 0.048035 3.29 0.0010
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.148146 0.065341 2.27 0.0235
Figure 50: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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C.7 OLS and 2SLS Results for Inbound Trips, Economy Class Late Pur-
chases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘D’, MktS egType =‘EconLate’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 3491
Number of Observations Used 3491
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 3126.99472 223.35677 476.29 <.0001
Error 3476 1630.06276 0.46895
Corrected Total 3490 4757.05748
Root MSE 0.68480 R-Square 0.6573




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.08835 0.05527 19.69 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.41133 0.04368 -9.42 <.0001 1.10110
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.39410 0.01676 23.52 <.0001 2.78289
RDD6 1 0.37698 0.04049 9.31 <.0001 1.01337
PUBHOL 1 0.19680 0.08518 2.31 0.0209 1.13561
SUN 1 0.68251 0.04559 14.97 <.0001 2.13157
MON 1 0.45480 0.04511 10.08 <.0001 1.84036
WED 1 -0.52880 0.04685 -11.29 <.0001 1.90724
THU 1 -0.63164 0.04850 -13.02 <.0001 1.91788
FRI 1 -0.68945 0.04952 -13.92 <.0001 1.96364
SAT 1 -0.41141 0.04473 -9.20 <.0001 1.80011
AUG 1 -0.07185 0.04039 -1.78 0.0754 1.03100
NOV 1 0.08786 0.04047 2.17 0.0300 1.03229
DEC 1 -0.07776 0.04199 -1.85 0.0642 1.03437
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.07664 0.04400 1.74 0.0816 1.04398
Figure 51: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 3123.413 223.1010 440.69 <.0001
Error 3476 1759.722 0.506249
Corrected Total 3490 4757.057
Root MSE 0.71151 R-Square 0.63963




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.350151 0.072598 18.60 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.13766 0.131312 -8.66 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.328338 0.020677 15.88 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.407351 0.042385 9.61 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.175163 0.088584 1.98 0.0481
SUN 1 0.728881 0.048016 15.18 <.0001
MON 1 0.472858 0.046971 10.07 <.0001
WED 1 -0.61240 0.050703 -12.08 <.0001
THU 1 -0.73410 0.053309 -13.77 <.0001
FRI 1 -0.80762 0.055219 -14.63 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.43440 0.046637 -9.31 <.0001
NOV 1 0.097692 0.042083 2.32 0.0203
AUG 1 -0.10480 0.042336 -2.48 0.0134
DEC 1 -0.09160 0.043696 -2.10 0.0361
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.03957 0.049782 -0.79 0.4268
Figure 52: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 3680
Number of Observations Used 3680
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 3314.33221 194.96072 445.25 <.0001
Error 3662 1603.48615 0.43787
Corrected Total 3679 4917.81836
Root MSE 0.66172 R-Square 0.6739




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.18798 0.05308 22.38 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.83079 0.04567 -18.19 <.0001 1.41439
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.44977 0.01619 27.79 <.0001 2.74432
PUBHOL 1 0.21519 0.07733 2.78 0.0054 1.19899
RDD6 1 0.28114 0.03973 7.08 <.0001 1.04137
SUN 1 0.56317 0.04483 12.56 <.0001 2.22697
MON 1 0.22832 0.04279 5.34 <.0001 1.80072
WED 1 -0.19328 0.04100 -4.71 <.0001 1.74700
THU 1 -0.38840 0.04234 -9.17 <.0001 1.88370
FRI 1 -0.44212 0.04299 -10.28 <.0001 1.92958
SAT 1 -0.85002 0.05040 -16.87 <.0001 1.96756
MAY 1 0.10584 0.03982 2.66 0.0079 1.11466
JUL 1 0.17534 0.03987 4.40 <.0001 1.12035
AUG 1 0.17592 0.03976 4.42 <.0001 1.12313
SEP 1 0.13218 0.03981 3.32 0.0009 1.10197
OCT 1 0.11851 0.03923 3.02 0.0025 1.11056
DEC 1 -0.08129 0.04049 -2.01 0.0448 1.10328
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.33509 0.04575 7.33 <.0001 1.03918
Figure 53: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 18 3290.108 182.7838 408.59 <.0001
Error 3661 1637.738 0.447347
Corrected Total 3679 4917.818
Root MSE 0.66884 R-Square 0.66766




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.415990 0.064166 22.07 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.23844 0.075400 -16.43 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.381302 0.019185 19.87 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.219104 0.078243 2.80 0.0051
RDD6 1 0.323406 0.040631 7.96 <.0001
SUN 1 0.563256 0.045318 12.43 <.0001
MON 1 0.231776 0.043260 5.36 <.0001
WED 1 -0.21971 0.041633 -5.28 <.0001
THU 1 -0.48083 0.044906 -10.71 <.0001
FRI 1 -0.54587 0.046038 -11.86 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.98500 0.054663 -18.02 <.0001
MAY 1 0.146191 0.041382 3.53 0.0004
JUL 1 0.209420 0.041366 5.06 <.0001
AUG 1 0.218161 0.041383 5.27 <.0001
SEP 1 0.162332 0.041253 3.94 <.0001
OCT 1 0.156391 0.040807 3.83 0.0001
NOV 1 0.049093 0.041200 1.19 0.2335
DEC 1 -0.08244 0.041731 -1.98 0.0483
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.327421 0.046253 7.08 <.0001
Figure 54: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 2871
Number of Observations Used 2871
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 164.59276 12.66098 52.83 <.0001
Error 2857 684.73969 0.23967
Corrected Total 2870 849.33245
Root MSE 0.48956 R-Square 0.1938




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.33563 0.04276 31.23 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.09553 0.02711 3.52 0.0004 1.42552
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.11243 0.01799 6.25 <.0001 1.15916
PUBHOL 1 -0.27833 0.08101 -3.44 0.0006 1.02684
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02077 0.00307 -6.76 <.0001 1.29579
RDD6 1 0.36453 0.03018 12.08 <.0001 1.02687
RDD7 1 0.31168 0.03235 9.64 <.0001 1.02516
SUN 1 -0.29109 0.03168 -9.19 <.0001 1.23260
MON 1 -0.12148 0.03081 -3.94 <.0001 1.13840
THU 1 0.07274 0.02771 2.63 0.0087 1.15319
SAT 1 0.16280 0.02818 5.78 <.0001 1.41060
FEB 1 0.06309 0.03319 1.90 0.0574 1.01459
AUG 1 -0.08378 0.03488 -2.40 0.0164 1.03558
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.06436 0.03604 1.79 0.0742 1.03187
Figure 55: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 18 163.7653 9.098071 35.66 <.0001
Error 2852 727.5492 0.255101
Corrected Total 2870 849.3325
Root MSE 0.50508 R-Square 0.18373




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.416766 0.051158 27.69 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.26737 0.104331 -2.56 0.0104
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.115612 0.018593 6.22 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.24048 0.084699 -2.84 0.0046
RDDINDEX 1 -0.03816 0.005775 -6.61 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.375411 0.031275 12.00 <.0001
RDD7 1 0.319532 0.033447 9.55 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.18770 0.043716 -4.29 <.0001
MON 1 -0.09989 0.032448 -3.08 0.0021
THU 1 0.079802 0.028649 2.79 0.0054
SAT 1 0.298336 0.047502 6.28 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.01212 0.035971 -0.34 0.7363
FEB 1 0.042195 0.036796 1.15 0.2516
JUN 1 -0.02073 0.035603 -0.58 0.5604
JUL 1 -0.00296 0.035606 -0.08 0.9337
AUG 1 -0.01401 0.042094 -0.33 0.7393
OCT 1 0.008223 0.034600 0.24 0.8122
NOV 1 0.001024 0.035072 0.03 0.9767
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.032816 0.038170 0.86 0.3900
Figure 56: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 3731
Number of Observations Used 3731
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 1055.05873 65.94117 157.98 <.0001
Error 3714 1550.25052 0.41741
Corrected Total 3730 2605.30925
Root MSE 0.64607 R-Square 0.4050




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.35286 0.05196 45.28 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.59351 0.03446 17.23 <.0001 1.69150
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.11177 0.01522 7.34 <.0001 1.40084
PUBHOL 1 -0.86865 0.07635 -11.38 <.0001 1.20006
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02447 0.00355 -6.89 <.0001 1.34567
RDD6 1 0.53719 0.03841 13.98 <.0001 1.03120
RDD7 1 0.37798 0.03883 9.73 <.0001 1.01188
SUN 1 -1.03526 0.04520 -22.90 <.0001 1.84736
MON 1 -0.34436 0.04149 -8.30 <.0001 1.67227
WED 1 0.19017 0.03930 4.84 <.0001 1.77359
THU 1 0.27211 0.03960 6.87 <.0001 1.79869
FRI 1 0.15378 0.03993 3.85 0.0001 1.75369
SAT 1 -0.31704 0.04153 -7.63 <.0001 1.95821
FEB 1 0.10590 0.03847 2.75 0.0059 1.04290
AUG 1 -0.21098 0.03902 -5.41 <.0001 1.13906
SEP 1 0.06550 0.03718 1.76 0.0782 1.04473
DEC 1 -0.11093 0.03820 -2.90 0.0037 1.05167
Figure 57: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 938.1495 55.18527 113.05 <.0001
Error 3713 1812.576 0.488170
Corrected Total 3730 2605.309
Root MSE 0.69869 R-Square 0.34106




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.418327 0.056578 42.74 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.28196 0.092608 -3.04 0.0023
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.118568 0.016486 7.19 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.53951 0.088778 -6.08 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.06747 0.005672 -11.90 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.614501 0.042220 14.55 <.0001
RDD7 1 0.381340 0.041998 9.08 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.80296 0.053795 -14.93 <.0001
MON 1 -0.38091 0.045033 -8.46 <.0001
WED 1 0.178169 0.042511 4.19 <.0001
THU 1 0.290066 0.042861 6.77 <.0001
FRI 1 0.202926 0.043438 4.67 <.0001
SAT 1 0.030402 0.056049 0.54 0.5876
FEB 1 0.082507 0.042033 1.96 0.0497
JUL 1 0.155290 0.045848 3.39 0.0007
AUG 1 0.104653 0.053135 1.97 0.0490
SEP 1 0.040534 0.040648 1.00 0.3187
DEC 1 -0.02876 0.042690 -0.67 0.5005
Figure 58: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘EconLate’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 2
177
C.8 OLS and 2SLS Results for Outbound Trips, First Class Advance
Purchases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘FrstAdvn’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 623
Number of Observations Used 623
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 9 158.14298 17.57144 70.35 <.0001
Error 613 153.12012 0.24979
Corrected Total 622 311.26310
Root MSE 0.49979 R-Square 0.5081




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.73386 0.05764 12.73 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.32573 0.09949 -3.27 0.0011 1.05303
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.40495 0.03349 12.09 <.0001 1.74043
PUBHOL 1 0.41691 0.17633 2.36 0.0184 1.10412
TUE 1 -0.39656 0.12377 -3.20 0.0014 1.12977
FRI 1 0.51238 0.06609 7.75 <.0001 2.49332
SAT 1 0.20682 0.05520 3.75 0.0002 1.66518
MAY 1 -0.13084 0.07888 -1.66 0.0977 1.03995
OCT 1 0.13133 0.06536 2.01 0.0449 1.03602
NOV 1 0.16232 0.07066 2.30 0.0219 1.05126
Figure 59: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 163.9794 16.39794 37.59 <.0001
Error 612 267.0063 0.436285
Corrected Total 622 311.2631
Root MSE 0.66052 R-Square 0.38048




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.026337 0.112278 9.14 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.45294 0.555586 -4.42 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.332662 0.047918 6.94 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.675346 0.242280 2.79 0.0055
TUE 1 -0.40914 0.163872 -2.50 0.0128
FRI 1 0.622710 0.091716 6.79 <.0001
SAT 1 0.097646 0.078035 1.25 0.2113
MAY 1 -0.10757 0.104415 -1.03 0.3033
OCT 1 0.134899 0.086389 1.56 0.1189
NOV 1 0.316911 0.101437 3.12 0.0019
LN_AVGCONN 1 -0.07744 0.093328 -0.83 0.4070
Figure 60: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 818
Number of Observations Used 818
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 192.57665 13.75548 56.52 <.0001
Error 803 195.41784 0.24336
Corrected Total 817 387.99449
Root MSE 0.49332 R-Square 0.4963




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.16922 0.06947 16.83 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.42249 0.08864 -4.77 <.0001 1.11953
LN_LAG_TOTALPAX 1 0.30242 0.03109 9.73 <.0001 1.68158
SUN 1 -0.48017 0.11084 -4.33 <.0001 1.12839
MON 1 -0.33310 0.10738 -3.10 0.0020 1.19282
TUE 1 -0.44378 0.11355 -3.91 0.0001 1.13424
WED 1 -0.31699 0.06498 -4.88 <.0001 1.34905
FRI 1 0.45937 0.05027 9.14 <.0001 1.67942
SAT 1 0.13505 0.04734 2.85 0.0044 1.44176
JAN 1 -0.37732 0.07305 -5.17 <.0001 1.16269
MAY 1 -0.15620 0.06839 -2.28 0.0226 1.10114
AUG 1 -0.14566 0.06120 -2.38 0.0175 1.13545
SEP 1 -0.18130 0.06265 -2.89 0.0039 1.09871
OCT 1 0.12320 0.06118 2.01 0.0444 1.09778
NOV 1 0.25622 0.06824 3.75 0.0002 1.11269
Figure 61: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 194.2028 12.13767 39.28 <.0001
Error 801 247.5167 0.309010
Corrected Total 817 387.9945
Root MSE 0.55589 R-Square 0.43965




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.306748 0.088676 14.74 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.79293 0.374948 -4.78 <.0001
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.248412 0.037790 6.57 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.50228 0.126115 -3.98 <.0001
MON 1 -0.15957 0.129694 -1.23 0.2189
TUE 1 -0.43889 0.128009 -3.43 0.0006
WED 1 -0.30000 0.073666 -4.07 <.0001
FRI 1 0.592309 0.066326 8.93 <.0001
SAT 1 0.126731 0.053516 2.37 0.0181
JAN 1 -0.46808 0.089564 -5.23 <.0001
MAY 1 -0.16443 0.080997 -2.03 0.0427
JUL 1 -0.12948 0.077591 -1.67 0.0956
AUG 1 -0.29225 0.084678 -3.45 0.0006
SEP 1 -0.16351 0.074672 -2.19 0.0288
OCT 1 0.109477 0.073691 1.49 0.1378
NOV 1 0.446233 0.093486 4.77 <.0001
DEC 1 0.234530 0.084664 2.77 0.0057
Figure 62: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 538
Number of Observations Used 538
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 137.15993 19.59428 78.63 <.0001
Error 530 132.07214 0.24919
Corrected Total 537 269.23207
Root MSE 0.49919 R-Square 0.5094




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.88987 0.06524 13.64 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.35067 0.10172 -3.45 0.0006 1.01851
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.41005 0.03855 10.64 <.0001 1.68351
SUN 1 -0.23270 0.08446 -2.76 0.0061 1.13262
FRI 1 0.42200 0.05589 7.55 <.0001 1.64098
SAT 1 -0.47827 0.14888 -3.21 0.0014 1.04361
JAN 1 -0.17367 0.08386 -2.07 0.0388 1.04490
AUG 1 -0.16284 0.08626 -1.89 0.0596 1.02887
Figure 63: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 9 140.4547 15.60607 37.79 <.0001
Error 528 218.0252 0.412927
Corrected Total 537 269.2321
Root MSE 0.64259 R-Square 0.39181




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.139980 0.115792 9.85 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -2.24562 0.631558 -3.56 0.0004
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.369638 0.051125 7.23 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.29069 0.110749 -2.62 0.0089
TUE 1 0.135745 0.223857 0.61 0.5445
FRI 1 0.409905 0.072208 5.68 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.71446 0.205505 -3.48 0.0005
JAN 1 -0.13900 0.109106 -1.27 0.2032
AUG 1 -0.28011 0.120584 -2.32 0.0206
OCT 1 -0.08074 0.102219 -0.79 0.4300
Figure 64: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 1138
Number of Observations Used 1138
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 9 36.83407 4.09267 15.75 <.0001
Error 1128 293.07554 0.25982
Corrected Total 1137 329.90961
Root MSE 0.50972 R-Square 0.1116




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.50909 0.04164 36.24 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.08423 0.04918 1.71 0.0871 1.08705
SUN 1 -0.37435 0.06290 -5.95 <.0001 1.15865
MON 1 0.19594 0.04784 4.10 <.0001 1.21755
THU 1 -0.09387 0.04680 -2.01 0.0451 1.21891
FRI 1 -0.26437 0.04881 -5.42 <.0001 1.20088
SAT 1 -0.14829 0.04721 -3.14 0.0017 1.30588
JAN 1 -0.18030 0.06048 -2.98 0.0029 1.01066
MAY 1 -0.12189 0.06288 -1.94 0.0528 1.01300
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.14928 0.04940 3.02 0.0026 1.04049
Figure 65: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 36.94187 3.694187 13.40 <.0001
Error 1127 310.7126 0.275699
Corrected Total 1137 329.9096
Root MSE 0.52507 R-Square 0.10626




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.640847 0.072585 22.61 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.32468 0.189920 -1.71 0.0876
SUN 1 -0.42577 0.068949 -6.18 <.0001
MON 1 0.192741 0.049312 3.91 <.0001
THU 1 -0.09212 0.048253 -1.91 0.0565
FRI 1 -0.27013 0.050349 -5.37 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.24090 0.063866 -3.77 0.0002
JAN 1 -0.20083 0.063171 -3.18 0.0015
AUG 1 -0.05666 0.055619 -1.02 0.3085
MAY 1 -0.15468 0.066528 -2.33 0.0202
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.118064 0.052752 2.24 0.0254
Figure 66: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 1274
Number of Observations Used 1274
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 240.20701 20.01725 47.79 <.0001
Error 1261 528.16980 0.41885
Corrected Total 1273 768.37681
Root MSE 0.64719 R-Square 0.3126




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.02101 0.05757 17.73 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.10297 0.04935 2.09 0.0371 1.02859
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.20264 0.02699 7.51 <.0001 1.45525
SUN 1 -0.28331 0.06089 -4.65 <.0001 1.56408
MON 1 0.14227 0.06250 2.28 0.0230 1.57240
WED 1 -0.18020 0.06074 -2.97 0.0031 1.56833
THU 1 -0.37170 0.06407 -5.80 <.0001 1.57756
FRI 1 -0.66188 0.07663 -8.64 <.0001 1.48967
SAT 1 -0.88361 0.08511 -10.38 <.0001 1.46123
JAN 1 -0.32031 0.07114 -4.50 <.0001 1.07244
FEB 1 0.17322 0.06827 2.54 0.0113 1.03475
OCT 1 0.12757 0.06475 1.97 0.0490 1.03899
NOV 1 0.20221 0.06334 3.19 0.0014 1.04109
Figure 67: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
186





Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 246.6608 18.97391 29.29 <.0001
Error 1260 816.2009 0.647778
Corrected Total 1273 768.3768
Root MSE 0.80485 R-Square 0.23207




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.332094 0.107649 12.37 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.19928 0.349619 -3.43 0.0006
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.180154 0.034099 5.28 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.39370 0.081072 -4.86 <.0001
MON 1 0.213186 0.080049 2.66 0.0078
WED 1 -0.26456 0.078620 -3.37 0.0008
THU 1 -0.46974 0.083618 -5.62 <.0001
FRI 1 -0.82998 0.105157 -7.89 <.0001
SAT 1 -1.09224 0.119354 -9.15 <.0001
JAN 1 -0.41813 0.092199 -4.54 <.0001
FEB 1 0.148012 0.085785 1.73 0.0847
AUG 1 -0.18579 0.084400 -2.20 0.0279
OCT 1 0.082883 0.081881 1.01 0.3116
NOV 1 0.253720 0.081230 3.12 0.0018
Figure 68: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 833
Number of Observations Used 833
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 60.53061 6.05306 15.50 <.0001
Error 822 320.90931 0.39040
Corrected Total 832 381.43991
Root MSE 0.62482 R-Square 0.1587




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.71922 0.04606 15.62 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.25426 0.05359 4.74 <.0001 1.01763
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.10520 0.03424 3.07 0.0022 1.11015
PUBHOL 1 -0.31079 0.14067 -2.21 0.0274 1.03752
SUN 1 -0.18317 0.06174 -2.97 0.0031 1.11116
MON 1 0.18295 0.06237 2.93 0.0035 1.14741
FRI 1 -0.45488 0.07026 -6.47 <.0001 1.13185
MAY 1 -0.15144 0.08681 -1.74 0.0815 1.02505
JUL 1 -0.30500 0.07867 -3.88 0.0001 1.04272
AUG 1 -0.28999 0.08946 -3.24 0.0012 1.03530
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.17253 0.06090 2.83 0.0047 1.01560
Figure 69: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 54.10337 5.410337 9.02 <.0001
Error 822 493.3103 0.600134
Corrected Total 832 381.4399
Root MSE 0.77468 R-Square 0.09883




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.733522 0.057780 12.70 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 1.380329 0.695719 1.98 0.0476
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.074383 0.046490 1.60 0.1100
PUBHOL 1 -0.32400 0.174593 -1.86 0.0638
SUN 1 -0.30047 0.105188 -2.86 0.0044
MON 1 0.096250 0.093933 1.02 0.3058
FRI 1 -0.58689 0.119078 -4.93 <.0001
MAY 1 -0.14231 0.107780 -1.32 0.1871
JUL 1 -0.34561 0.100686 -3.43 0.0006
AUG 1 -0.30541 0.111326 -2.74 0.0062
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.176146 0.075545 2.33 0.0200
Hausman's Specification Test Results
Comparing To DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq
OLS 2SLS 11 2.64 0.9947
Figure 70: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 3
189
C.9 OLS and 2SLS Results for Outbound Trips, First Class Late Pur-
chases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘A’, MktS egType =‘FrstLate’, we first provide the results from the stepwise OLS




Number of Observations Read 1749
Number of Observations Used 1749
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 133.60761 11.13397 50.62 <.0001
Error 1736 381.85894 0.21996
Corrected Total 1748 515.46654
Root MSE 0.46900 R-Square 0.2592




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.20575 0.04759 25.34 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.01451 0.04594 0.32 0.7522 1.41382
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.13469 0.02281 5.90 <.0001 1.26108
PUBHOL 1 0.61592 0.10729 5.74 <.0001 1.03471
RDD9 1 -0.23581 0.04538 -5.20 <.0001 1.07068
RDD5 1 -0.31826 0.04973 -6.40 <.0001 1.01991
RDD0 1 -0.50440 0.04952 -10.19 <.0001 1.25554
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02887 0.00388 -7.44 <.0001 1.68695
FRI 1 0.40149 0.03031 13.25 <.0001 1.53088
SAT 1 0.34694 0.02899 11.97 <.0001 1.40973
JUL 1 0.06181 0.03588 1.72 0.0851 1.01867
DEC 1 -0.10658 0.03986 -2.67 0.0076 1.03211
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.10622 0.03794 2.80 0.0052 1.05736
Figure 71: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 135.5342 8.470889 36.82 <.0001
Error 1732 398.4342 0.230043
Corrected Total 1748 515.4665
Root MSE 0.47963 R-Square 0.25382




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.349688 0.074667 18.08 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.39303 0.172798 -2.27 0.0231
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.137154 0.023434 5.85 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.601942 0.111076 5.42 <.0001
RDD9 1 -0.25290 0.046966 -5.38 <.0001
RDD5 1 -0.31765 0.051049 -6.22 <.0001
RDD0 1 -0.50575 0.050971 -9.92 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.04540 0.008037 -5.65 <.0001
MON 1 -0.00226 0.048890 -0.05 0.9632
WED 1 -0.04456 0.054863 -0.81 0.4168
FRI 1 0.426512 0.038317 11.13 <.0001
SAT 1 0.352754 0.035032 10.07 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.02667 0.045307 -0.59 0.5561
JUN 1 -0.05807 0.040805 -1.42 0.1549
JUL 1 0.043335 0.037554 1.15 0.2487
DEC 1 -0.12845 0.041824 -3.07 0.0022
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.074767 0.043634 1.71 0.0868
Figure 72: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 1976
Number of Observations Used 1976
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 10 222.45288 22.24529 96.14 <.0001
Error 1965 454.67910 0.23139
Corrected Total 1975 677.13197
Root MSE 0.48103 R-Square 0.3285




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.14362 0.03839 29.79 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.00523 0.04350 0.12 0.9042 1.30927
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.17756 0.02178 8.15 <.0001 1.34776
PUBHOL 1 0.30369 0.08453 3.59 0.0003 1.03174
RDD5 1 -0.34710 0.05149 -6.74 <.0001 1.01536
RDD9 1 -0.28905 0.04727 -6.12 <.0001 1.05424
RDDINDEX 1 -0.02161 0.00324 -6.67 <.0001 1.36342
FRI 1 0.51669 0.03026 17.08 <.0001 1.54194
SAT 1 0.46249 0.02843 16.27 <.0001 1.41268
JUL 1 0.13043 0.03622 3.60 0.0003 1.02374
DEC 1 -0.13009 0.03895 -3.34 0.0009 1.02428
Figure 73: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 225.6162 18.80135 75.73 <.0001
Error 1963 487.3291 0.248257
Corrected Total 1975 677.1320
Root MSE 0.49825 R-Square 0.31646




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.350632 0.069067 19.56 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.52656 0.156951 -3.35 0.0008
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.163246 0.022918 7.12 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.232031 0.089820 2.58 0.0099
RDD5 1 -0.33494 0.053457 -6.27 <.0001
RDD9 1 -0.30847 0.049260 -6.26 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.04084 0.006336 -6.45 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.12712 0.057192 -2.22 0.0264
TUE 1 -0.09534 0.056141 -1.70 0.0896
FRI 1 0.521963 0.032635 15.99 <.0001
SAT 1 0.461106 0.030792 14.97 <.0001
JUL 1 0.113402 0.037894 2.99 0.0028
DEC 1 -0.12077 0.040473 -2.98 0.0029
Figure 74: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 2085
Number of Observations Used 2085
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 356.02685 22.25168 92.04 <.0001
Error 2068 499.95108 0.24176
Corrected Total 2084 855.97793
Root MSE 0.49169 R-Square 0.4159




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.64394 0.04993 32.93 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.09952 0.04327 2.30 0.0215 1.72183
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.16443 0.02114 7.78 <.0001 1.55161
PUBHOL 1 -0.16361 0.08500 -1.92 0.0544 1.08615
RDD5 1 -0.41061 0.04532 -9.06 <.0001 1.02802
RDD9 1 -0.23606 0.04412 -5.35 <.0001 1.09345
RDDINDEX 1 -0.03557 0.00363 -9.78 <.0001 1.67854
SUN 1 -0.45469 0.03948 -11.52 <.0001 1.69274
MON 1 -0.43732 0.05139 -8.51 <.0001 1.27396
TUE 1 -0.40413 0.04780 -8.46 <.0001 1.32351
WED 1 -0.30325 0.03726 -8.14 <.0001 1.48689
FRI 1 0.29001 0.03287 8.82 <.0001 1.81377
SAT 1 -0.33642 0.05235 -6.43 <.0001 1.37165
FEB 1 -0.08166 0.03883 -2.10 0.0356 1.04139
JUL 1 0.06413 0.03599 1.78 0.0749 1.04569
DEC 1 -0.09011 0.03754 -2.40 0.0165 1.04433
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.11852 0.04255 2.79 0.0054 1.08996
Figure 75: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 18 355.0035 19.72241 81.13 <.0001
Error 2066 502.2257 0.243091
Corrected Total 2084 855.9779
Root MSE 0.49304 R-Square 0.41413




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.653847 0.054265 30.48 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.03941 0.175368 -0.22 0.8222
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.167483 0.021730 7.71 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.12331 0.095105 -1.30 0.1949
RDD5 1 -0.41929 0.046792 -8.96 <.0001
RDD9 1 -0.24395 0.045527 -5.36 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.04189 0.008431 -4.97 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.41731 0.061863 -6.75 <.0001
MON 1 -0.43403 0.052091 -8.33 <.0001
TUE 1 -0.40321 0.048031 -8.39 <.0001
WED 1 -0.30658 0.037612 -8.15 <.0001
FRI 1 0.315595 0.045603 6.92 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.31286 0.059430 -5.26 <.0001
FEB 1 -0.08177 0.041020 -1.99 0.0463
JUL 1 0.080967 0.038366 2.11 0.0349
NOV 1 0.037144 0.040796 0.91 0.3627
OCT 1 0.012044 0.038223 0.32 0.7527
DEC 1 -0.07560 0.039217 -1.93 0.0540
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.124596 0.043101 2.89 0.0039
Hausman's Specification Test Results
Comparing To DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq
OLS 2SLS 19 0.70 1.0000
Figure 76: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 2704
Number of Observations Used 2704
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1408.83111 108.37162 133.97 <.0001
Error 2690 2175.96789 0.80891
Corrected Total 2703 3584.79900
Root MSE 0.89939 R-Square 0.3930




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.15401 0.07607 28.32 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.77782 0.05493 14.16 <.0001 1.26594
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.11303 0.01772 6.38 <.0001 1.43681
PUBHOL 1 -0.71340 0.10010 -7.13 <.0001 1.07767
RDD6 1 0.65338 0.06209 10.52 <.0001 1.02252
RDD0 1 -0.89312 0.07176 -12.45 <.0001 1.38168
RDDINDEX 1 -0.11735 0.00605 -19.39 <.0001 1.75399
MON 1 0.16026 0.04571 3.51 0.0005 1.07056
FRI 1 -0.22455 0.04716 -4.76 <.0001 1.08880
JUN 1 0.13520 0.06116 2.21 0.0272 1.04923
AUG 1 -0.52816 0.06175 -8.55 <.0001 1.11922
SEP 1 0.11353 0.06105 1.86 0.0630 1.04901
DEC 1 -0.15731 0.06102 -2.58 0.0100 1.05937
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.71502 0.06017 11.88 <.0001 1.04516
Figure 77: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1254.475 96.49806 72.89 <.0001
Error 2690 3561.486 1.323972
Corrected Total 2703 3584.799
Root MSE 1.15064 R-Square 0.26048




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.618181 0.158093 16.56 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.49545 0.614204 -2.43 0.0150
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.076596 0.024684 3.10 0.0019
PUBHOL 1 -0.40642 0.152278 -2.67 0.0077
RDD6 1 0.886660 0.101143 8.77 <.0001
RDD0 1 -0.95480 0.093284 -10.24 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.20256 0.024147 -8.39 <.0001
MON 1 0.143334 0.058658 2.44 0.0146
FRI 1 -0.24324 0.060536 -4.02 <.0001
JUN 1 0.000682 0.086176 0.01 0.9937
AUG 1 0.088026 0.183291 0.48 0.6311
SEP 1 0.008348 0.083045 0.10 0.9199
DEC 1 -0.05898 0.082407 -0.72 0.4742
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.536399 0.090687 5.91 <.0001
Figure 78: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 3472
Number of Observations Used 3472
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 1116.10500 93.00875 171.29 <.0001
Error 3459 1878.23318 0.54300
Corrected Total 3471 2994.33818
Root MSE 0.73688 R-Square 0.3727




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.74089 0.05044 34.51 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.37396 0.03358 11.14 <.0001 1.21793
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.12150 0.01656 7.34 <.0001 1.33334
PUBHOL 1 -0.45417 0.08456 -5.37 <.0001 1.05426
RDD6 1 0.32463 0.04541 7.15 <.0001 1.00612
RDDINDEX 1 -0.09228 0.00380 -24.28 <.0001 1.30766
SUN 1 -0.36628 0.03723 -9.84 <.0001 1.17971
THU 1 -0.09161 0.03881 -2.36 0.0183 1.13302
FRI 1 -0.55856 0.04227 -13.21 <.0001 1.21719
SAT 1 -0.71920 0.04512 -15.94 <.0001 1.31561
AUG 1 -0.28190 0.04310 -6.54 <.0001 1.03814
DEC 1 -0.14044 0.04571 -3.07 0.0021 1.02279
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.35371 0.04472 7.91 <.0001 1.05213
Figure 79: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 1054.878 75.34842 77.31 <.0001
Error 3457 3369.400 0.974660
Corrected Total 3471 2994.338
Root MSE 0.98725 R-Square 0.23843




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.646822 0.074331 22.16 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.38932 0.557974 -2.49 0.0128
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.138502 0.022852 6.06 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.13542 0.151432 -0.89 0.3713
RDD6 1 0.423182 0.068344 6.19 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.15702 0.021051 -7.46 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.21027 0.069949 -3.01 0.0027
THU 1 -0.12105 0.052922 -2.29 0.0222
FRI 1 -0.52575 0.057514 -9.14 <.0001
SAT 1 -0.35632 0.129208 -2.76 0.0059
JUN 1 -0.07199 0.068780 -1.05 0.2953
JUL 1 0.111783 0.072534 1.54 0.1234
AUG 1 0.030108 0.114307 0.26 0.7923
DEC 1 -0.05073 0.068071 -0.75 0.4562
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.624520 0.104928 5.95 <.0001
Figure 80: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 3166
Number of Observations Used 3166
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 2002.91017 154.07001 207.96 <.0001
Error 3152 2335.15562 0.74085
Corrected Total 3165 4338.06579
Root MSE 0.86073 R-Square 0.4617




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.55545 0.05967 42.82 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.45615 0.04858 9.39 <.0001 1.09575
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.12846 0.01723 7.45 <.0001 1.58107
PUBHOL 1 -0.85669 0.09937 -8.62 <.0001 1.06459
RDD6 1 0.55453 0.05423 10.23 <.0001 1.00676
RDDINDEX 1 -0.13065 0.00480 -27.20 <.0001 1.39959
SUN 1 -0.44355 0.04417 -10.04 <.0001 1.16188
THU 1 -0.20347 0.04492 -4.53 <.0001 1.13361
FRI 1 -1.06726 0.05275 -20.23 <.0001 1.31520
SAT 1 -1.74291 0.07983 -21.83 <.0001 1.36841
JUL 1 -0.09366 0.05340 -1.75 0.0795 1.04210
AUG 1 -0.46250 0.05462 -8.47 <.0001 1.06079
DEC 1 -0.20726 0.05545 -3.74 0.0002 1.03540
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.19069 0.05468 3.49 0.0005 1.02787
Figure 81: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 3
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 13 1939.517 149.1936 119.73 <.0001
Error 3152 3927.772 1.246120
Corrected Total 3165 4338.066
Root MSE 1.11630 R-Square 0.33056




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.729610 0.136013 20.07 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.79636 1.448000 -1.24 0.2149
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.119041 0.023154 5.14 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.89655 0.131391 -6.82 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.642956 0.090400 7.11 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.18545 0.035740 -5.19 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.35386 0.081237 -4.36 <.0001
THU 1 -0.22029 0.059250 -3.72 0.0002
FRI 1 -1.09500 0.070691 -15.49 <.0001
SAT 1 -1.78620 0.107199 -16.66 <.0001
JUL 1 -0.30565 0.152751 -2.00 0.0455
AUG 1 -0.63263 0.130213 -4.86 <.0001
DEC 1 -0.12746 0.088311 -1.44 0.1490
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.177127 0.071449 2.48 0.0132
Hausman's Specification Test Results
Comparing To DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq
OLS 2SLS 14 2.42 0.9997
Figure 82: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘A’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 3
201
C.10 OLS and 2SLS Results for Inbound Trips, First Class Advance
Purchases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘D’, MktS egType =‘FrstAdvn’, we first provide the results from the stepwise




Number of Observations Read 696
Number of Observations Used 696
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 6 50.89396 8.48233 32.97 <.0001
Error 689 177.27032 0.25729
Corrected Total 695 228.16428
Root MSE 0.50723 R-Square 0.2231




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.15595 0.02941 5.30 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.10023 0.05580 1.80 0.0729 1.00483
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.12509 0.03596 3.48 0.0005 1.15672
PUBHOL 1 0.64257 0.10771 5.97 <.0001 1.08685
SUN 1 0.46593 0.04993 9.33 <.0001 1.24505
MON 1 0.34655 0.05243 6.61 <.0001 1.16279
MAY 1 0.16813 0.07549 2.23 0.0263 1.02788
Figure 83: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 50.99244 6.374055 23.78 <.0001
Error 687 184.1218 0.268008
Corrected Total 695 228.1643
Root MSE 0.51770 R-Square 0.21688




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.151541 0.044512 3.40 0.0007
LN_PRATIO 1 0.389602 0.284890 1.37 0.1719
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.132226 0.037470 3.53 0.0004
PUBHOL 1 0.629382 0.111988 5.62 <.0001
SUN 1 0.444063 0.054753 8.11 <.0001
MON 1 0.324593 0.057164 5.68 <.0001
WED 1 -0.03303 0.074477 -0.44 0.6576
THU 1 -0.01541 0.085309 -0.18 0.8567
MAY 1 0.157264 0.077704 2.02 0.0434
Hausman's Specification Test Results
Comparing To DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq
OLS 2SLS 9 1.13 0.9991
Figure 84: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 659
Number of Observations Used 659
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 8 88.53684 11.06711 43.67 <.0001
Error 650 164.71663 0.25341
Corrected Total 658 253.25347
Root MSE 0.50340 R-Square 0.3496




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.78521 0.05360 14.65 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.00249 0.07109 0.04 0.9721 1.03711
LN_LAG_TOTALPAX 1 0.31837 0.03652 8.72 <.0001 1.30385
BANK_HOL 1 0.33006 0.09812 3.36 0.0008 1.08787
SUN 1 0.43451 0.04875 8.91 <.0001 1.33489
WED 1 -0.12881 0.06621 -1.95 0.0521 1.08239
AUG 1 -0.15520 0.06865 -2.26 0.0241 1.04458
SEP 1 -0.11924 0.07124 -1.67 0.0947 1.02629
NOV 1 0.19148 0.07363 2.60 0.0095 1.06051
Figure 85: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 9 91.24036 10.13782 26.19 <.0001
Error 649 251.1978 0.387054
Corrected Total 658 253.2535
Root MSE 0.62214 R-Square 0.26644




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.869665 0.079163 10.99 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -1.33870 0.517886 -2.58 0.0100
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.282734 0.047067 6.01 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.466992 0.132962 3.51 0.0005
SUN 1 0.658983 0.104165 6.33 <.0001
WED 1 -0.09646 0.086174 -1.12 0.2634
FRI 1 0.211004 0.095677 2.21 0.0278
AUG 1 -0.21119 0.087403 -2.42 0.0160
SEP 1 -0.14891 0.088744 -1.68 0.0938
NOV 1 0.313374 0.101923 3.07 0.0022
Figure 86: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 356
Number of Observations Used 356
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 8.40590 1.20084 5.51 <.0001
Error 348 75.85271 0.21797
Corrected Total 355 84.25861
Root MSE 0.46687 R-Square 0.0998




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.13398 0.05950 2.25 0.0250 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.08414 0.10335 0.81 0.4161 1.01000
WED 1 0.14553 0.08402 1.73 0.0841 1.59424
THU 1 0.32092 0.07930 4.05 <.0001 1.70803
FRI 1 0.27732 0.07834 3.54 0.0005 1.73069
SAT 1 0.30724 0.07854 3.91 0.0001 1.72359
AUG 1 -0.20409 0.10808 -1.89 0.0598 1.01158
NOV 1 0.25040 0.07884 3.18 0.0016 1.01242
Figure 87: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 7 8.768409 1.252630 5.65 <.0001
Error 348 77.09521 0.221538
Corrected Total 355 84.25861
Root MSE 0.47068 R-Square 0.10212




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.141260 0.060254 2.34 0.0196
LN_PRATIO 1 0.330890 0.218729 1.51 0.1312
WED 1 0.139658 0.084831 1.65 0.1006
THU 1 0.311323 0.080298 3.88 0.0001
FRI 1 0.273493 0.079034 3.46 0.0006
SAT 1 0.314397 0.079373 3.96 <.0001
AUG 1 -0.20332 0.108961 -1.87 0.0629
NOV 1 0.248387 0.079495 3.12 0.0019
Figure 88: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 1029
Number of Observations Used 1029
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 168.35868 14.02989 33.31 <.0001
Error 1016 427.87454 0.42114
Corrected Total 1028 596.23322
Root MSE 0.64895 R-Square 0.2824




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.90656 0.06154 14.73 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.04353 0.07013 0.62 0.5350 1.07538
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.13215 0.03095 4.27 <.0001 1.19430
PUBHOL 1 -0.82047 0.20329 -4.04 <.0001 1.06787
SUN 1 -0.60507 0.09351 -6.47 <.0001 1.37255
MON 1 -0.45228 0.08932 -5.06 <.0001 1.39783
WED 1 0.19248 0.06872 2.80 0.0052 1.70857
THU 1 0.16580 0.06708 2.47 0.0136 1.75387
FRI 1 0.27210 0.06926 3.93 <.0001 1.72093
SAT 1 -0.58565 0.08103 -7.23 <.0001 1.64058
AUG 1 -0.38369 0.08303 -4.62 <.0001 1.02532
NOV 1 0.16281 0.06885 2.36 0.0182 1.01608
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.23155 0.06367 3.64 0.0003 1.00996
Figure 89: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 12 184.5974 15.38311 6.64 <.0001
Error 1016 2355.080 2.317992
Corrected Total 1028 596.2332
Root MSE 1.52250 R-Square 0.07269




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.286931 0.203712 6.32 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 4.787753 1.799922 2.66 0.0079
LN_LAG_PAX 1 -0.02111 0.092871 -0.23 0.8203
PUBHOL 1 -1.57443 0.555515 -2.83 0.0047
SUN 1 -1.04694 0.275682 -3.80 0.0002
MON 1 -0.54845 0.212689 -2.58 0.0101
WED 1 0.148227 0.162081 0.91 0.3607
THU 1 0.189476 0.157624 1.20 0.2296
FRI 1 0.378127 0.167348 2.26 0.0241
SAT 1 -1.74883 0.478806 -3.65 0.0003
AUG 1 -0.65797 0.220639 -2.98 0.0029
NOV 1 0.213967 0.162670 1.32 0.1887
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.124125 0.154793 0.80 0.4228
Figure 90: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstAdvn’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 2
209
C.11 OLS and 2SLS Results for Inbound Trips, First Class Late Pur-
chases
In the following figures, for each classification group based on S atS tay and TimeS lot un-
der PoS =‘D’, MktS egType =‘FrstLate’, we first provide the results from the stepwise OLS




Number of Observations Read 1763
Number of Observations Used 1763
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 207.96616 14.85473 54.46 <.0001
Error 1748 476.81888 0.27278
Corrected Total 1762 684.78504
Root MSE 0.52228 R-Square 0.3037




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.13207 0.04929 2.68 0.0074 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.15121 0.03384 4.47 <.0001 1.08555
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.11993 0.02313 5.18 <.0001 1.36471
PUBHOL 1 0.22866 0.07976 2.87 0.0042 1.19877
RDD6 1 0.38501 0.03974 9.69 <.0001 1.02212
RDDINDEX 1 0.01049 0.00398 2.64 0.0084 1.07010
SUN 1 0.47163 0.04337 10.87 <.0001 2.36092
MON 1 0.31163 0.04314 7.22 <.0001 2.06816
WED 1 -0.11777 0.05173 -2.28 0.0229 1.54617
THU 1 -0.15946 0.05526 -2.89 0.0040 1.45246
FRI 1 -0.19627 0.05729 -3.43 0.0006 1.41799
SAT 1 -0.09813 0.05322 -1.84 0.0654 1.51923
AUG 1 -0.18176 0.04528 -4.01 <.0001 1.03160
NOV 1 0.12874 0.04297 3.00 0.0028 1.02314
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.09479 0.03117 3.04 0.0024 1.02248
Figure 91: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 202.5211 14.46580 51.54 <.0001
Error 1748 490.5669 0.280645
Corrected Total 1762 684.7850
Root MSE 0.52976 R-Square 0.29220




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.165989 0.273736 0.61 0.5443
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.08905 1.906684 -0.05 0.9628
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.122133 0.029259 4.17 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.249731 0.185739 1.34 0.1790
RDD6 1 0.392220 0.069973 5.61 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 0.005793 0.037485 0.15 0.8772
SUN 1 0.517686 0.368104 1.41 0.1598
MON 1 0.319542 0.076548 4.17 <.0001
WED 1 -0.10947 0.084208 -1.30 0.1938
THU 1 -0.15852 0.056556 -2.80 0.0051
FRI 1 -0.20384 0.083598 -2.44 0.0149
SAT 1 -0.09542 0.058089 -1.64 0.1006
AUG 1 -0.17951 0.049278 -3.64 0.0003
NOV 1 0.131358 0.048292 2.72 0.0066
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.090994 0.043690 2.08 0.0374
Hausman's Specification Test Results
Comparing To DF Statistic Pr > ChiSq
OLS 2SLS 14 0.65 1.0000
Figure 92: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 2374
Number of Observations Used 2374
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 1074.58092 76.75578 213.99 <.0001
Error 2359 846.14076 0.35869
Corrected Total 2373 1920.72168
Root MSE 0.59890 R-Square 0.5595




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 0.02484 0.04150 0.60 0.5496 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.32446 0.03821 8.49 <.0001 1.15402
PUBHOL 1 0.56376 0.07890 7.15 <.0001 1.12995
RDD6 1 0.42138 0.04052 10.40 <.0001 1.01292
RDDINDEX 1 0.04335 0.00389 11.14 <.0001 1.08874
SUN 1 1.11821 0.04515 24.77 <.0001 2.41954
MON 1 0.26491 0.03783 7.00 <.0001 1.35333
WED 1 -0.09969 0.04123 -2.42 0.0157 1.25595
THU 1 -0.08466 0.04015 -2.11 0.0351 1.27029
FEB 1 0.09880 0.04336 2.28 0.0228 1.04648
AUG 1 -0.12648 0.04402 -2.87 0.0041 1.05203
NOV 1 0.10498 0.04290 2.45 0.0145 1.04934
DEC 1 -0.10901 0.04469 -2.44 0.0148 1.04750
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.11167 0.03907 2.86 0.0043 1.01805
Figure 93: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=1, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 15 1051.464 70.09761 134.39 <.0001
Error 2358 1229.901 0.521587
Corrected Total 2373 1920.722
Root MSE 0.72221 R-Square 0.46089




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 0.250279 0.098676 2.54 0.0113
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.93068 0.464687 -2.00 0.0453
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.199293 0.024025 8.30 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 0.802881 0.128943 6.23 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.451558 0.050091 9.01 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 0.013669 0.011901 1.15 0.2509
SUN 1 1.418188 0.122885 11.54 <.0001
MON 1 0.363235 0.058335 6.23 <.0001
WED 1 -0.10320 0.049729 -2.08 0.0381
THU 1 -0.06152 0.049272 -1.25 0.2120
FEB 1 0.119872 0.053251 2.25 0.0245
JUL 1 0.130405 0.063253 2.06 0.0394
AUG 1 -0.01364 0.066801 -0.20 0.8382
NOV 1 0.119380 0.052485 2.27 0.0230
DEC 1 -0.06719 0.056119 -1.20 0.2314
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.137369 0.048086 2.86 0.0043
Figure 94: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=1,





Number of Observations Read 2347
Number of Observations Used 2347
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 16 445.98877 27.87430 65.50 <.0001
Error 2330 991.55167 0.42556
Corrected Total 2346 1437.54044
Root MSE 0.65235 R-Square 0.3102




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 1.16159 0.05560 20.89 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.24365 0.06149 3.96 <.0001 1.02629
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.13500 0.02019 6.69 <.0001 1.40523
PUBHOL 1 -0.32491 0.12639 -2.57 0.0102 1.03844
RDD6 1 0.42679 0.04441 9.61 <.0001 1.04614
RDD7 1 0.31557 0.04667 6.76 <.0001 1.04521
RDD1 1 -0.48009 0.05212 -9.21 <.0001 1.39544
RDDINDEX 1 -0.07476 0.00522 -14.33 <.0001 1.64081
SUN 1 -0.62287 0.06319 -9.86 <.0001 1.16890
MON 1 -0.22570 0.04748 -4.75 <.0001 1.24123
WED 1 0.21613 0.04197 5.15 <.0001 1.29025
THU 1 0.27547 0.04111 6.70 <.0001 1.31766
FRI 1 0.24301 0.04095 5.93 <.0001 1.32835
MAY 1 -0.10473 0.04797 -2.18 0.0291 1.03383
JUL 1 -0.16532 0.04622 -3.58 0.0004 1.03317
AUG 1 -0.49807 0.06099 -8.17 <.0001 1.06555
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.10949 0.03761 2.91 0.0036 1.03220
Figure 95: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 1
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 17 441.5164 25.97156 33.77 <.0001
Error 2329 1791.138 0.769059
Corrected Total 2346 1437.540
Root MSE 0.87696 R-Square 0.19775




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 1.154914 0.100915 11.44 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 2.918608 3.325354 0.88 0.3802
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.125502 0.029568 4.24 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -0.31740 0.182576 -1.74 0.0823
RDD6 1 0.454080 0.072502 6.26 <.0001
RDD7 1 0.304381 0.064242 4.74 <.0001
RDD1 1 -0.37470 0.152969 -2.45 0.0144
RDDINDEX 1 -0.06373 0.015588 -4.09 <.0001
SUN 1 -0.39805 0.340359 -1.17 0.2423
MON 1 -0.25900 0.073002 -3.55 0.0004
WED 1 0.171673 0.066595 2.58 0.0100
THU 1 0.246194 0.066231 3.72 0.0002
FRI 1 0.189552 0.067686 2.80 0.0051
SAT 1 0.177909 0.316518 0.56 0.5741
MAY 1 -0.07374 0.074554 -0.99 0.3228
JUL 1 -0.09460 0.105793 -0.89 0.3713
AUG 1 -0.40206 0.144543 -2.78 0.0055
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.170266 0.089430 1.90 0.0570
Figure 96: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=0,





Number of Observations Read 3374
Number of Observations Used 3374
Analysis of Variance
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 14 2632.89998 188.06428 202.29 <.0001
Error 3359 3122.77364 0.92967
Corrected Total 3373 5755.67362
Root MSE 0.96420 R-Square 0.4574




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Inflation
Intercept 1 2.53941 0.06686 37.98 <.0001 0
LN_PRATIO 1 0.17883 0.05487 3.26 0.0011 1.07094
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.11860 0.01654 7.17 <.0001 1.65788
PUBHOL 1 -1.41363 0.13009 -10.87 <.0001 1.07274
RDD6 1 0.76544 0.05872 13.04 <.0001 1.03195
RDD7 1 0.56284 0.06177 9.11 <.0001 1.02285
RDDINDEX 1 -0.09339 0.00511 -18.28 <.0001 1.14436
SUN 1 -1.57695 0.06167 -25.57 <.0001 1.48593
MON 1 -0.44016 0.05330 -8.26 <.0001 1.16448
WED 1 0.08855 0.04983 1.78 0.0757 1.13394
SAT 1 -1.41195 0.05803 -24.33 <.0001 1.40195
FEB 1 0.10118 0.05968 1.70 0.0901 1.02520
AUG 1 -0.62401 0.06143 -10.16 <.0001 1.06572
DEC 1 -0.18208 0.05904 -3.08 0.0021 1.03086
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.39479 0.06091 6.48 <.0001 1.01720
Figure 97: Stepwise OLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’,
S atS tay=0, TimeS lot = 2
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Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 15 2628.637 175.2425 177.25 <.0001
Error 3358 3320.060 0.988702
Corrected Total 3373 5755.674
Root MSE 0.99433 R-Square 0.44188




Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept 1 2.505910 0.069932 35.83 <.0001
LN_PRATIO 1 -0.62072 0.264879 -2.34 0.0192
LN_LAG_PAX 1 0.117277 0.017065 6.87 <.0001
PUBHOL 1 -1.35211 0.135555 -9.97 <.0001
RDD6 1 0.750895 0.060748 12.36 <.0001
RDD7 1 0.574887 0.063824 9.01 <.0001
RDDINDEX 1 -0.09881 0.005553 -17.79 <.0001
SUN 1 -1.41761 0.081846 -17.32 <.0001
MON 1 -0.43071 0.055110 -7.82 <.0001
WED 1 0.086193 0.051401 1.68 0.0937
SAT 1 -1.33061 0.065347 -20.36 <.0001
FEB 1 0.132984 0.062617 2.12 0.0338
AUG 1 -0.60262 0.063977 -9.42 <.0001
NOV 1 -0.01746 0.063320 -0.28 0.7828
DEC 1 -0.20598 0.062019 -3.32 0.0009
LN_AVGCONN 1 0.467800 0.067104 6.97 <.0001
Figure 98: 2SLS Estimation Results for PoS =‘D’, MktS egType=‘FrstLate’, S atS tay=0,
TimeS lot = 2
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